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The Default Provisions of Revised Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part II
By Timothy R. Zinnecker*

REVISED SECTION 9-615: APPLICATION OF PROCEEDS
OF DISPOSITION; LIABILITY FOR DEFICIENCY AND
RIGHT TO SURPLUS
Under current Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Article 9, a creditor
applies proceeds received from a collateral disposition according to a fourstep payment scheme.' Revised Article 9 prescribes a five-step payment
scheme that resembles-but does not mirror-its predecessor. Revised section 9-615 codifies the new payment scheme.2
Like its predecessor, revised section 9-615 initially permits a creditor to
recover its reasonable expenses incurred in retaking, holding, and disposing
*Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. David G. Epstein, Steve H. Nickles,
Donald J. Rapson, Steven 0. Weise, and Robert A. Zadek were extremely generous with
their time, reviewing and offering many insightful comments on earlier drafts. Two of my
favorite students, Trang-Dai Vu Hoang and William Scott Youngblood, provided invaluable
research assistance. My employer graciously provided a research stipend.
Please note that The Default Provisions of Revised Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part
Iappeared in the May 1999 issue of The Business Lawyer. When citing to provisions of revised
Article 9, Part II of this article uses a "1998" reference to be consistent with the citation
form used in Part I. The official publication date of revised Article 9 is 1999. Both parts of
this article cite to the official text and comments and not to text or comments merely in draft
form, except where "Draft" is specifically cited.
1. See U.C.C. § 9-504(1), (2) (1995).
2. The payment scheme analyzed in this section is codified in revised U.C.C. section 9615(a), which applies only to cash proceeds. A creditor that receives noncash proceeds, such
as a promissory note, is under no obligation to apply the proceeds unless the failure to do so
is commercially unreasonable; a creditor that applies noncash proceeds must do so in a
commercially reasonable manner. See id. § 9-615(c) and cmt. 3 (1998). The duties imposed
by revised § 9-615(c) cannot be waived or varied. See id. § 9-602(4). However, the creditor
and the debtor may contractually agree on the application of noncash proceeds through
terms that are not manifestly unreasonable. See id. § 9-615 cmt. 3; see also Timothy R. Zinnecker The Default Provisions of Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part I, 54 Bus.
LAW. 1113, 1139 nn.159-67 and accompanying text (1999).
A creditor's decision to forego applying noncash proceeds was not expressly subject to a
commercial reasonableness test until late in the drafting process. Compare U.C.C. § 9-615(c)
(DraftJuly 24-31, 1998) ("A secured party need not apply or pay over for application noncash
proceeds of disposition under this section." ), with id. § 9-615(c) (Draft approved at NCCUSL
Annual Meeting, July 30, 1998) (adding "unless the failure to do so would be commercially
unreasonable" to the end of sentence).
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of the collateral, 3 such as out-of-pocket payments made to a repossession
company, a storage facility, or an auctioneer. Additionally, a creditor can
reimburse itself for reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses, but only
to the extent provided for by agreement and not prohibited by law.4 A
secured party should revise its loan documents accordingly
Like current section 9-504, revised section 9-615 next permits the creditor to apply the proceeds against the debt secured by the disposed collateral. 5 This permits a creditor to apply proceeds to multiple debts if those
debts are secured by the disposed collateral; otherwise, the creditor cannot
6
apply the proceeds to other obligations of the debtor.
In many cases the proceeds will not completely extinguish the unpaid
7
debt, leaving the creditor with a deficiency claim against the debtor. Oc3. See U.C.C. § 9-615(a)(1) (1998); id. § 9-504(l)(a) (1995); see also Contrail LeasingPartners,
Ltd. v. Consolidated Airways, Inc., 742 E2d 1095, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding
creditor was entitled to recover reasonable expenses of $26,143.77 incurred in rebuilding
aircraft propellers); CIT Corp. v. Nielson Logging Co., 706 P2d 967, 969-70 (Or. Ct. App.
1985) (holding creditor can recover commercially reasonable costs even if the sale itself is
not commercially reasonable). But see Ford & Vlahos v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 23 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 175, 184-87 (Ct. App. 1993) (affirming trial court's decision to disallow all but
$82,743 of over $400,000 spent to repossess and refurbish repossessed aircraft where creditor
failed to provide adequate documentation of costs); West Des Moines State Bank v. Ralph's
Distrib. Co., 516 N.W2d 801, 802 (Iowa 1994) (reducing bank's judgment against debtor by
excessive liquidation expenses of $137,000); Imperial Discount Corp. v. Aiken, 238 N.YS.2d
269, 270-71 (Civ. Ct. 1963) (concluding unpaid debt of $11.75 made creditor's fees and
expenses of $128.80 oppressive, confiscatory, and unconscionable); Hall v. Crocker Equip.
Leasing, Inc., 737 S.W2d 1, 2-4 (Tex. App. 1987, writ denied) (holding proof that expenditures were necessary to transport, repair, store, and insure repossessed helicopter did not
necessarily mean that charges of $132,344.79 were reasonable).
4. See U.C.C. § 9-615(a)(1) (1998); id. § 9-504(l)(a) (1995); see also Wilson Leasing Co. v.
Seaway Pharmacal Corp., 220 N.W2d 83, 87-88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (permitting creditor
to recover reasonable attorneys' fees in light of U.C.C. § 9-504(l)(a) and contract provision).
But see White v. Associates Commercial Corp., 725 S.W2d 7, 9-10 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding contractual provision permitting recovery of attorneys' fees was not enforceable
under Arkansas statute prohibiting recovery of attorneys' fees except in lawsuits on promissory notes); First Nat'l Bank v. Schroeder, 355 N.W2d 780, 782-83 (Neb. 1984) (concluding
contract provision requiring debtor to pay attorneys' fees was contrary to public policy, void,
and unenforceable); First Bank v. Haberer Dairy & Farm Equip., Inc., 412 N.W2d 866, 87475 (S.D. 1987) (ruling state statute permitting attorneys' fees in cases only if "specifically
provided by statute" did not authorize award under U.C.C. § 9-504(l)(a)); cf KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 16a-2-507 (1995) (limiting enforceability of attorneys' fee clauses in consumer credit
transactions).
5. U.C.C. § 9-615(a)(2) (1998); id. § 9-504(l)(b) (1995).
6. See, e.g., In re Russell, 165 B.R. 262, 263 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994) (concluding bank's
failure to properly cross-collateralize truck loan and camper loan prevented bank from applying surplus proceeds from sale of camper against deficiency resulting from sale of truck);
Wilson Leasing, 220 N.W2d at 89-90 (concluding proceeds from dispositions of distinct collateral items pledged pursuant to distinct security agreements were to be applied separately;
creditor had no discretion in applying proceeds to debts as each security interest secured but
one debt).
7. Generally the debtor is liable for any deficiency if the creditor has disposed of the
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casionally, however, some proceeds remain. Under current law, these excess proceeds are applied to reduce debt of other parties, subject to several
requirements. First, the debt must be encumbered by a security interest in
the collateral; 8 unsecured debts, and debts secured by an encumbrance
other than a security interest, such as a judgment lien, are ineligible. 9
Second, the security interest must be subordinate to the interest under
which the disposition is made; interests that enjoy priority or share equal
rank do not qualify.' 0 And third, the creditor that disposes of the collateral
must receive a written demand for excess proceeds from the junior creditor
before the proceeds are completely distributed. 1
Revised section 9-615 has adopted current section 9-504(l)(c), with some
modifications. The debt to be paid with excess proceeds still must be secured
by an interest in the disposed collateral, but that interest can be either a
security interest or a lien. 12 The competing property interest must be subordinate to the security interest under which the disposition is made, 13 but
the subordinate property interest must enjoy priority over the competing

collateral in accordance with the rules of Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-504(2)(1995); id. § 9615(d)(2) (1998). An exception exists when the underlying transaction involved the sale of
certain assets to the secured party. See id. § 9-504(2) (1995); id. § 9-615(e)(2) (1998).
8. See id. § 9-504(l)(c) (1995).
9. But see BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 4.06[3], at 4-99 (rev. ed. 1993 & Supp. 1998) ("It is unfortunate
that [§9-504(l)(c)] gives junior judgment creditors no protection."); 2 GRANT GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.8, at 1250 (1965) (suggesting that "the

reference [to 'security interests'] should be read broadly to include ... liens"); C. Edward
Dobbs, Enforcement of Article 9 Security Interests-Why So Much Deference to the JuniorSecured Party?,
28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 131, 138 (1994) (contending that the payment scheme of § 9-504(1)
triggers a "palpably unfair" result for the holder of a lien that is subordinate to the security
interest of the foreclosing creditor but senior to a junior security interest). Cf U.C.C. § 9504(4) (indicating that disposition terminates "any security interest or lien subordinate
thereto") (emphasis added).
10. See U.C.C. § 9-504(l)(c). Debts secured by subordinate security interests are eligible
for payment because the disposition terminates those interests; non-junior interests survive
disposition, so holders of those interests have no need of monetary protection. See id. § 9504(4). This statutory protection may ring hollow if the senior creditor cannot locate either
the purchaser or the collateral-a distinct possibility if the creditor does not receive notice
of the disposition. See Dobbs, supra note 9, at 140. Under current law, a senior creditor is
entitled to notice only if the foreclosing creditor has received timely written notice of the
senior interest. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
11. See U.C.C. § 9-504(l)(c). The creditor may ignore the written demand for excess proceeds if the junior creditor fails to timely furnish the creditor with reasonable proof of the
subordinate interest. Id.
12. See id. § 9-615(a)(3) (1998); see also PEB STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE ARTICLE 9, at 215 (1992) [hereinafter PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT] (recommending

that any holder of a subordinate property interest should be entitled to receive excess proceeds if the holder has given the foreclosing creditor a timely written demand).
13. See U.C.C. § 9-615(a)(3).
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interest of any consignor. 14 Although the creditor may have knowledge of
the subordinate property interest and may have sent notice of the disposition to the holder of that interest, 15 the foreclosing creditor need not
disgorge excess proceeds to the holder of the subordinate property interest
unless the foreclosing creditor has timely received an authenticated de16
mand for the excess proceeds from the holder of that property interest.
As a general rule under both current and revised Article 9, the debtor
is entitled to any surplus proceeds. 17 Under current law, the debtor is not

14. See id. § 9-615(a)(3)(B). If a consignor has an interest in the disposed collateral that is
not junior to the subordinate interests of secured creditors or lienholders, then the consignor
is entitled to the excess proceeds (regardless of the priority of its interest against the security
interest held by the foreclosing creditor) if the foreclosing creditor has timely received an
authenticated demand from the consignor. See id. § 9-615(a)(4). The statute does not require
the consignor to comply with a request by the foreclosing creditor for reasonable proof of
the consignor's interest unless the consignor's interest is subordinate to the interest of the
foreclosing creditor. See id. § 9-615(b). This may be a drafting oversight. Fairness to all concerned parties dictates that the foreclosing creditor should be entitled to demand proof of a
consignor's interest (regardless of its priority) in the foreclosing collateral before disbursing
excess funds to that person. Nor does the statute expressly state how excess proceeds should
be applied if all of the following conditions are present: (i) a consignor has an interest in the
disposed collateral that is subordinate to the interest of the foreclosing creditor (or, alternatively, the consignor's interest is not subordinate but the foreclosing creditor never timely
receives the consignor's authenticated demand for payment), (ii) a secured party (or lienholder) has a security interest (lien) in the disposed collateral that is subordinate to the interest
of the foreclosing creditor, (iii) the consignor's interest is senior to the interest of the subordinate secured party (lienholder), and (iv) if the consignor's interest is subordinate to the
interest of the foreclosing creditor, the consignor fails to timely comply with the foreclosing
creditor's request for reasonable proof of the consignor's interest. The foreclosing creditor
can avoid paying excess proceeds to the subordinate secured party (lienholder) under revised
§ 9-615(a)(3)(B), the consignor with an interest not subordinate to the foreclosing creditor's
interest under revised § 9-615(a)(4), and the consignor with an interest subordinate to the
foreclosing creditor's interest under revised § 9-615(b). Following the payment scheme, the
foreclosing creditor should remit excess proceeds to the debtor under revised § 9-615(d)(1).
Because the interests of the subordinate security interests and liens are terminated by the
disposition, see revised § 9-617(a)(3), a more equitable payment scheme would permit the
foreclosing creditor to remit excess proceeds to the holders of those subordinate security
interests and liens if a consignor has an interest in the disposed collateral but fails to satisfy
the conditions of revised §§ 9-615(a)(4) or 9-615(b).
15. See id. § 9-611 (c)(3).
16. See id. § 9-615(a)(3)(A); see also id. § 9-102(a)(7) (defining "authenticate"). The foreclosing creditor is entitled to request reasonable proof of the subordinate security interest or
lien. Failure by the holder of that interest or lien to timely comply with the request relieves
the creditor from honoring the holder's demand for proceeds. See id. § 9-615(b).
17. Id. § 9-615(d)(1); id. § 9-504(2) (1995); see also Bill Fitts Auto Sales, Inc. v. Daniels, 922
S.W2d 718, 720-21 (Ark. 1996) (affirming trial court's judgment awarding surplus proceeds
to debtor). This duty to account for surplus proceeds is (under current Article 9) and remains
(under revised Article 9) a duty that cannot be waived or varied. See U.C.C. § 9-501(3)(a)
(1995); id. § 9-602(5) (1998).
Under current Article 9, if the creditor knows that a party other than the debtor owned
the collateral, then the owner-rather than the debtor-is entitled to the surplus proceeds.
See id. §§9-112, 9-504 cmt. 2 (1995). This provision is necessary because current U.C.C. § 9-
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entitled to surplus proceeds resulting from the creditor's disposition of
accounts or chattel paper that the creditor has purchased from the debtor
unless their security agreement so provides.18 Revised section 9-615 continues this exception in modified form. As revised, the creditor need not
remit to the debtor any surplus proceeds resulting from the disposition of
accounts or chattel paper or-as the result of the expanded scope of
revised Article 919-payment intangibles or promissory notes sold by the
debtor to the creditor.20 Unlike current section 9-502(2), which permits
the parties to contractually override the exception, revised section 9-615
does not specifically permit contrary agreement. However, revised section
9-615(e) (the statutory address for this exception) is not referenced among
the numerous statutes listed in revised section 9-602 (the "anti-waiver"

provision).2 1 Therefore, language expressly permitting parties to contract

around the exception is not necessary and, in light of revised section 9602, would be redundant.
In those instances where proceeds remain after the foreclosing creditor
has paid its reasonable expenses and its debt, the payment scheme may
raise questions for the foreclosing creditor that are not easily answered.
How does the creditor determine whether a security interest or lien is
junior to its own interest? How does it resolve the priority of multiple (but
allegedly subordinate) security interests or liens? And what if the debtor
disputes the amount owed to the other secured creditors or lienholders or
the validity of the security interest or lien? Revised section 9-615 offers
no guidance. 22 Presumably a creditor would not violate its disbursement

obligations by depositing the excess proceeds into court and bringing an
23
interpleader action against all interested parties.

105(l)(d) defines "debtor" in a manner that includes parties without a property interest in
the collateral. As revised U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(28) defines "debtor" in a more restrictive manner,
revised Article 9 has no provision comparable to current U.C.C. § 9-112.
In many transactions, the proceeds will not satisfy the foreclosing creditor's expenses and
debt, leaving the creditor with a deficiency. Under current Article 9, the "debtor" remains
liable for any deficiency. See id. § 9-504(2). Under revised Article 9, the liability falls on any
"obligor" (who may not be a "debtor"). See id. § 9-615(d)(2) (1998); see also id. § 9-102(a)(28)
& (59) (defining "debtor" and "obligor," respectively).
18. See id. § 9-504(2) (1995); see also id. § 9-102(1)(b) (including within the scope of current
Article 9 the sale of accounts and chattel paper).
19. See id. § 9-109(a)(3) (1998); see also DonaldJ. Rapson, "Receivables" Financing UnderRevised
Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 136-40 (1999) (discussing expansion).
20. See U.C.C. § 9-615(e)(1).
21. Cf § 9-602(4) (referencing revised § 9-615(c)); id. § 9-602(5) (referencing revised § 9615(d)); id. § 9-602(8) (referencing revised § 9-615()).
22. Cf PEB STuDY GROUP REPORT, supranote 12, at 216 (recommending that the official
comments provide a safe harbor for a secured party that disburses disposition proceeds in
good faith).
23. Cf N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-9-504.1, -504.2 (1997) (permitting a secured party to tender
any surplus to a court clerk who may institute a special proceeding to determine ownership).
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Noticeably excluded from the current and revised payment schemes as
a potential recipient is any creditor whose interest in the collateral is not
24
junior to the interest of the foreclosing creditor. There is a reason that
the payment scheme makes a priority-based distinction: the interest of a
junior creditor is terminated when the collateral is disposed, but the interest of a non-junior creditor survives the disposition.2 5 Nevertheless, this
point has eluded courts in the past. 26 Revised section 9-615 should reduce,
if not eliminate, this confusion. 27 Under subsection (g), a foreclosing creditor can retain cash proceeds free of non-junior property interests (whether
24. An early draft of Article 9 expressly provided for payment of proceeds to holders of
senior security interests and liens before all other interests, including the interest under which
the disposition occurred, but the provision never became part of the official text. See Steve
H. Nickles, Rights and Remedies Between UCC. Article 9 Secured Parties with Conflicting Security
Interests in Goods, 68 IowA L. REV. 217, 242-44 (1983) (discussing drafting history of § 9-504).
25. See U.C.C. § 9-617(a)(3) (1998); id. § 9-504(4) (1995). This statutory protection offers
little solace if the non-junior creditor is not informed of the disposition or cannot locate
either the purchaser or the collateral. Revised Article 9 reduces this likelihood by expanding
the list of parties to whom the foreclosing creditor must send its disposition notice. Compare
id. § 9-611 (c) (1998) (requiring notice to certain creditors that have either provided the foreclosing creditor with written notice of a competing interest or perfected the competing interest by filing a financing statement or complying with other law), with id. § 9-504(3) (1995)
(requiring notice to certain creditors that have provided the foreclosing creditor with written
notice of a competing interest).
26. See, e.g., Stotts v. Johnson, 791 S.W2d 351, 352-53 (Ark. 1990) (relying on priority
provisions of current Article 9 to conclude that a senior secured creditor has a claim to
proceeds of a sale conducted by a junior secured creditor); Delaware Truck Sales, Inc. v.
Wilson, 618 A.2d 303, 308 (NJ. 1993) (relying on U.C.C. § 9-306(2) to hold that absent
countervailing considerations a senior secured creditor could require ajunior secured creditor
to disgorge proceeds from collection of accounts receivable); Roemer & Zeller, Inc. v. Ace
Transmission Center, Inc., 454 N.YS.2d 377, 378 (1982) (noting that althoughjunior creditor
had right to replevy and sell inventory, senior creditor would enjoy priority in any sale
proceeds); Consolidated Equip. Sales, Inc. v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 627 P.2d 432,
438 (Okla. 1981) (relying on U.C.C. §§ 9-312(5) and 9-306(2) to hold that junior secured
creditor had obligation to tender sales proceeds to senior secured creditor and that failure to
do so amounted to conversion). But see Continental Bank, N.A. v. Krebs, 540 N.E.2d 1023,
1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding senior creditor was not entitled to proceeds of disposition
conducted by junior creditor); Chadron Energy Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 459 N.W2d 718,
731-32 (Neb. 1990) (concluding junior secured creditor was not guilty of conversion for
retaining proceeds from disposition without first applying them to debt secured by senior
security interests); 4JAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 34-10, at 433-34 (4th ed. 1995) (observing that the "drafters plainly knew the difference between senior and junior claimants" and expressing disbelief that failure to reference a senior
claimant's rights to proceeds in the distribution scheme was "inadvertent"); Cynthia Starnes,
U C.C. Section 9-504 Sales By Junior Secured Parties:Is A Senior Party Entitled To NoticeAnd Proceeds?,
52 U. PrIr. L. REV. 563,583-88 (1991) (criticizing court decisions permitting senior creditors
to share in sale proceeds received by junior creditor). See generally Nickles, supra note 24, at
241-56 (analyzing the propriety of a senior secured creditor's claim to proceeds).
27. The PEB Study Group recognized this confusion and recommended that § 9-504
explicitly permit a junior secured party to dispose of collateral and retain and apply proceeds
without regard for any senior security interests. See PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note
12, at 218-19.
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in the form of a security interest or a lien), is not obligated to apply the
proceeds to the debt secured by those property interests, and is not required to pay any surplus proceeds to any holder of such a property interest. 28 However, the foreclosing creditor cannot invoke subsection (g)
unless it receives the cash proceeds "in good faith and without knowledge
that the receipt violates the rights of the holder" of the property interest. 29
Hopefully, courts will not conclude that the foreclosing creditor has acquired the adverse knowledge merely because evidence reveals that the
creditor knew that the competing property interest existed (e.g., through
30
the discovery of a financing statement); that conclusion is erroneous.
A related issue not expressly addressed by revised section 9-615 is
whether a secured creditor, holding a security interest that is not subordinate to the security interest held by the foreclosing secured creditor, can
claim that its security interest attaches to any surplus proceeds that are
remitted to the debtor. A secured creditor retains a security interest in
identifiable proceeds "[e]xcept as otherwise provided" by revised Article

9 (and section 2-403(2)).31 Assuming that the proceeds remain identifiable,
the secured creditor may argue that its security interest extends to the
surplus in the debtor's hands because revised section 9-615 does not, in
clear language, "otherwise provide."' 32 However, that result would seem to
28. See U.C.C. § 9 -615(g) (1998).
29. Id.; see also id. § 9-102(a)(43) (defining "good faith"); id. § 1-201(24) (1995) (stating when
a person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact).
30. One need only look to the definition, and rights, of a "buyer in ordinary course of
business," to recognize the distinction between knowledge of the competing property interest
and knowledge of a violation of the rights of the holder of that property interest. See id. § 1201(9) (1998) (defining "buyer in ordinary course of business" as a person "without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person"); id. § 9-320(a) (indicating that a
buyer in the ordinary course of business acquires the goods free of a security interest even
if the buyer knows that the security interest exists); id. § 9-320 cmt. 3 (clarifying the distinction
between knowledge of a security interest and knowledge of a violation of third-party rights);
see also id. § 9-307 cmt. 2 (1995) (making same distinction); id. § 9-402 cmt.2 (indicating that
a financing statement "indicates merely that the secured party who has filed may have a
security interest") (emphasis added). Query whether a senior secured party could provide the
requisite adverse knowledge by filing a financing statement that states "SECURITY INTERESTS
GRANTED IN FAVOR OF, AND RETENTION OF PROCEEDS IN ANY FORM BY, ANY OTHER
PARTY VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE SECURED PARTY IDENTIFIED HEREIN." See DonaldJ.

Rapson, Default and Enforcement of Security Interests Under Revised Article 9, CHI.-KENT LJ.(forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 24-25, on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland
School of Law) (discussing use of so-called "bulletin board" financing statements).
31. See U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(2) (1998); cf id. § 9-306(2) (1995) (extending a secured party's
interest to identifiable proceeds "[e]xcept where this Article otherwise provides").
32. There is judicial and scholarly precedent for this proposition under current Article 9.
See, e.g., Chadron Energy Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 459 N.W2d 718, 733 (Neb. 1990) ( "[1f
the disposition of the collateral by ajunior secured party produces a surplus which the debtor
is entitled to receive pursuant to § 9-504(2), such proceeds are subject to the continuing
security interest of the senior secured party"); Nickles, supra note 24, at 241-42 n.86, 245
n. 103, and 254; Starnes, supra note 26, at 586 n.1 10 and 587. Cf 9 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND
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violate the spirit of the payment scheme of revised section 9-615, which
excludes those very creditors from the list of potential recipients. It makes
little sense to expressly exclude a party from a payment scheme if that
same party can recover the payment via another statutory avenue. Nevertheless, a provision or comment on this issue would have been welcome.

33

Normally a foreclosing creditor has every incentive to maximize disposition proceeds. As Judge Easterbrook observed:
[W]hy shouldn't they maximize? Even if the secured party could be
assured of a judgment for the full deficiency, why would it forgo a
dollar today for the chance to enforce a deficiency judgment tomorrow? ... [The secured party will expend every cost-justified effort
because it prefers money now to judgment later. ...

Add the uncer-

tainty of recovery in litigation and this preference for cash grows
stronger. That the debtor has defaulted is an indication that it is
unlikely to be good for all of any judgment the creditor is able to
get.

34

What the foregoing passage fails to acknowledge is that a secured party
may, after conducting a disposition that satisfies the procedural requirements of commercial reasonableness, calculate its deficiency claim by using an unreasonable sales price. For example, Seller repossesses equipment
following Debtor's default on a $100,000 debt. Seller paints and cleans
the equipment and advertises the disposition in all of the appropriate
ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-306:03, at 37 (1997) (indicating, under

the "except" clause of U.C.C. § 9-306(2), that a secured party's interest in proceeds may be
subject to the interest of other parties under specific list of sections that does not include
U.C.C. § 9-504).
33. Guidance on this issue was requested in the Memorandum from Timothy R. Zinnecker, Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law, to Steven L. Harris & Charles
Mooney, Jr. (Sept. 2, 1998) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School
of Law) [hereinafter Zinnecker Memorandum]. Louisiana has addressed the issue by defining
"proceeds" in a manner that excludes "receipts that are derived from the disposition of
collateral by a secured party by way of public or private sale under R.S. 10:9-504 or by
judicial sale pursuant to applicable law." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-306(1) (West Supp. 1997).
34. In re Excello Press, Inc., 890 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Huntington Nat'l
Bank v. Elkins, 559 N.E.2d 456, 459 (Ohio 1990) ("Given the economic realities of the
lending industry, a secured creditor will generally attempt to obtain the highest possible price
for the collateral since the recovery of a deficiency judgment against a defaulted debtor is
usually dubious."); EdwardJ. Heiser, Jr. & RobertJ. Flemma,Jr., Consumer Issues in the Article
9 Revision Project: The Perspective of Consumer Lenders, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q REP. 488, 495
(1994) (contending that a secured creditor has every incentive to maximize disposition proceeds "because every dollar sacrificed on the sale of collateral becomes an unsecured claim
against a debtor who is necessarily a bad risk by virtue of his default"); Richard B. Wagner,
Commentary: Proposed Consumer Changes to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Would Adversely
Affect Consumer Credit, 50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q REP. 92, 93 (1996) (noting "the powerful
incentives that creditors have to maximize recovery from the sale of collateral given the
uncertainty of collection of deficiencies").
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newspapers and trade journals. Seller has the equipment appraised at
$75,000, but because the equipment will be sold at foreclosure, Seller
realistically expects a successful bid somewhere between $55,000 and
$65,000. Seller conducts a public sale at a convenient time and place.
Although all procedural aspects of the sale are commercially reasonable,
no serious buyers attend the public sale other than Seller, who bids
$10,000. Two weeks later, Seller sells the equipment to a dealer for
$60,000. Soon thereafter, Seller sues Debtor for a $90,000 deficiency

($100,000 debt minus a $10,000 credit from the foreclosure sale 35). If all
procedural aspects of the foreclosure sale were commercially reasonable,
must Debtor accept Seller's calculation of a $90,000 deficiency claim?
The answer is found in revised section 9-615(f), which permits a debtor
(or obligor) to challenge the amount of the deficiency claim.3 6 Revised
section 9-615(f) provides a special formula for calculating a surplus or
deficiency resulting from selected collateral dispositions. 3 7 The special formula does not subject a secured party's disposition to judicial scrutiny if the
procedures are commercially reasonable. But it does place the spotlight on
the amount of proceeds used by the secured party to calculate its deficiency
claim. And if the spotlight reveals that the secured party calculated its
deficiency claim by using an unreasonably low amount of proceeds, the
deficiency is recalculated by using the amount of proceeds that would have
been realized in a commercially reasonable disposition to a party other
than the secured party, a party related to the secured party, or a secondary

obligor.

38

Focusing attention on any aspect of a collateral disposition may
displease a foreclosing creditor, but several reasons should mitigate a
creditor's expected disfavor with revised section 9-615(f). First, the
provision applies only if a secured party disposes of collateral to itself, a "person related to" the secured party,3 9 or a secondary obli-

35. "When the secured party 'bids in' the collateral it does not pay money; rather it just
allows a credit against the outstanding debt. That is called a credit bid." DonaldJ. Rapson,
Deficient Treatment of Deficiency Claims: Gilmore Would Have Repented, 75 WASH. U. L.Q 491, 497
n.22 (1997); see also 2 GILMORE, supra note 9, § 43.2, at 1188-89 (noting that "the person
who buys at the sale today, nine times out of ten, is not our hero, the good faith purchaser
for value, but the holder of the security interest who pays not in cash but by a credit against
the debt").
36. See U.C.C. § 9-615(l) (1998). This statutory provision cannot be waived or varied. See
id. § 9-602(8).
37. See id. § 9-615 cmt.6.
38. See id. § 9-615(). Mr. Rapson, a member of the drafting committee, is most responsible
for the formula that is codified at subsection (f). He recounts his efforts to persuade the
drafting committee to adopt the formula in Rapson, supra note 35, at 512-36. Already subsection (f) is being referred to as "the Rapson Rule." See Barkley Clark & Barbara Clark,
Special Report: New Article 9, 31 UCC L.J. 243, 257 (1999).
39. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(62) (defining "person related to" an individual); id. § 9-102(a)(63)
(defining "person related to" an organization). The definitions are patterned after
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gor;40 it does not apply to all dispositions. 4 1 Second, the provision applies
only if the secured party's calculation utilizes an amount of proceeds that
falls significantly42 below the range of proceeds that would have been realized
from a disposition to a party outside the three classes; it does not apply
merely because the disposition failed to yield a credit that approximates
an amount that the debtor perceives is the approximate fair market value
of the collateral. 43 Third, the burden of proof under revised section 9615(f) rests not on the secured party but on the party challenging the
deficiency calculation. 44 And fourth, a similar rule already exists under
real estate law

45

REVISED SECTION 9-616: EXPLANATION OF
CALCULATION OF SURPLUS OR DEFICIENCY
Sometime after it has disposed of the collateral, the secured creditor
will return any surplus to, or, more likely, demand payment of any deficiency from, the appropriate party. Revised section 9-616, which has no
predecessor under current Article 9, imposes a duty on a secured creditor
46
to provide that party, in selected situations, with certain information.
UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE 1974 § 1.301(32), 7A U.L.A. 48-49 (1985) (defining "person related to").
40. What appears to be a disposition to a secondary obligor may not be treated as a
"disposition." See U.C.C. § 9-618, discussed infra notes 99-132 and accompanying text.
41. See U.C.C. § 9-615(l)(1).
42. History suggests that such an imprecise term encourages litigation that may not produce consistent results. For example, current § 9-302(1)(e) provides a secured party with automatic perfection of an assignment of accounts that does not constitute "a significant part"
of the debtor's outstanding accounts. Courts have used various tests to craft the contours of
the nebulous phrase. See, e.g., 9 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 32, § 9-302:10, at 9-1336 to
9-1339 (1997); id. § 9-302:10, at 9-113 (Supp. 1998) (summarizing tests and citing cases);
Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, When Is Filing Of FinancingStatement Necessary To Perfect
An Assignment Of Accounts Under UCC§ 9-302(1)(e), 85 A.L.R.3D 1050 (1978); id. at 73 (Supp.
1998) (collecting and analyzing cases).
43. See U.C.C. § 9-615(l)(2).
44. See id. § 9-626(a)(5). Mr. Rapson suggests that the party challenging the deficiency
calculation may satisfy its burden of proof by introducing the following evidence: (i) the
actual condition of the collateral; (ii) collateral appraisals, evaluations, surveys, and the like;
(iii) guidebooks with values of the kind or type of collateral at the time of disposition; (iv)
any estimates of value or ranges of value made or obtained by the secured party in establishing the minimum acceptable purchase price from an unrelated purchaser; (v) prices paid
at any subsequent dispositions of the collateral by the purchaser, taking into consideration
the proximity of the time of such dispositions to the initial disposition and any costs incurred
by the purchaser in protecting, marketing, repairing, or improving the collateral; (vi) prices
paid at comparable dispositions of the kind or type of collateral; (vii) whether the purchaser
regularly sells the kind or type of collateral; and (viii) market practices and conditions for
dispositions of the kind or type of collateral at the time and place of the disposition. Rapson,
supra note 35, at 522-23.
45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 8.4 (1997).

46. This duty cannot be waived or varied. See U.C.C. § 9-602(9).
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Revised section 9-616 requires the secured party in a consumer-goods
transaction to send an "explanation" to each consumer obligor liable for
any deficiency or, if applicable, a debtor entitled to any surplus. 47 The
"explanation" must be sent no later than when the secured party initially
demands, in writing, payment of the deficiency by the consumer obligor
or, if applicable, remits the surplus to the debtor.48 The secured party also
must send an "explanation" within fourteen days after it receives from a
debtor or consumer obligor an authenticated record requesting the cred-

itor to provide an "explanation.

'49

What is an "explanation"? It is a writing 5° that provides four pieces of
information. First, the writing must state the amount of the deficiency or
surplus. 5 ' Second, it must explain how the creditor calculated the deficiency or surplus, 52 using the following formula:
A. aggregate debt secured by security interest
in disposed collateral, calculated as of (date)53

$

47. See id. § 9-616(b).
48. See id. § 9-616(b)(I)(A). A secured party's oral demand for payment of a deficiency
need not be accompanied (or preceded) by an "explanation."
49. See id. § 9-616(b)(l)(B) (referencing a "request"); id. § 9-616(a)(2) (defining "request").
Alternatively, the secured party may, within 14 days after receiving the consumer obligor's
request, send to the consumer obligor a record in which the secured party waives its right to
any deficiency. Id. § 9-616(b)(2).
A secured party is entitled to charge the recipient up to $25 for sending an explanation in
response to the recipient's request if the secured party has already sent an explanation to
the recipient during the previous six months. See id. § 9-616(e).
50. See id. § 9-616(a)(1). As the statute elsewhere refers to an authenticated record, see id.
§ 9-616(a)(2), it is obvious that the reference to "writing" is intentional. What is not so obvious
is why the "explanation" must be a writing, rather than an authenticated record. Perhaps
consumer representatives expressed concern that consumers might fail to timely review email correspondence. See Memorandum from Steven 0. Weise to Timothy R. Zinnecker
(Mar. 22, 1999) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law)
[hereinafter Weise Memorandum].
51. See U.C.C. § 9-616(a)(1)(A).
52. See id. § 9-616(a)(1)(B).
53. See id. § 9-616(c)(1). If the secured party took possession of the collateral after default,
the secured debt cannot be calculated as of a date more than 35 days before the possession
date. See id. § 9-616(c)(1)(A). For example, if the creditor repossessed collateral on July 20 (a
post-default date), then the secured debt set forth in the "explanation" can be calculated as
of any date after June 14 (including any date after July 20). If, however, the secured party
either took possession of the collateral before default or never took possession, then the
secured debt cannot be calculated as of a date more than 35 days before the date of disposition. See id. § 9-616(c)(1)(B). For example, if a default occurred on May 1,the creditor
never took possession of the collateral (or,alternatively, took possession before May 1), and
the collateral was sold on October 15, then the secured debt set forth in the "explanation"
can be calculated as of any date after September 9 (including any date after October 15).
Presumably the purpose for requiring a creditor to select a calculation date no earlier than
35 days before a particular date is a desire to arrive at an amount of secured debt that more
closely approximates the actual figure (which may change daily). If so, then one must wonder
why the statute adopts a bifurcated approach in which the counting date turns on when (or
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B. proceeds from disposition 54
C. "A minus "B" 55
D. disposition expenses, and attorneys' fees
secured by the disposed collateral 56
E. credits not included in ,A",57
F deficiency or surplus 58

$
$
$
$
$

_

Third, the explanation must state, if applicable, that the surplus or deficiency may be affected by future debits, credits, charges, rebates, and expenses. 59 And fourth, the writing must include a telephone number or
mailing address that can be used by the recipient to obtain additional
60
information about the transaction.
The section neither proposes a model form of explanation nor mandates that an explanation include any particular language. 6 1 An explanation is sufficient if it substantially complies with the content requirements
of revised section 9-616(a) even if the explanation has minor errors that
are not seriously misleading.62 Rather than rely on the nebulous flexibility
afforded by the statute, 63 a creditor should exercise care in preparing the
if) the creditor takes possession of the collateral, rather than a single rule that applies in all
situations and that measures the 35-day period from the disposition date-a date more
current than the possession date (which may pre-date the disposition date by weeks or
months). For a while, the statute provided a uniform rule pegged to the disposition date (see
U.C.C. § 9-616(b)(2)(A) (Draft July 25-Aug. 1, 1997)), but late in the drafting process (and
without explanation) the statute created two possession-sensitive rules (see U.C.C. § 9616(c)(1) (Draft Apr. 6, 1998)). An explanation of the bifurcated approach was requested in
the Zinnecker Memorandum, supra note 33, at 3.
54. See U.C.C. § 9-616(c)(2) (1998).
55. See id. § 9-616(c)(3).
56. See id. § 9-616(c)(4). The expenses may be reflected by type or in the aggregate. See id.
To avoid double-counting, one would think that these expenses should be a separate line
item only if they are not part of the aggregate debt mentioned in 'A." Cf id. § 9-616(c)(5)
(referencing credits "which are not reflected in the amount in ['A]"). For a while, language
similar to that quoted from revised § 9-616(c)(5) appeared in revised § 9-616(c)(4). See, e.g., id.
§ 9-616(c)(4) (Draft July 24-31, 1998). The language was deleted in a subsequent draft. See,
e.g., id. § 9-616(c)(4) (Draft approved at NCCUSL Annual Meeting, July 30, 1998). An explanation for this late revision was requested in the Zinnecker Memorandum, supra note 33,
at 3.
57. See U.C.C. § 9-616(c)(5) (1998).
58. See id. § 9-616(c)(6).
59. See id. § 9-616(a)(1)(C).
60. See id. § 9-616(a)(l)(D).
61. See id. § 9-616(d).
62. See id. Although revised §§ 9-616 and 9-614 both describe notices to be sent in consumer-goods transactions, the two sections do not treat errors in a uniform manner. See id.
§ 9-614(4)-(6). Why a uniform standard does not apply to all notices sent in consumer-goods
transactions is unclear. Clarification was requested in the Zinnecker Memorandum, supra
note 33, at 3.
63. Several questions come to mind: What is "substantial compliance"? When is an error
"minor"? Can a monetary error ever be "minor"? When is an error "seriously" misleading?
Should an error not "minor" be tolerated if it is not "seriously misleading"?
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explanation and adhere to the content requirements. Otherwise, the creditor may be liable for damages equal to any loss caused by its noncompliance 64 plus (in some instances) $500.65
Revised section 9-616, which applies only in consumer-goods transactions, 66 "reflects the view that, in every consumer-goods transaction, the
debtor or obligor is entitled to know the amount of a surplus or deficiency
and the basis upon which the surplus or deficiency was calculated. '6 7 The
reason for imposing a duty on the creditor to send the required notice
makes sense, and imposing a statutory duty on a foreclosing creditor to
provide that basic information (which perhaps may indirectly encourage
the foreclosing creditor to more carefully monitor its disposition-related
conduct) makes revised section 9-616 a welcome addition to the default
provisions. However, all obligors and debtors have an interest in knowing
the amount of any deficiency or surplus and how the creditor calculated
that amount, and the usefulness and importance of that information justifies a provision requiring the secured party to send an explanation in all
transactions, not just consumer-goods transactions.
REVISED SECTION 9-617: RIGHTS OF TRANSFEREE
OF COLLATERAL
Current Article 9, through section 9-504(4), sets forth the property rights
of a purchaser that acquires collateral at foreclosure. With some change,
these rights are codified in revised Article 9 at section 9-617.
Current Article 9 refers to the acquiring party as a "purchaser. ' 68 Under
revised Article 9 the acquiring party is known as a "transferee. ' 69 Revised
Article 9 does not define "transferee," but a "purchaser" is a party that
takes by "purchase, ' 70 a term that "includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest, issue or re-issue, gift, or
any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property." 7 1 By
acquiring an interest in the foreclosed property by sale or other voluntary
transaction, the successful bidder at a public or private disposition appears
to be a "purchaser." The official comments expressly refute that idea by
indicating that a "a buyer at a foreclosure sale does not meet the definition

64. See U.C.C. § 9-625(b). The secured party's noncompliance will not trigger liability for
minimum statutory damages calculated under revised § 9-625(c)(2). See id. § 9-625(c) ("Except
as otherwise provided in Section 9-628 .... "); id. § 9-628(d).
65. See id. § 9-625(e)(5), (6).
66. See id. § 9-616(b).
67. Id. § 9-616 cmt. 2.
68. See id. § 9-504(4) (1995).
69. See id. § 9-617 (1998).
70. See id. § 1-201(33).
71. Id. 1-201(32). The definition of "purchase" has been revised by inserting "security
interest," after "lien," and a comma after "gift." Id.
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of 'purchaser' in Section 1-201.'172 The reason is that a foreclosure disposition is not a "voluntary transaction" when viewed through the eyes of
73
the debtor, the party that created the property interest being foreclosed.
As before, the transferee acquires all of the debtor's rights in the collateral. 74 Additionally, the transferee acquires the collateral free of the
foreclosing creditor's security interest. 75 Furthermore, the transferee takes
the collateral free of any security interest or lien in the collateral that is
subordinate to the security interest of the foreclosing creditor.76 By providing the transferee with immunity from the foregoing title claims, it is
hoped that the disposition will attract additional prospective transferees
and result in higher prices. In this manner the statute benefits not only the
77
transferee but also the foreclosing creditor and the debtor.
Under current Article 9, a secured party's noncompliance with the default provisions (or, if applicable, any judicial proceeding 78 ) does not affect
the rights of a purchaser at a public sale if the purchaser did not know of

72. Id. § 9-617 cmt. 2.
73. See id. One could argue that if the debtor contractually acknowledges that the secured
party, upon default, enjoys all rights and remedies afforded by law (including U.C.C. Article
9), then the debtor has indeed consented to the disposition, making the disposition a "voluntary transaction."
74. See id. § 9-617(a)(1); id. § 9-504(4) (1995); see also Thomas v. Price, 975 E2d 231, 240
(5th Cir. 1992) (holding transferee acquired debtor's rights in collateral at time of sale);
Krueger v. Saiki, 820 E Supp. 467, 473 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (same); Leasing Serv. Corp. v.
Graham, 646 F Supp. 1410, 1419 (S.D.N.Y 1986) (same); Commercial Discount Corp. v.
King, 515 E Supp. 988, 992 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (same); Sloves Assocs. v. Boudouris, 592 N.YS.2d
236, 237 (Civ. Ct. 1992) (same); Auton's FineJewelry & Bridal Center, Inc. v. Beckners, Inc.,
707 S.W2d 539, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (same).
75. See U.C.C. § 9-617(a)(2) (1998); id. § 9-504(4) (1995); see also Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co. v. McCoy, 270 S.E.2d 164, 166 (W. Va. 1980) (concluding purchaser acquires property
free of seller's security interest).
76. See U.C.C. § 9-617(a)(3) (1998); id. § 9-504(4) (1995); see also Mastro v. Witt, 39 F3d
238, 243 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding foreclosure sale discharged subordinate security interest);
Hope v. Performance Automotive Inc., 710 So. 2d 1235, 1239-41 (Ala. 1998) (same); Food
City, Inc. v. Fleming Cos., 590 S.W2d 754, 758 (Tex. App. 1979, no writ) (same); David
Frisch, The Implicit TakingsJurisprudence of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. I1,23 (1995) ('As a general rule, a person who buys property at a foreclosure sale
acquires the debtor's equity plus the equity created by the absence of the lien being foreclosed
and all subordinate liens and interests."). Notwithstanding revised § 9-617(a)(3), the secured
party and any prospective transferee should consult a lawyer familiar with the provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code (particularly 26 U.S.C. § 7425 (1994)) to determine whether the
disposition will terminate a subordinate federal tax lien.
77. See Robyn L. Meadows, A Potential Pitfall for the Unsuspecting Purchaser of Repossessed
Collateral: The Overlooked Interaction Between Sections 9-504(4) and 2-312(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 44 AM4. U. L. REV. 167, 177-78 (1994).
78. This reference to "anyjudicial proceeding" has left more than one scholar befuddled.
See, e.g., 2 GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.7, at 1248 (describing the reference as "mystifying");
9 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 32, § 9-504:11, at 841 ("Exactly what is meant by 'any
judicial proceeding' is not known.").
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any sale defects and did not collude with the secured party.79 If the disposition is not by public sale, the purchaser must merely act in good faith. 80
Revised section 9-617 changes the law in two respects. 8' First, it offers
protection to a transferee when the secured party fails to comply with any
requirement of Article 9, not just a default provision. 8 2 Second, the statute
eliminates the "knowledge" and "collusion" tests and requires the transferee, in every type of disposition, to act in good faith. 83 This revision is
welcome, for it eliminates the distinction between acting in good faith and
84
not acting in bad faith, a distinction that "has long troubled the law"
79. See U.C.C. § 9-504(4)(a) (1995); see also id. § 9-504 cmt. 4 (indicating that a purchaser
has no duty to inquire into the circumstances of a public sale and is protected "so long as
he is not actively in bad faith"); PWS, Inc. v. Ban, 285 Cal. Rptr. 598, 600-01 (Ct. App.
1991) (holding creditor that sold collateral to itself could not rely on U.C.C. § 9-504(4) as
defense if debtor had sued to set aside sale when creditor-purchaser had to have knowledge
of defect in sale held on July 22 where notice had indicated sale would occur on July 23);
Sheffield Progressive, Inc. v. Kingston Tool Co., 405 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980)
(concluding purchaser could not invoke protection of U.C.C. § 9-504(4) where evidence
indicated purchaser colluded with foreclosing creditor in manner that violated the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act). However, although the foreclosing creditor's failure to conduct a
proper disposition may not prevent a transferee from acquiring the collateral free of selected
property interests, the foreclosing creditor may be liable to the debtor and other interested
parties under revised § 9-625 for its misconduct (which, under revised § 9-626, may adversely
affect the creditor's ability to recover any deficiency).
80. See U.C.C. § 9-504(4)(b); see also Duffy v. Big Al's Autorama, Inc. (In re Duffy), 186
B.R. 503, 505 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) (holding debtor's rights in repossessed vehicle were
extinguished by sale to purchaser, even if creditor-seller failed to comply with statutory notice
requirements); Pippin Way, Inc. v. Four Star Music Co. (In re Four Star Music Co.), 2 B.R.
454, 464-65 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1979) (concluding buyer at private sale was not good-faith
purchaser for value as terms of sale were so highly unusual and beneficial to buyer that buyer,
as merchant-and thus chargeable with knowledge and skill of merchant-could not in good
faith have believed that the terms were commercially reasonable); Lichty v. Federal Land
Bank, 467 N.W2d 657, 660 (Neb. 1991) (holding good-faith purchaser at private sale acquired collateral free of debtor's interest even if secured party failed to send, to debtor,
reasonable notice of time after which private sale would occur).
81. Additionally, what was implied under current § 9-504(4) is now expressly stated: A
transferee that does not satisfy the statutory requirements takes the collateral subject to the
property interests of the debtor, the foreclosing creditor, and other secured creditors and
lienholders. See U.C.C. § 9-617(c) (1998).
82. See id. § 9-617(b) (referencing noncompliance "with this article").
83. See id. § 9-617(b); see also id. § 9-102(a)(43) (defining "good faith"). This change occurred
late in the revision process. During most of the process, the statute protected a transferee in
a public sale only if the transferee (i) had no knowledge of any defects in the sale, (ii) did not
collude with the secured party, other bidders, or the person conducting the sale, and (iii)
acted in good faith. See, e.g., id. § 9-504(n) (DraftJuly 28-Aug. 4, 1995); id. § 9-617(b) (Draft
July 24-31, 1998). Cf id. § 9-617(b) (Draft approved at NCCUSL Annual Meeting, July 30,
1998) (deleting all requirements other than good faith). According to the official comments,
no substantive change from current § 9-504(4) is intended, as a transferee's knowledge of
sale defects, or its collusion with various parties, were merely "specific examples of the
absence of good faith." Id. § 9-617 cmt. 3 (1998).
84. See William E. Hogan, The Secured Party andDefault Proceedings Under the UCC, 47 MINN.
L. REv. 205, 233 (1962); see also 2 GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.7, at 1249 ("The distinction
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When will a transferee fail to exercise good faith? The facts and circumstances surrounding the disposition will dictate the answer to that question.85 However, as knowledge of existing security interests is generally
irrelevant when resolving priority disputes, a transferee should not violate
the good-faith requirement merely because it knows of a competing, but
subordinate, property interest. 86 A contrary rule only discourages interested parties from searching the public records for property interests that
might survive the transfer and, in effect, shrinks the pool of potential
transferees to the detriment of both the foreclosing creditor and the debtor
with no corresponding benefit to the holder of the subordinate interest.
By negative implication, the transferee obtains the collateral subject to
any security interests or liens that are not junior to the security interest
under which the disposition occurred. 87 Therefore, before participating in
between the affirmative presence of good faith and the negative absence of bad faith ...
has never been a workable one.").
85. Note, however, that the transferee's good faith only becomes an issue if the foreclosing
creditor has conducted an improper disposition. The transferee's good faith, or lack thereof,
is irrelevant if the disposition is proper. See Thomas v. Price, 975 E2d 231, 238-40 (5th Cir.
1992).
86. See Mastro v. Witt, 39 E3d 238, 243 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that good-faith requirement of U.C.C. § 9-504(4)(b) does not require purchaser of collateral to lack knowledge of
any pre-existing subordinate claims against the collateral); Northwest Equip. Sales Co. v.
Western Packers, Inc., 623 E2d 92, 95-96 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); Landmark Land Co. v.
Sprague, 529 E Supp. 971, 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 701 E2d 1065
(2d Cir. 1983); cf. Young v. Golden State Bank, 560 P.2d 855, 860 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977)
(stating, in dicta, that purchaser's knowledge that the holder of a subordinate security interest
had not been given notice of private disposition might be evidence of lack of good faith).
87. See Continental Bank v. Krebs, 540 N.E.2d 1023, 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Utility
Trailers v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 726 P2d 282, 285 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986); Chadron
Energy Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 459 N.W2d 718, 732-33 (Neb. 1990); Nickles, supra note
24, at 253 ("Upon the sale of the original collateral, the junior creditor's interest and any
security interest or lien subordinate to his own are terminated, along with the debtor's rights
in the property. Any senior security interest survives, however."); Luize E. Zubrow, Rethinking
Article 9 Remedies: Economic and FiduciaryPerspectives, 42 UCLA L. REV. 445, 457 (1994) ("Under
Article 9 priority rules, the [senior] foreclosing creditor's claim would be superior to the
ownership rights of ... a [junior creditor's] purchaser."); see also 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 26, § 34-10, at 432 ("One thing is clear from [U.C.C. § 9-504(4)], namely, a senior
secured party's interest in the collateral is not discharged by a junior's foreclosure sale, and
continues to attach to the goods in the hands of the purchaser at the sale."). During most of
the drafting process, revised Article 9 included a statement making this point somewhat less
implied and little more express. See U.C.C. § 9-504(o) (DraftJuly 28-Aug. 4, 1995) ("Except
as otherwise provided in this subsection or elsewhere in this article, the disposition does not
discharge any security interest or other lien."). But see id. § 9-615(d) (Draft Apr. 6, 1998)
(deleting sentence).
Unless a secured party has authorized a disposition of collateral free and clear of its
interest, the interest generally continues after the disposition "[e]xcept as otherwise provided
in this article and in Section 2-403(2)." Id. § 9-315(a) (1998); cf. id. § 9-306(2) (1995) (continuing a security interest in collateral after disposition absent consent and "[e] xcept where this
Article otherwise provides"). One of the exceptions "otherwise provided" is the "buyer in
ordinary course of business" exception codified in revised § 9-320(a), the successor to current

HeinOnline -- 54 Bus. Law. 1752 1998-1999

The Default Provisions of Revised Article 9

1753

a public or private disposition of the collateral an interested party should
review the public records to determine whether the collateral is encumbered by any security interests or liens that may survive the disposition,
determine (if it can) the amount of debt secured by those security interests
or liens, and factor that amount (together with the fair market value of
the collateral) into its price deliberations. The transferee also should contact the holder of any security interest that survives the disposition in order
to terminate the priority afforded to post-disposition advances funded by
that holder.88 The transferee should be prepared to either pay off the debt

§ 9-307(1). As revised Article 9 rejects the notion that commercially reasonable dispositions
are "out of the ordinary commercial course" or "peculiar," see id. § 9-6 10 cmt. I1 (1998),
a transferee of collateral consisting of the debtor's inventory may, relying on the foregoing
comment, invoke the "buyer in ordinary course of business" exception and argue that security interests that survive the disposition under revised § 9-617 are nevertheless terminated
by revised § 9-320(a). One response is that the transferee is not a "buyer in ordinary course
of business" as defined in revised § 1-201(9) because a party excluded from the broad definition of "purchaser" cannot be a "buyer." But see id. § 9-617 cmt. 2 (referring to a "buyer at
a foreclosure sale") (emphasis added). Another response is that the transferee is not a "buyer
in ordinary course of business" because a foreclosure sale does not "comporto with the usual
or customary practices in the kind of business in which the seller is engaged or with the
seller's own usual or customary practices." Cf Nickles, supra note 24, at 254 n.146 ("Is such
a buyer [at a foreclosure sale] one not in the ordinary course ... ?"); id. at 254 n. 148 (stating
that a buyer at a foreclosure sale is "probably a buyer not in the ordinary course"); Zubrow,
supra, at 457 n.30 ("In a battle between the original secured creditor and the purchaser, the
secured creditor wins because the purchaser at a foreclosure sale is not a buyer in the ordinary
course of business."). However, comment II to revised § 9-610 somewhat undercuts that
response. Perhaps a better response is that the transferee is not a "buyer in ordinary course
of business" because the definition requires the transferee to buy goods from a person "in
the business of selling goods of that kind." U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1998). But this requirement
only disqualifies a transferee when the foreclosing creditor is a bank, finance company, or
other party that is not in the business of selling goods like the collateral. The goods may
have been sold on credit to the debtor by the foreclosing creditor, in which case the foreclosing
creditor would indeed be "in the business of selling goods of that kind." (Query whether a
finance company that is closely affiliated with a merchant also could be held to be "in the
business of selling goods of that kind." See Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Lotito, 703 A.2d
288, 292-95 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (permitting consumer lessee to assert breach of
warranty against financing lessor having close relationship with seller and manufacturer);
U.C.C. § 2A-103(g) (1995) (defining "finance lease"); id. § 2A-103 cmt. g (stating that Article
2A "creates no special rule where the lessor is an affiliate of the supplier").) Perhaps the best
response is that even if the transferee is a "buyer in ordinary course of business," revised
§ 9-320(a) offers no protection to the transferee because the statute allows a transferee to
acquire collateral free of a security interest only if the security interest was "created by the
buyer's seller." The transferee's seller at a disposition is the foreclosing creditor, but the
security interest referenced in revised § 9-320(a) was created by someone else: the debtor.
88. See U.C.C. § 9-323(d) (1998) (permitting selected buyers to acquire goods free of a
security interest to the extent that the interest secures repayment of advances made after the
earlier of (i) the time when the secured creditor acquires knowledge of the buyer's purchase
and (ii) the 45th day after the date of purchase); id. § 9-323(e) (protecting advances made
pursuant to a commitment entered into by a secured party without knowledge of the buyer's
purchase and entered into no later than the 45th day after the purchase); id. § 9-102(a)(68)
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secured by the surviving interest or surrender possession of the collateral.
If the transferee is unable or unwilling to do so, it may be liable for conversion. 89 The transferee's recourse will be against the foreclosing creditor
for breaching any title warranty given under revised section 9-6 10(d).90 If
the foreclosing creditor disclaimed any title warranty and did not otherwise
agree to indemnify the transferee against title claimants, the transferee
may find itself without a legal remedy under revised Article 9.91
Revised section 9-617 applies only to post-default dispositions. 92 What
rights are acquired by a transferee if the debtor was not in default at the
time of disposition? Under pre-U.C.C. law, the transferee (if a good-faith
purchaser for value) acquired the property free of the debtor's interest,
even if the foreclosing creditor was liable to the debtor for conversion. 93
By introducing a post-default requirement, Article 9 departs from preU.C.C. law and no longer provides the good-faith transferee with any

rights in property acquired at a pre-default disposition. 94 What property
(defining "pursuant to commitment"). Current Article 9 offers similar protection. See id. §§ 9307(3), 9-105(k) (1995).
89. See id. § 9-306 cmt. 3 (1998) ("[S]ince the transferee takes subject to the security
interest, the secured party may repossess the collateral from him or in an appropriate case
maintain an action for conversion."); Steve H. Nickles, EnforcingArticle 9 Security InterestsAgainst
Subordinate Buyers of Collateral,50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 511, 520-36 (1982).
90. See U.C.C. § 9-610(d).
91. A sympathetic court might invoke equitable principles and permit the transferee to
recover the purchase price from the seller. See id. § 1-103 (1995) (allowing principles of equity
to supplement U.C.C. provisions). However, because the giving (and waiving) of title warranties are expressly addressed in revised § 9-610(d), and as revised § 9-617 contemplates the
post-disposition survival of certain security interests and liens, equitable principles would
seem to be "displaced by the particular provisions" of revised Article 9. Id.
92. See id. § 9-617(a) (1998) ("A secured party's disposition of collateral aJLer default .... ")
(emphasis added); see also id. § 9-504(4) (1995) ("When collateral is disposed of... aterdefault
") (emphasis
...
added).
93. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.7, at 1247 (discussing Uniform Trust Receipts Act
§ 6(3)(c), the forerunner of U.C.C. § 9-504(4)); see also U.C.C. § 9-504 cmt. 4 (1995) (referring
to the Uniform Trust Receipts Act as its genesis).
94. The transferee may argue that revised § 9-617 and its predecessor do provide the
transferee with rights in collateral acquired at a pre-default disposition. By disposing of
collateral in the absence of a default, the foreclosing creditor has failed to comply with Article
9. See U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (1998) ("After default, a secured party may sell, lease, license, or
otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral .... ") (emphasis added); id. § 9-504(1) (1995)
("A secured party after default may sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral
.... ") (emphasis added). Nevertheless, current and revised Article 9 both permit the transferee to acquire the property free of the debtor's interest, the interest being foreclosed, and
all subordinate property interests, even if the foreclosing creditor "fails to comply with ...
the requirements " of Article 9, as long as the transferee has acted in good faith (and, in a
public disposition under current Article 9, without knowledge of any defect and not in
collusion with other parties). See id. § 9-617(b) (1998); id. § 9-504(4) (1995). As attractive as
that argument may be, its acceptance requires one to overlook the organization and language
of the statute and accompanying comments, all of which suggest that the reference to noncompliance was included to address a secured party's post-default noncompliance, such as
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95
rights, if any, are held by the transferee are determined by other law. So,
too, are any rights that the transferee may have against the debtor (who
may demand return of the collateral) and, if the title warranty under
96
revised section 9-610 has been disclaimed, the foreclosing creditor. Ac97
knowledgment, if not closure, of this gap in the default provisions would
have been welcome. 98

REVISED SECTION 9-618: RIGHTS AND DUTIES
OF CERTAIN SECONDARY OBLIGORS
Consider the following typical transaction. Dealer sells a boat to Consumer pursuant to a retail installment sales contract that creates a security
interest in the boat in favor of Dealer. Dealer then discounts the contract
(chattel paper9 9 ) to Finance Company, with recourse. Consumer defaults
on its payment obligations and Finance Company repossesses the boat.
Dealer honors its recourse obligations by paying to Finance Company an

breaching the peace while repossessing the collateral, failing to send a disposition notice to
all required parties, or disposing of collateral in a commercially unreasonable manner. See
id. § 9-504 cmt. 4 ("Subsection (4) provides that a purchaser for value from a secured party
default takes free of any rights of the debtor and of the holders of junior security interests
after
and liens, even though the secured party has not complied with the requirements of this Part
or of any judicial proceedings.") (emphasis added); GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.7, at 1248
(noting that U.C.C. § 9-504(4) "distinguish[es] between wrongful pre-default and wrongful
post-default transfers" and "covers only disposition[s] by a secured party 'after default' "); id.
§ 42.14, at 1175-76 (observing that no section of the U.C.C. deals with the status of a
transferee who acquires collateral at a pre-default disposition); Meadows, supra note 77, at
180-81; cf U.C.C. § 9-617 cmt. 2 (1998) (making no distinction between pre- and post-default
noncompliance in its statement that a disposition "has the effect specified in subsection (a),
even if the secured party fails to comply with this Article").
95. Even if the transferee of goods has acted in good faith and given value, it cannot
claim the protection afforded by U.C.C. § 2-403, which states: "A person with voidable title
has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value." The foreclosing creditor
that makes an unauthorized disposition of collateral has void, rather than voidable, title. See
Meadows, supra note 77, at 182-90. Furthermore, the transferee is not a "purchaser." See

U.C.C. § 9-617 cmt. 2 (1998).
96. Unlike the transferee, the debtor enjoys certain rights under revised Article 9. For
example, because a pre-default disposition is not sanctioned by revised § 9-610, the debtor's
right of redemption under revised § 9-623 has not been terminated. Additionally, the debtor
may collect damages under revised § 9-625. Furthermore, the debtor's liability for any deficiency may be reduced under revised § 9-626.
97. The "gap" may be more of a slight indentation than a chasm, as the issue may be
more academic than practical. It is hoped that a debtor would promptly bring to the foreclosing creditor's attention its concern that a default has not yet occurred and that the creditor
would only proceed with any scheduled disposition after addressing that concern.
98. For an excellent article that analyzes the problem and proposes a statutory solution,
see Meadows, supra note 77, at 167.
99. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(1 1) (1998) (defining "chattel paper"); id.§ 9-105(l)(b) (1995)
(same). The sale of chattel paper is a transaction that falls within the scope of Article 9. See
§ 9-102(l)(b) (1995).
id.
§ 9-109(a)(3) (1998); id.

HeinOnline -- 54 Bus. Law. 1755 1998-1999

1756

The Business Lawyer; Vol. 54, August 1999

amount equal to Consumer's unpaid debt. In return, Finance Company
returns the contract (and the boat) to Dealer. Dealer then sells the boat to
Purchaser and thereafter sues Consumer for a deficiency.
In the foregoing transaction, Dealer has sold the boat to Purchaser. But
prior to that sale, had Finance Company "sold" the boat to Dealer when
Dealer honored its recourse obligations? If so, several questions may arise.
Which sale terminates Consumer's right of redemption' 0 0 and Consumer's interest in the collateral?01 Which sale requires the seller to send
a sales notice to Consumer? 10 2 Which sale can be scrutinized for commercial reasonableness? 0 3 Which sales price is used in calculating a deficiency or surplus? Which sale is a "disposition" under the default provisions of
Article 9?
Current Article 9 states that collateral is not sold or otherwise disposed
when a person honoring its obligations "under a guaranty, indorsement,
repurchase agreement or the like" receives a transfer of collateral from,
or is subrogated to the rights of, a secured party 104 Revised Article 9 retains
this concept, but not the language. Revised section 9-618 excludes from
revised section 9-610105 (and, therefore, any other disposition-related provision) (i) any "assignment of a secured obligation" from a secured party
to a secondary obligor, 10 6 (ii) any "transfer of collateral" from a secured
party to a secondary obligor that "agrees to accept the rights and assume
the duties of the secured party,"' 1 7 and (iii) any subrogation by a secondary
obligor "to the rights of a secured party with respect to collateral."' 1 8 The
reason for treating transactions described in current section 9-504(5) and
revised section 9-618 as non-dispositions "is to insure that the value of
repossessed collateral is measured by a bona fide sale in the market place,
and not by an artificial value, usually the balance due on the debtor's
contract, set by a repurchase or guaranty agreement between a seller and
a finance company." 0 9
100. See id. § 9-506 (1995); id. § 9-623(a), (c)(2) (1998).
101. See id. § 9-504(4) (1995); id. § 9-617(a)(1) (1998).
102. See id. § 9-504(3) (1995); id. § 9-611 (b), (c)(1) (1998).
103. See id. § 9-504(3) (1995); id. § 9-610(b) (1998).
104. See id. § 9-504(5) (1995).
105. See id. § 9-618(b)(1) (1998).
106. See id. § 9-618(a)(1).
107. See id. § 9-618(a)(2).
108. See id. § 9-618(a)(3).
109. See Reeves v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 247 N.W2d 434, 439 (Neb. 1976); see also
Shields v. Bobby Murray Chevrolet, Inc., 261 S.E.2d 238, 240 (N.C. Ct. App.), affirmed without
precedentialvalue, 266 S.E.2d 658 (N.C. 1980) (indicating that the provision attempts to achieve
a sales price "measured by a bona fide market value, and not by an artificial value"); 3
HOWARD RUDA, ASSET-BASED FINANCING § 28.04[3], at 28-10 to 28-11 (1993) (stating that
a lender's sale of dealer's inventory to the manufacturer pursuant to the manufacturer's
repurchase agreement "does not constitute a commercially reasonable sale because the price
the manufacturer pays is tied to the indebtedness due the lender, not the market value of
the collateral").
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Revised section 9-618 is an improvement over its predecessor. The reference in current section 9-504(5) to "guaranty, indorsement, repurchase
agreement or the like" suggests that its authors had sureties in mind. 110
Rather than continue to indirectly acknowledge suretyship concepts
through a reference to the types of agreements that may create surety
status, revised section 9-618 focuses attention on the surety status itself

through its use of "secondary obligor."'I Hopefully, the replacement of
agreement-based language with a status-based term will reduce some of
the confusion that has surrounded current section 9-504(5), particularly
' 2
the meaning of "repurchase agreement." "1

Another source of confusion has been the meaning of "transfer of
collateral."1 13 The phrase, isolated in current section 9-504(5), remains in
revised section 9-618, but is accompanied by language requiring the trans4
feree to "accept the rights and assume the duties of the secured party.""
Additionally, new language in revised section 9-618 excludes from the
disposition-relation provisions of revised Article 9 any "assignment of a
secured obligation" from a secured party to a secondary obligor.'l 5 Together, these changes clarify which "transfers of collateral" are intended
to be treated as non-dispositions. Unless the secured party has assigned
the secured debt to the secondary obligor, or achieved the functional equivalent of an assignment through the secondary obligor's agreement to step
into the shoes of the secured party, the transaction between the secured
party and the secondary obligor should be viewed as a sale of collateral,
triggering application of all disposition-related provisions."l 6 However,
when evidence reveals that either the secured party has assigned its posi-

tion to the secondary obligor or the secondary obligor has agreed to assume that position, then the transaction should be viewed as a purchase
110. See DonaldJ. Rapson, Repurchase (of Collateral)Agreements and the LargerIssue of Deficiency
Actions: What Does Section 9-504(5) Mean?, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 649, 651-54 (1992-1993).
111. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GuARANrY § I(l)(a) (1996) (eschewing "surety" in favor of "secondary obligor"); Homer Kripke, Practice Commentary to
Section 9-504, N.Y U.C.C. LAw § 9-504, at 611-12 (McKinney 1964), cited in Rapson, supra
note 110, at 653 (using the following caption in his description of § 9-504(5): Sale of Collateral Back to Secondary Oblor)(emphasis added). Mr. Rapson describes Professor Kripke as
"one of the leading architects of Article 9, past and present, and probably the most knowledgeable secured transactions lawyer in the country." See Rapson, supra note 110, at 653.
112. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 9, 10.05[5], at 10-67 to 10-71; Rapson, supra note 110,
at 660-66.
113. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 9, 4.08[8] [c], at 4-171 to 4-172; Rapson, supra note 110,
at 666-73.
114. U.C.C. § 9-618(a)(2) (1998).
115. Id. § 9-618(a)(1).
116. If revised § 9-618(a)(2) did not include language requiring the secondary obligor to
agree "to accept the rights and assume the duties of the secured party," a statutory conflict
would exist between revised § 9-618(a)(2) (which would treat any "transfer of collateral" from
a secured party to a secondary obligor as a non-disposition) and revised § 9-615(0 (which
acknowledges that a secondary obligor can be the transferee in a collateral disposition).
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of the secured debt, accompanied by the underlying security interest,
rather than a purchase of the collateral.
Another clarification concerns subrogation rights. Under current section
9-504(5), collateral is not disposed when a guarantor or similar party becomes "subrogated to [the secured party's] rights."'1 17 That statement is
narrowed by revised section 9-618, which indicates that collateral is not
disposed when a secondary obligor "is subrogated to the rights of a secured
party with respect to collateral.'" 118 In some transactions the secondary obligor's payment may be applied to unsecured debt.1 19 In such a case, the
secondary obligor is subrogated to certain rights of the creditor, but, as a
result of the emphasized language, revised section 9-618 is implicated only
20
to the extent that those subrogated rights are collateral-related. 1
Although current section 9-504(5) states that the guarantor or similar
party will, by honoring its contractual obligations, acquire the rights and
duties of the secured party, the statute does not indicate whether the secured party remains liable for any prior breach of its duties or may be
held liable for any subsequent breach of a duty by the guarantor or similar
party. 12 1 Nor does the statute expressly state whether the guarantor or
similar party can be held liable for the secured party's prior behavior.
Revised section 9-618 clarifies the status of both parties. The statute provides that an assignment, transfer, or subrogation to which revised section
9-618 applies "relieves the secured party of further duties." 122 Therefore,
while the secured party may not be held liable for the secondary obligor's
subsequent noncompliance (e.g., failing to send notice of a disposition to
the debtor as required by revised section 9-611 (b)), the secured party does
remain liable for its own prior misbehavior (e.g., repossessing collateral
under revised section 9-609 in a manner that breaches the peace). And
because the statute states that a secondary obligor "becomes obligated to
perform the duties of the secured party after the secondary obligor" has
117. U.C.C. § 9-504(5) (1995).
118. Id. § 9-618(a)(3) (1998) (emphasis added).
119. In other transactions the secondary obligor may make a payment not in satisfaction
of its secondary obligation but as the successful bidder at a public or private disposition.
Revised Article 9 acknowledges that a secondary obligor can be the transferee in a collateral
disposition. See id. § 9-615(). If a party makes a payment with the intent to buy the collateral,
rather than discharge its secondary obligation, the party is not subrogated to any of the
secured party's rights and revised § 9-618 is inapplicable. To avoid any confusion concerning
the capacity in which the payment is made, the secured party and the secondary obligor
should document the nature and circumstances of the payment accordingly. See id. § 9-618
cmt. 2.
120. See id. § 9-618 cmt. 2; cf id. § 9-618(a)(1), (b)(1) (stating that collateral is not disposed
when a secondary obligor "receives an assignment of a secured obligation") (emphasis added).
121. Cf PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 12, at 237 (recommending that § 9-504
"should be revised to specify the circumstances under which a secured party continues to be
responsible to the debtor," notwithstanding the secured party's assignment or transfer to a
recourse party under § 9-504(5)).
122. U.C.C. § 9-618(b)(2).
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received an assignment, transfer, or subrogation to which revised section
9-618 applies,' 23 the secondary obligor should not inherit any liability
124
arising from the secured party's earlier misconduct.
Assuming that the Finance Company-Dealer transaction qualifies as an
assignment, transfer, or subrogation governed by revised section 9-618,125
it is the Dealer-Purchaser transaction, rather than the Finance CompanyDealer transaction, to which the disposition provisions of revised Article
9 apply. 126 As a result, Dealer inherits all of the rights afforded to, and
12 7
must perform all of the obligations thereafter placed on, a secured party.
Among these obligations are the duty to exercise reasonable care with
respect to collateral in its possession, 128 the duty to send to Consumer a
disposition notice, 129 the duty to conduct the disposition in a commercially
123. Id. § 9-618(a) (emphasis added).
124. See id. § 9-618 cmt. 4.
125. Of course a court must examine the true nature of the relationship between Dealer
and Finance Company, and the facts and circumstances surrounding their transaction, before
concluding whether revised § 9-618 applies. See, e.g., Reeves v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 247
N.W2d 434, 439-40 (Neb. 1976) (concluding trial court's reliance on U.C.C. § 9-504(5) to
grant summary judgment was premature where evidence raised conflicting inferences on
whether parties enjoyed principal-agent relationship or had acted pursuant to a guaranty or
repurchase agreement).
126. See Stoppi v. Wilmington Trust Co., 518 A.2d 82, 85 (Del. 1986) (concluding under
§ 9-504(5) that reassignment of collateral from bank to seller pursuant to repurchase agreement was not a collateral disposition); Weast v. Arnold, 474 A.2d 904, 912 (Md. 1984)
(holding under § 9-504(5) that transfer of collateral from secured party to guarantor upon
guarantor's payment of secured debt was not a "sale" of collateral); Reeves, 247 N.W2d at
439 (citing § 9-504(5) for the proposition that a transfer of collateral from a finance company
to a dealer that has honored its obligations under a repurchase agreement or guaranty is not
a sale or disposition of collateral); Bexar County Nat'l Bank v. Hernandez, 716 S.W2d 938,
938-39 (Tex. 1986) (relying on U.C.C. § 9-504(5) to conclude that bank's transfer of collateral
to guarantor was not a disposition that required notice under U.C.C. § 9-504(3); instead,
guarantor's subsequent transfer triggered the notice requirement); cf. Shields v. Bobby Murray
Chevrolet, Inc., 261 S.E.2d 238, 241 (N.C. Ct. App.), affirmed without precedential value, 266
S.E.2d 658 (N.C. 1980) (concluding U.C.C. § 9-504(5) did not apply to public sale conducted
by finance company that treated non-present dealer, under terms of repurchase agreement,
as successful bidder in absence of any other bids at public sale); CLARK, supra note 9,
10.05[5], at 10-67 to 10-71 (arguing that certain repurchases by a manufacturer from a
floor plan financer should be treated as Article 9 dispositions).
127. See U.C.C. § 9-61 8 (a) (stating that the secondary obligor "acquires the rights and
becomes obligated to perform the duties of the secured party"); cf id. § 9-504(5) (1995)
(indicating that the transferee has "the rights and duties of the secured party").
128. See id. § 9-207(a) (1998); id. § 9-207(1) (1995); see also Murray v. Payne, 437 So. 2d 47,
53-54 (Miss. 1983) (concluding guarantor that succeeded to creditor's security interest in
aircraft had duty to apply profits from operating aircraft against secured debt in accordance
with U.C.C. § 9-207(2)(c)).
129. See U.C.C. § 9-61 l(b) (1998); id. § 9-504(3) (1995); see also Stoppi, 518 A.2d at 85-86
(ruling that transfer of collateral from bank to dealer under repurchase agreement placed
duty on dealer to notify debtor of sale; dealer breached duty and could not rely on notice
sent by bank as bank's transfer of collateral to dealer was not a sale); Papas v. Speizman,
511 N.E.2d 768, 769-70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that guarantors who paid secured debt
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reasonable manner,130 and the duty to remit any surplus proceeds to Consumer. 13 1 Dealer's noncompliance may trigger statutory penalties and may
132
adversely affect its ability to recover any deficiency from Consumer.

REVISED SECTION 9-619: TRANSFER OF RECORD OR
LEGAL TITLE
In most dispositions the transferee acquires all of the debtor's rights in
the collateral.1 33 Occasionally the debtor's ownership interest in the collateral has been recorded on a certificate of title (e.g., a motor vehicle 134 )
or otherwise registered (e.g., an airplane 135 or copyright 136 ). The transferee

and received assignment of creditor's security interest breached duty to give notice of subsequent disposition);Joyce v. Cloverleaf Homes, Inc., 344 S.E.2d 58, 60 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)
(concluding mobile home dealer that repurchased collateral from finance company breached
its duty to send notice of subsequent sale); Bexar County Nat'l Bank, 716 S.W2d at 938-39
(noting guarantor failed to give notice of disposition following transfer of collateral from
bank to guarantor); Multi-Moto Corp. v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 806 S.W2d 560, 56466 (Tex. App. 1990, writ denied) (holding finance company's transfer of dealer's repossessed
inventory to seller was not a disposition that required prior notice).
130. See U.C.C. § 9-610(b) (1998); id. § 9-504(3) (1995); see also Erickson v. Marshall, 771
P2d 68, 69-70 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (concluding trial court's grant of summary judgment
motion was premature where behavior of guarantor that became subrogated to secured
party's rights in collateral raised questions on commercial reasonableness of guarantor's
disposition).
131. See U.C.C. § 9-615(d)(1) (1998); id. § 9-504(2) (1995); see also Reeves, 247 N.W2d at
439 (stating that a debtor is entitled to recover surplus proceeds from a dealer, not a finance
company, if the finance company has transferred its interest in the collateral to the dealer
under a repurchase agreement or guaranty).
132. See U.C.C. § 9-625(b), (c) (1998) (stating noncompliance may trigger liability for actual
damages and, in appropriate circumstances, statutory minimum damages); id. § 9-626(a)(3)
(indicating noncompliance may reduce deficiency); cf id. § 9-507(1) (1995) (imposing liability
on secured party for "any loss caused" by noncompliance and, in appropriate circumstances,
statutory minimum damages).
133. See id. § 9-617(a)(1) (1998); id. § 9-504(4) (1995).
134. See, e.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 501.022(a) (West 1997) ("The owner of a motor
vehicle registered in this state may not operate or permit the operation of the vehicle on a
public highway until the owner obtains a certificate of title for the vehicle."); id. § 502.002(a)
(requiring the owner of a motor vehicle to "apply for the registration of the vehicle for: (1)
each registration year in which the vehicle is used or to be used on a public highway"); id.
§ 502.152(a) (indicating that the Texas Department of Transportation will not register a
motor vehicle unless the owner has obtained a certificate of title for the vehicle).
135. See 49 U.S.C. § 44101(a) (1994) (providing generally that "a person may operate an
aircraft only when the aircraft is registered under section 44103 of this title"); id. § 44103(a)
(indicating that, on application by the owner, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration shall "register the aircraft" and "issue a certificate of registration to its
owner").
136. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (stating that the Register of Copyrights "shall register the
claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration" for copyrightable subject matter).
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may demand that the certificate or registry reflect its ownership immediately following the foreclosure. That may be difficult if a new certificate
cannot be issued, or the registry cannot be revised, without the debtor's
consent or cooperation, which may not be forthcoming after default. 137
Unlike current Article 9, revised Article 9 acknowledges this predicament
and provides a mechanism for obtaining record or legal title. The mechanism is codified in revised section 9-6 19.
The section contemplates use of a "transfer statement," a record that
has been authenticated by the secured party 138 and which states the following:
* the debtor has defaulted on an obligation secured by specific
39

collateral; 1
" the secured party has exercised its post-default remedies with respect
140
to the specific collateral;
" the transferee has acquired the debtor's rights in the collateral as a
14 1
result of the secured party's exercise of its post-default remedies;
and
* the name and mailing address of the secured party, the debtor, and
42
the transferee.
Upon receipt of the transfer statement and any applicable fee, revised
section 9-619 directs the official to accept the statement, revise its records
accordingly, and, if applicable, issue a new title certificate in the name of
43
the transferee.
Revised section 9-619 does not prescribe a model form, 144 perhaps because the recipient most likely will be a public official with the authority
137. The debtor's obstinance may not go unpunished. Title concerns may discourage
potential buyers from attending the disposition or participating in the bidding process, and
attendance and participation are factors that have a direct bearing on the ultimate disposition
price and the amount of any deficiency for which the debtor may be liable or any surplus
to which the debtor may be entitled.
Many creditors, cognizant that a debtor's post-default cooperation is unlikely, address the
problem by including some variation of the following clause in the loan documents: "Debtor
appoints Secured Party as its attorney-in-fact, effective upon the occurrence of a Default,
with power to take such action (including the execution of documents) as Secured Party
deems necessary or desirable. Debtor acknowledges that this power of attorney granted to
Secured Party is irrevocable and coupled with an interest."
138. See U.C.C. § 9-619(a) (1998); see also id. § 9-102(a)(7) (defining "authenticate"); id. § 9102(a)(69) (defining "record").
139. See id. § 9-619(a)(1).
140. See id. § 9-619(a)(2).
141. See id. § 9-619(a)(3).
142. See id. § 9-619(a)(4).
143. See id. § 9-619(b).
144. Cf id. § 9-613(5) (providing form of notice of collateral dispositions in transactions
other than consumer goods transactions); id. § 9-614(3) (providing form of notice of collateral
dispositions in consumer goods transactions); id. § 9-616 (not providing form of explanation
of calculation of surplus or deficiency).
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to require the secured party to submit the information on (or attach it to)
an "official" form. 145 Nor does revised section 9-619 address the treatment
of major or minor errors that may or may not make the transfer statement
seriously misleading. 146 This may not be an oversight. If the transfer statement is accepted and the records are revised to reflect the change in title,
then the only error surviving the revision that could cause concern would
be a typographical error in the name or mailing address of the transferee.
Presumably the transferee will timely discover and report any such error
to the public official, who then can take prompt remedial action to correct
the certificate or registry.
If no official form is required, 147 the following proposed form (modified
as necessary to fit a particular transaction) may be a useful guide:
Dear Public Official:
This letter is submitted as a "transfer form" as defined in Texas Business
& Commerce Code § 9-619.
Under a security agreement dated
-, 19 -, executed by [name/
address of debtor] ("Debtor"), and [name/address of secured party] ("Secured Party"), Debtor granted a security interest in "Collateral" (as defined in the security agreement) to secure payment and performance of
certain obligations owed to Secured Party. The "Collateral" includes a
1996 Ford Taurus (the "Vehicle"). Debtor's ownership of the Vehicle is
145. See id. § 9-619(b) (contemplating a standard "request form").
146. Cf id.
§ 9-613(3) (permitting minor errors that are not seriously misleading); id. § 9614(5) (prohibiting misleading errors concerning statutory rights and deferring to non-U.C.C.
law for treatment of some errors); id. § 9-616(d) (permitting minor errors that are not seriously
misleading).
147. Applicable law may recognize the title-clearing problem addressed by revised § 9619 without offering specific and exhaustive guidelines for its resolution. For example, the
Texas Transportation Code provides: "If a lien [on a motor vehicle] is foreclosed by nonjudicial means, the department may issue a new certificate of tide in the name of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale on receiving the affidavit of the lienholder of the fact of the
nonjudicial foreclosure." TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 501.074(b) (West 1997). Because the
statute does not state with particularity the contents of the affidavit, the secured party may
find the proposed transfer statement a useful form of "affidavit" in Texas and other jurisdictions with a similar law. Cf IDAHO CODE § 49-514 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (requiring "satisfactory proof" in the form of an "affidavit" by a person "setting forth facts entitling him
to possession and ownership," together with a copy of the "instrument upon which the claim
of possession and ownership is founded"); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-114(a) (West
Supp. 1998) (requiring "proof of the transfer"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.47 (West 1997)
(requiring "presentation of satisfactory proof ...of ownership and right of possession to
the vehicle"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4505.10(A) (Anderson 1997) (requiring "satisfactory
proof ... of ownership and rights of possession" in the form of an "affidavit" by a person
"setting forth the facts entitling the person to the possession and ownership," accompanied
by a copy of the "instrument upon which the claim of possession and ownership is founded");
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-104(c) (Michie 1997) (requiring a "verified or certified statement
of the transfer of the interest" that sets forth "[t]he reason for the involuntary transfer, the
interest transferred, the name of the transferee, the process or procedure effecting the transfer
and other information requested by the county clerk").
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19-.
Debtor has defaulted in its obligations owed to Secured Party. Secured
Party has exercised its post-default remedies, including disposing of the
Vehicle as permitted by Texas Business and Commerce Code § 9-610. As
a result of the disposition and pursuant to Texas Business and Commerce
Code § 9-615, all of Debtor's rights in the Vehicle have been transferred
to [name/address of transferee] (the "Purchaser").
Please promptly amend your records to reflect that Debtor's interest in
the Vehicle has been transferred to Purchaser and mail a new certificate
of title, issued in the name of Purchaser, to Purchaser at its address in the
preceding paragraph.
Please contact me if you have questions on this matter or need additional information.
In an effort to expedite registration in the name of the successful purchaser, a secured party may attempt to obtain record or legal title prior to
the foreclosure (which should improve the marketability of the collateral
and, therefore, facilitate a sale). A transfer statement that is processed prior
to foreclosure and transfers title from the debtor to the secured party does
not of itself trigger either a "disposition"1 48 under Article 9 or an acceptance of the collateral in satisfaction of the debt. 149 The secured party
remains obligated to perform its statutory duties, 150 such as the duty to
send notice of the disposition, 15 1 and the debtor still enjoys its statutory
152
rights, including the right to timely redeem the collateral.
As the Official Comments acknowledge, revised section 9-619 is not
intended to replace non-U.C.C. law that provides a means by which title
records can be revised to reflect changes in ownership resulting from postdefault dispositions under Article 9.153 Therefore a secured party and its
counsel should consult other federal and state law governing title to, and
registration of, the collateral being disposed before concluding that revised
section 9-619 applies. But to the extent that federal and state law fail to

148. Cf U.C.C. § 9-619(c).
149. See id. § 9-620(b) (stating that a purported or apparent acceptance of collateral is
ineffective unless certain conditions have been satisfied). But see Comer v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc., 858 P2d 560, 565 (Wyo. 1993) (holding that a strict foreclosure occurred when
a creditor acquired title to a repossessed mobile home in its own name after default and
before selling it). Cf Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-504(c) (stating that a transfer, by operation of
law, of an interest in a mobile home to a creditor "shall not be considered a strict foreclosure
or an election to retain the collateral in satisfaction of an obligation" under U.C.C. § 9-505
"and does not affect the debtor's right to redeem the collateral" under U.C.C. § 9-506).
150. See U.C.C. § 9-619(c).
151. Seeid. § 9-611(b).
152. See id. § 9-623(a), (c).
153. See id. § 9-619 cmt. 3.
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provide a title-clearing mechanism, revised section 9-619 affords welcome
relief.

REVISED SECTION 9-620: ACCEPTANCE OF
COLLATERAL IN FULL OR PARTIAL SATISFACTION
OF OBLIGATION; COMPULSORY DISPOSITION
OF COLLATERAL
Instead of disposing of collateral, a secured party may be willing to
retain the collateral and forgive the unpaid secured debt. A secured party
may find this option attractive for a variety of reasons. The creditor may
have no desire to collect a deficiency for economic, social, or other reasons.
The creditor may be worried that, despite its best efforts, it will trip over
one or more of the procedural hurdles placed in its path by the dispositionrelated provisions and expose itself to potential liability for its noncompliance. The creditor may wish to avoid having its conduct scrutinized

under a judicial microscope when the debtor alleges that the disposition
was not commercially reasonable. And certainly the secured party may
find the option attractive if it believes that the value of the collateral
exceeds the unpaid debt. The debtor, too, may welcome such an offer,
especially if it has no realistic hope of satisfying any deficiency or believes
that a commercially reasonable disposition is not likely to produce any
surplus proceeds. Recognizing that the debtor and secured party "are
frequently better off without a resale of the collateral,"' 154 current Article
9, through section 9-505, provides an alternative arrangement whereby
the secured party may retain the collateral and forego any claim to a
deficiency1 55 Revised Article 9, through section 9-620, continues to pro156
vide the secured party with this option, known as "strict foreclosure."'
154. See id. § 9-505 cmt. 1 (1995); see also GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.3, at 1220 ("The
best and simplest way of liquidating any secured transaction ... is for the secured party to
keep the collateral as his own free of the debtor's equity, waiving any clam to a deficiency
judgment.").
155. See U.C.C. § 9-505(2).
156. See, e.g., id. § 9-620 cmt. 2 (1998) (stating that revised §§ 9-620, 9-621, and 9-622 "deal
with strict foreclosure, a procedure by which the secured party acquires the debtor's interest
in the collateral without the need for a sale or other disposition under Section 9-610");
LaRoche v. Amoskeag Bank, 969 E2d 1299, 1303 (1st Cir. 1992) (referring to the 'strict
foreclosure' option available under U.C.C. § 9-505(2)"); LeRoy Adventures, Inc. v. Cafritz
Harbour Group, Inc., 660 A.2d 908, 912 (D.C. 1995) (referring to the "remedy of strict
foreclosure" under the local version of § 9-505); Patrick v. Wix Auto Co., 681 N.E.2d 98,
101 (111. App. Ct. 1997) (stating that § 9-505(2) "contains specific requirements for a strict
foreclosure"); General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Vashi, 480 N.W2d 880, 882 (Iowa 1992) (observing that the procedure of § 9-505(2) "is sometimes called 'strict foreclosure'); Alvin C.
Harrell, 1994 Meetings Refine Proposed Article 9 Revisions, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q REP. 326,
329 (1994) ("Current section 9-505 permits a secured party to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt, subject to certain qualifications. This is called 'strict foreclosure."');
Robert M. Lloyd, The Absolute Bar Rule in UC.C. Foreclosure Sales: A Prescriptionfor Waste, 40
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Under current Article 9, a secured party may propose to keep the collateral "in satisfaction of the obligation."' 157 Whether the statute permits
partial strict foreclosure-a process by which the creditor retains the collateral, forgives part of the debt, and sues the debtor for an agreed-upon
deficiency-has been the subject of debate. 158 Some interpret section 9505(2) as an all-or-nothing proposition that requires a creditor to forgive
the entire unpaid debt and forego any deficiency if the collateral is kept,
rather than disposed.' 59 Others have concluded that section 9-505(2) per-

UCLA L. REv. 695, 726 (1993) ('Article 9 expressly provides for strict foreclosure, but only
under the very limited circumstances of [U.C.C. § 9-505]."); Steve H. Nickles & Edward S.
Adams, Tracing Proceeds to Attorneys' Pockets (and the Dilemma of Payingfor Bankruptcy), 78 MINN.
L. REV. 1079, 1160 (1994) (referencing "the strict foreclosure remedy of section 9-505").
Except as provided by revised § 9-624, the rights and duties under revised § 9-620 cannot
be waived or varied. See U.C.C. § 9-602(10) (1998); id. § 9-624(b) (discussed infra notes 31319, 325-27, and accompanying text).
157. See U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1995). Under current Article 9, a creditor may propose strict
foreclosure "after default." Id. § 9-505(2). Revised § 9-620 does not expressly require a default
as a condition precedent to strict foreclosure, which might suggest that the creditor may
propose strict foreclosure at any time during the transaction. However, revised § 9-601 discourages any such suggestion by stating: "After default, a secured party has the rights provided
in this part .... " Id. § 9-601(a) (1998) (emphasis added).
158. The phrase "partial strict foreclosure" also could refer to the creditor's retention of
part of the collateral in satisfaction of all of the unpaid debt. The creditor's ability to do so
has not been challenged. See Weiss v. Alterman, 577 N.YS.2d 768, 771-72 (1991) (finding
"no reason" to hold that U.C.C. § 9-505(2) does not permit a creditor to retain part of the
collateral in full satisfaction of the debt, but refusing to apply that interpretation in a case
where the creditor's notices did not clearly manifest that intent); 2 GILMORE, supra note 9,
§ 44.3, at 1223 n.2 (construing the statutory reference to "the collateral" as "all or part of
the collateral"); 9 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 32, § 9-505:08, at 865-66 (suggesting that
a creditor's proposal to keep some collateral and forgive the entire unpaid debt "would seem
to create little problem").
159. See U.C.C. § 9-505 cmt. 1 (1995) (indicating that a creditor may keep the collateral,
"thus discharging the obligation and abandoning any claim for a deficiency") (emphasis
added); LaRoche, 969 F.2d at 1303 (indicating that U.C.C. § 9-505(2) "permits the secured
creditor to notify the debtor that it intends to retain the collateral in complete satisfaction of the
indebtedness"); Patrick, 681 N.E.2d at 101 (stating that under U.C.C. § 9-505 "a creditor
elects to retain the collateral asfull satisfaction of the debtor's obligations") (emphasis added);
2 GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.3, at 1223 n.2 (concluding that the statutory reference to "the
obligation" requires discharge of "the entire obligation"); Clark & Clark, supra note 38, at
257 (suggesting that acceptance of collateral in partial satisfaction of the debt is "something
that probably cannot be done under current law"); Neil B. Cohen, Credit Enhancement in
Domestic Transactions: Conceptualizingthe Devices and Reinventing the Law, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
21, 52 (1996) ("Under current law, a secured party may propose retaining the collateral only
in total satisfaction of the secured debt."); Wendell H. Holmes, "Involuntary Strict Foreclosure"
Under Section 9-505(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code: Tarpitfor the Tardy Creditor, 26 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 289, 298-99 n.50 (1991) ("The Code's language does not expressly foreclose
[the creditor from proposing to retain all of the collateral as satisfaction of only part of the
obligation], but surely it is beyond the policy of the statute."); Rapson, supra note 30, at 38
("Present Article 9 makes no provision for acceptance of the collateral in partial satisfaction
of the obligation.").
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mits (or should permit) partial strict foreclosure. 160 Revised Article 9 resolves the debate by permitting the creditor to accept collateral "in full or
partial satisfaction" of the unpaid secured debt. 16 1 This clarification,
which comports with pre-U.C.C. law, 162 benefits both parties by providing
additional flexibility in a variety of situations, including when the creditor's
unsecured position makes retention in full satisfaction of the debt impractical and any disposition is unlikely to result in net proceeds satisfactory to
the parties.163 It also recognizes that a secured party already can achieve
the functional equivalent of a partial strict foreclosure by buying collateral
at public and, in limited situations, private dispositions 164 and then suing
65
the debtor for a deficiency'1
Whether revised Article 9 should permit partial strict foreclosure in
consumer transactions was the subject of much debate during the revision
process. Early drafts prohibited partial strict foreclosure in all consumer
secured transactions.

166

167
It
Later, the blanket prohibition was deleted.

160. See Peter E Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REV. 477, 520-24 (1973)
(arguing that the "rights" which can be modified by a debtor under § 9-505 include the right
to agree to a partial strict foreclosure); Alysse Kaplan, PartialSatisfaction Under the UCC, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 221, 227-34 (1992) (offering statutory and policy reasons for permitting
partial satisfaction under U.C.C. § 9-505(2)); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 26, § 34-9, at
428 ("All judges appear to agree that if the debtor has expressly agreed after default that the
secured creditor may take the collateral at an agreed valuation in partial satisfaction of the
debt, the secured creditor may still recover the balance owing."); see also Oraka v. Jaraysi,
486 S.E.2d 69, 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) ('After default, a creditor cannot, absent express
agreement of the debtor, take the collateral at a specific valuation and only give such credit
against the deficiency"); S. M. Flickinger Co. v. 18 Genesee Corp., 423 N.YS.2d 73, 77
(App. Div. 1979) (Moule,J., dissenting) (citing Professor Coogan's article for the proposition
that a debtor can agree to a partial strict foreclosure).
161. See U.C.C. § 9-620(a) (1998). Louisiana, through a non-uniform amendment to
U.C.C. § 9-505, already expressly permits a creditor to retain collateral in partial satisfaction
of the unpaid debt. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-505(5) (West 1993).
162. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 55 cmt. a (1941) ("The pledgor and pledgee
should not be prevented from making a bargain by which the pledged chattel can be taken
in whole or in part satisfaction of the pledgee's claim.").
163. See PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 12, at 243-44.
164. See U.C.C. § 9-610(c) (1998); id. § 9-504(3) (1995); see also Zubrow, supra note 87, at
539 n.381 ("There is virtually no difference between strict foreclosure and the purchase of
collateral by a creditor for its own account at a purportedly 'public' sale with only a few
bidders.").
165. See U.C.C. § 9-615(d)(2) (1998); id. § 9-504(2) (1995). However, the amount of the
deficiency might not be the same in both situations. One reason for a potential difference is
that the debtor can attempt to negotiate the amount of the deficiency in a partial strict
foreclosure before agreeing to the foreclosure. The debtor has much less control over the
amount of the deficiency in a traditional disposition. A difference also could result from the
presence or absence of disposition-related expenses (such as storage charges) and reasonable
attorneys' fees and legal expenses.
166. See id. § 9-505(1) (DraftJuly 28-Aug. 4, 1995) ("In a consumer secured transaction, a
secured party may accept collateral only in full satisfaction, and not in partial satisfaction,
of the obligation it secures.").
167. See id. § 9-618 (DraftJuly 25-Aug. 1, 1997).
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subsequently reappeared as part of a compromise between representatives
of consumer creditors and advocates of consumer interests.1 68 As passed,
revised Article 9 prohibits partial strict foreclosure in a consumer trans-

168. See id. § 9-618(h) (Draft Mar. 1998) ("In a consumer transaction, a secured party may
not accept collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures."). The following excerpt reflects the "consumer compromise":
During the February, 1998, meeting of the Drafting Committee in Rosemont, Illinois,
the Drafting Committee approved in principle, and asked the Reporters to incorporate
in this draft, a list of proposed revisions relating to consumer transactions. Most of the
proposals, but not all, relate to Part 6, Default. The chair of the Drafting Committee
presented the proposals as a compromise, explaining that if the package of proposals
were accepted by the Drafting Committee and its sponsors, representatives of consumer
creditors involved in the process would actively support, and advocates of consumer
interests involved in the process would not oppose, enactment of revised Article 9. The
chair explained further that the alternative would be widespread opposition, with
pitched battles in the various legislatures during the enactment process. This controversy
could delay or inhibit enactment of the revisions. The compromise grew out of discussions among creditor and consumer representatives, a special consumer subcommittee
organized by the NCCUSL leadership, and the chair of the Drafting Committee.
Under the proposal, several provisions of the prior draft would be deleted: Sections
... 9-613(b)(3) (notice of disposition containing minor errors not seriously misleading
is sufficient); 9-622 (reinstatement rights of consumer debtor or secondary obligor); 9624(d) and (e) (reduction of secured party's liability for statutory damages by amount
of loss of deficiency or actual damages awarded to consumer); 9-625, Alternative A
(absolute bar rule alternative for consumer transactions); 9-627(d) (bona-fide error defense to statutory damages); 9-627(e) (limitation on recoveries in class actions); 9-628
(reciprocal attorney's fees in consumer transactions).
The proposal also calls for revision of several other provisions. Sections 9-104() and
(g) (approving "dual status" rule and setting burden of proof) would be applicable only
to non-consumer transactions, as would Section 9-625, Alternative B (rebuttable presumption rule).... Section 9-614A (post-disposition notice) would be revised to provide
for a somewhat more general statement of how a deficiency or surplus was calculated.
The comments to Section 9-614 would be modified to delete any statement that "price"
is not a term of a disposition that is required to be commercially reasonable, and an
explanatory comment would be added to the effect that a low price mandates enhanced
judicial scrutiny of the terms of a disposition. Finally, Section 9-618 would be revised
to prohibit partial strict foreclosure for consumer goods.
Revised Article 9, Reporters' Prefatory Note, cmt. 2 (Draft Mar. 1998).
The debate over whether (and to what extent) Article 9 should govern consumer transactions has raged since original Article 9 was drafted. See I GILMORE, supra note 9, § 9.2, at
293 (contending that "[t]he controversy over the consumer question was one of the most
violent in the history of the Code's drafting"); Grant Gilmore, The Secured TransactionArticle
of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 44 (1951) (observing that "how
much or how little Article 9 should do for the consumer, or about the special problems arising
in the consumer field, has caused more debate than any other single matter that has been
considered in the course of drafting"). William Burke, the chair of the drafting committee,
has referred to the treatment of consumer issues as "the most difficult problem" confronted
by the drafting committee. SeeJulian B. McDonnell, Securing Consumer Credit CardAccounts With
Goods Purchased: Celebration of Freedom or Exercise in Bondage?, 31 UCC LJ. 332, 343 (1999).
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action. 169 The reason for prohibiting partial strict foreclosures in consumer
transactions may have been in response to a concern that a consumer
might not understand the creditor's proposal and accept it without realizing all of the ramifications. 170 Rather than address the concern through
a blanket prohibition, the statute could have mandated the insertion of
conspicuous language in the creditor's notice aimed at fully apprising the
consumer of its rights and potential liability. In this manner, revised section
9-620 could have addressed the need to improve consumer awareness
while concurrently preserving a remedy that both parties might find mutually beneficial.
A creditor may accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the
unpaid secured debt only if four conditions are satisfied. First, the debtor
must consent to the creditor's proposal.17 If the creditor proposes partial
strict foreclosure, the debtor consents by agreeing to the proposal in a
record authenticated after default. 172 If the creditor proposes full strict
foreclosure, the debtor's consent can be express or implied. The debtor
can expressly consent in a record authenticated after default.173 Alternatively, the debtor's consent is implied if (i) the creditor's proposal is unconditional (or subject only to the condition that collateral not in the creditor's possession be preserved and maintained), 174 (ii) the creditor's
proposal expresses an intent to accept collateral in full satisfaction of the
unpaid secured debt, 175 (iii) the creditor fails to receive, within twenty days
after sending its proposal to the debtor, the debtor's authenticated notification of objection, 176 and (iv) the creditor's proposal is made in good
7
faith. 17
169. See U.C.C. § 9-620(g) (1998); see also id. § 9-102(a)(26) (defining "consumer transaction"). A secured party may not contract around the prohibition. See id. § 9-602(10).
170. See Michael M. Greenfield, The Role of Assent in Article 2 and Article 9, 75 WASH. U.
L.Q 289, 301 (1997) (stating that the drafting committee elected to prohibit partial strict
foreclosure in consumer transactions in recognition of "the high risk of ineffective communication in the consumer context").
171. See U.C.C. § 9-620(a)(1).
172. See id. § 9-620(c)(1); see also id. § 9-102(a)(7) (defining "authenticate"); id. § 9-102(a)(69)
(defining "record"); cf id. § 9-505(2) (1995) (referencing the secured party's receipt of an
"objection in writing").
173. See id. § 9-620(c)(2) (1998).
174. See id. § 9-620(c)(2)(A).
175. See id. § 9-620(c)(2)(B).
176. See id. § 9-620(c)(2)(C); see also id. § 9-102 cmt. 9(b) (indicating that an authenticated
notification refers to an authenticated record that contains a notification). Under current
Article 9, the debtor has a 2 1-day objection period that starts on the date when the creditor
sends its notice. See id. § 9-505(2) (1995). Early drafts of revised Article 9 continued the 21day objection period. See id. § 9-505(d)(2)(iii) (Draft July 28-Aug. 4, 1995). The objection
period lost a day in subsequent drafts for no apparent reason. See id. § 9-505(d)(2)(iii) (Draft
July 12-19, 1996). Even so, the objection period remains more liberal than that currently
adopted by the Kansas legislature. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-505(2) (1996) (providing an
objection period of 15 days).
177. See U.C.C § 9-620 cmt. 11 (1998).
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Two observations on this first requirement are worth stating. First, the
debtor's consent to a proposal of partial satisfaction must be express; it
cannot be implied. The prohibition against implied consent to a partial
strict foreclosure presumably results from a heightened concern that
through mere silence a debtor should not lose its property and also remain
liable for an amount of debt calculated by the creditor in its sole discretion.
And second, unless the debtor receives the proposal on the date when it
is sent by the creditor, the debtor does not have a full twenty days in which
to object. The objection period begins running from the date when the
creditor sends the notice, not the date when the debtor receives the notice. 178 Furthermore, the debtor's objection must be received within that
twenty-day period; an objection sent within that period but received by
the creditor thereafter is not timely. Therefore, a debtor should send the
notice in a manner that provides objective evidence of the date of the
creditor's receipt.
The second condition to an effective strict foreclosure is that the secured
party must not timely receive an authenticated notification of objection
from either (i) a party to whom the secured party is required to send its
proposal or (ii) a lienholder or other secured party with a subordinate
property interest in the collateral subject to the proposal.17 9 To be timely,
an objection from a party to whom the secured party is required to send
its proposal must be received by the secured party within twenty days after
the date when the secured party sent its proposal to that person. 180 An
objection from any other party is timely if the secured party receives it
within twenty days after the date when it last sent its proposal to any
required recipient, unless the only party to whom the secured party is
required to send its notice is the debtor, in which case an objection must
be received before the debtor consents to the proposal. 18 1
As mentioned before, the usual twenty-day objection period' 8 2 begins
running on the date when the creditor sends the notice, not the date when
the objecting party receives the notice. Also observe that a non-recipient
normally has a comparable objection period, but in those situations where
the debtor is the only party to whom the secured party must send its
proposal, the debtor's acceptance terminates a non-recipient's right to
178. Prior to its amendment in 1972, U.C.C. § 9-505(2) provided the debtor with a 30day objection period that commenced on the date of the debtor's receipt of the creditor's
notice. See id. § 9-505 ("Text Prior to 1972 Amendment"). Through a non-uniform amendment to § 9-505(2), Wisconsin presently provides a debtor with a 21-day objection period
that runs from the date of its receipt of the notice. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 409.505(2) (West
1995).
179. See U.C.C. § 9-620(a)(2) (1998).
180. See id. § 9-620(d)(1).
181. See id. § 9-620(d)(2).
182. Cf id. § 9-505(2) (1995) (providing a 21-day objection period); § id. 9-505(e) (Draft
July 28-Aug. 4, 1995) (continuing the 21-day objection period); id. § 9-505(e) (Draft July 12-

19, 1996) (shortening the period to 20 days).
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object or the effectiveness of any objection sent but not yet received by
the secured party. Therefore, a non-recipient should expedite the creditor's
receipt of any objection and not assume that it enjoys the normal objection
period.
The third condition applies only if the collateral consists of consumer
goods. A strict foreclosure of consumer goods is not effective if the debtor
183
possesses the consumer goods when it consents to the strict foreclosure.
Presumably this limitation is included to address the concern that a consumer debtor may believe that as long as it exercises physical control of
the item, the creditor cannot exercise strict foreclosure. In reliance on that
erroneous belief the consumer may fail to timely object to a creditor's
proposal, not realizing that silence may create implied consent. 184 To protect the consumer against the harsh results of its own inaction the statute
renders ineffective any consent by a debtor that possesses the consumer
goods.
But the condition extends too far and may have unintended consequences for the party it seeks to protect, the consumer debtor. Knowing
that the consumer's consent, express or implied, to an offer of strict foreclosure is not effective if the consumer possesses the collateral, a creditor
may repossess the collateral before sending its proposal. After adding the
costs of repossession to the unpaid debt, the creditor may rethink its options. If the creditor foregoes strict foreclosure and decides to dispose of
the collateral, the debtor not only loses its interest in the collateral but also
is likely to be sued for a deficiency. The statute would better protect consumers against such litigation if it permitted debtors, in possession of
consumer goods, to expressly consent to the creditor's proposal to take the
collateral in satisfaction of the unpaid debt.
The fourth condition also applies only if the collateral consists of consumer goods. A creditor cannot exercise the remedy of strict foreclosure
if it possesses consumer goods and at least sixty percent of the cash price
has been paid (if the security interest is a purchase-money security interest)
or at least sixty percent of the principal amount has been paid (in nonpurchase-money cases).1 85 Instead, the creditor must timely dispose of the
183. See id. § 9-620(a)(3) (1998).
184. See id. § 9-620(c)(2).
185. See id. § 9-620(a)(4), (e); see also id. § 9-103 (discussing purchase-money concepts). Current Article 9 also prescribes a "60 percent" test. See id. § 9-505(1) (1995). Under pre-U.C.C.
law, a creditor in a transaction governed by the Uniform Conditional Sales Act was required
to dispose of repossessed collateral if the buyer had paid "at least fifty per cent of the
purchase price at the time of the retaking." See UNIF. COND. SALES ACT § 19, 3B U.L.A.
585 (1992).
Notice that in a purchase-money transaction the test is 60% of the cash price, which may
be different from the amount financed. For example, if a debtor buys a $30,000 car by
making a $3000 down payment and financing the balance of $27,000, the test is satisfied
(and strict foreclosure is not an option) when the debtor has paid $18,000 (60% of $30,000),
not $16,200 (60% of $27,000).
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collateral. 186 Theoretically, a consumer debtor should benefit from this
provision because a forced disposition of collateral in which the debtor
has significant equity should produce surplus proceeds. 187 But what should
happen and what will happen may not mirror each other. The vagaries
of market prices for used consumer goods, combined with the off-the-top
payment of the creditor's costs of repossession and other disposition-related expenses,1 8 8 may make the possible benefits afforded by revised section
9-620(e) less attractive to a risk-averse debtor than the certain advantages
provided by an offer of strict foreclosure. 189 Recognizing that a consumer
debtor may be better off accepting the creditor's offer of a strict foreclosure, current Article 9 permits a consumer debtor who satisfies the "60%
186. See U.C.C. § 9-620(e), () (1998). The creditor must dispose of the collateral within
90 days after taking possession unless the debtor and all secondary obligors agree, after default
and in an authenticated agreement, to a longer period. See id. § 9-620(). The statute imposes
a relatively short disposition period in an effort to avoid loss of value due to excessive depreciation, a trait common to most consumer goods. 9 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 32,
§ 9-505:02, at 854; Holmes, supra note 159, at 298.
Current Article 9 does not expressly permit the parties to extend the 90-day period. See
U.C.C. § 9-505(1) (1995); cf CAL. COM. CODE § 9505(1) (West 1990) (requiring the secured
party to dispose of the collateral "within 90 days after he takes possession or within a reasonable time after such 90-day period"); OR. REV. STAT. § 79.5050(1) (1988) (providing a
180-day period). U.C.C. § 9-505(1) does permit a consumer, however, after default, to execute
a statement "renouncing or modifying his rights." One court has construed this language as
permitting a debtor to agree to extend the 90-day period. See Kelley v. Commercial Nat'l
Bank, 678 E2d 620, 622-24 (Kan. 1984) (concluding creditor that possessed collateral on
November 4, 1981, and sold it on August 16, 1982, did not violate § 9-505(1) where evidence
revealed debtor had agreed to extension of 90-day disposition period). But see 2 GILMORE,
supra note 9, § 44.3, at 1222 ("What was meant was that the debtor could waive his right to
a compulsory resale and agree to let the secured party keep the collateral as his own provided
the debtor was discharged from his obligation."). The express flexibility provided by revised
§ 9-620() should benefit debtors when the market for collateral is seasonal. For example, a
creditor may repossess a snowmobile from a Vermont resident in February. If the optimum
market for snowmobile purchases does not fall in the 90-day period following repossession,
the debtor can agree to extend the period into the fall or winter months, when the demand
for snowmobiles may bring a sales price both higher than an off-season disposition and
sufficient to compensate for any depreciation during the extension.
Under current Article 9, a creditor that fails to timely dispose of the collateral may be
liable for conversion or other damages. See U.C.C. § 9-505(1). Under revised Article 9, the
creditor remains liable for damages. See id. § 9-625(b), (c) (1998). Accompanying comments
reveal an intent to continue to allow an aggrieved party to recover a different measure of
damages in tort. See id. § 9-625 cmt. 3.
187. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.3, at 1222; 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 26,
§ 34-9, at 427; James P Nehf, Effective Regulation of Rent-to-Own Contracts, 52 OHIO ST. LJ.
751, 803 (1991); see also Ielley, 678 P2d at 623.
188. See U.C.C. § 9-615(a)(1) (1998); id. § 9-504(1)(a) (1995).
189. See Nehf, supra note 187, at 803 (concluding that, in the absence of "extraordinary
circumstances," the possibility of a consumer receiving any surplus proceeds under U.C.C.
§ 9-505(1) is "remote"); see also Holmes, supra note 159, at 317-18 n. 150 (suggesting that the
rule is "probably perverse" because a forced sale of consumer goods that have rapidly depreciated "simply guarantee[s] a deficiency judgment").
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test" to waive his right to a forced sale. 190 Revised Article 9 retains the
same flexibility.19'
Under current section 9-505, a secured creditor cannot propose to ac2
cept collateral in satisfaction of the debt unless it possesses the collateral. 19
This prevents strict foreclosure not only if the debtor possesses the collateral but also when the collateral is intangible, such as accounts and intellectual property. With the exception of consumer goods, 19 3 revised section
9-620 no longer requires a secured party to possess the collateral, 194 making this remedy an option in more post-default situations. 19 5
An issue that exists under current Article 9 is whether a secured party
that possesses collateral for an unreasonable period of time without attempting to dispose of it can be deemed, as a matter of law, to have elected
190. See U.C.C. § 9-505(1) (1995).
191. See id. § 9-620(a)(4) (1998); id. § 9-624(b) (discussed infra notes 313-19, 325-27, and
accompanying text). Not until very late in the drafting process did revised Article 9 permit
this waiver. Compare id. § 9-620(a)(4) (Draft approved at NCCUSL Annual MeetingJuly 30,
1998) ("subsection (e) does not require the secured party to dispose of the collateral"), with
id. §§ 9-620(a), 9-624 (Draft Nov. 15, 1998) (adding "or the debtor waives the requirement
pursuant to Section 9-624" to end of revised § 9-620(a)(4) and adding new revised § 9-624(b)
that allows the debtor to waive its right to require a disposition under revised § 9 - 6 20(e)).
192. See id. § 9-505(2) (1995); see also Bischoff v. Thomasson, 400 So. 2d 359, 368-69 (Ala.
1981) (holding that creditor could exercise strict foreclosure of ring in its possession); Sprangers v. Fundamental Bus. Tech., Inc., 412 N.W2d 47, 48-50 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding creditor could not exercise strict foreclosure of securities held by escrow agent where
creditor was not party to escrow agreement, and holding unenforceable a provision in security
agreement waiving possession requirement). But see Martin-Musumeci v. Law Offices of
Herbert Hafif Pension & Profit Sharing Plan, 19 F3d 28 (9th Cir.) (unpublished opinion),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 79 (1994) (concluding, for limited purpose of U.C.C. § 9-505(2), that
creditor had possession of equity interest in a trust, a general intangible); CLARK, supra note
9, 4.10[2], at S4-73 ("There is no policy reason why that remedy should not be available
for all types of collateral. Although U.C.C. § 9-505(2) refers to strict foreclosure as the remedy
of a secured party 'in possession' of the collateral, it does not seem unreasonable to read
that phrase as 'in possession, where possession is possible.' "); 2 GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.3,
at 1223 ("No satisfactory reason suggests itself why the formality of taking possession must
be accomplished before the secured party can make a proposal under § 9-505(2) and set the
time periods running."); cf PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 12, at 239-41 (indicating
that the PEB Study Group could not reach consensus on whether the possession requirement
should be retained when collateral is tangible, but recommending elimination of the possession requirement when collateral is intangible).
193. See U.C.C. § 9-620(a)(3) (1998).
194. See id. § 9-620 cmt. 7.
195. If all parties agree to a strict foreclosure of accounts, payment intangibles, promissory
notes, or chattel paper, then the secured party's acceptance of that collateral is treated as a
"sale" by the debtor to the secured party, whose interest in the collateral will be considered
a "security interest" under revised Article 9. See id. § 9-109(a)(3). The secured party and the
debtor need not execute a new security agreement to evidence the security interest, nor will
the secured party need to file a new financing statement (assuming that any financing statement previously filed
by the secured party perfected its security interest in the collateral prior
to the strict foreclosure) or take any other action to perfect its interest. See id. § 9-620
cmt. 10.
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to keep the collateral, forgive the debt, and waive any right to a deficiency,
even though the creditor has never sent notice of that intent to the debtor
and other interested parties. Courts have taken three different approaches.
Some courts refuse to find that a creditor has involuntarily elected a strict
foreclosure in the absence of any notice of that intent. 196 They reason that

current section 9-505(2)'s notice requirement discourages an implied election and that a debtor can protect its interests under current section 9-507(1)

by compelling a disposition or seeking damages. 197 Other courts have concluded that a creditor's retention of collateral for an unreasonable period
of time can trigger a strict foreclosure.1 98 These courts are concerned that
a creditor may hold the collateral an unreasonable period of time and
196. See, e.g., Warnaco, Inc. v. Farkas, 872 E2d 539, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1989); Forbes v. Four
Queens Enters., Inc., 210 B.R. 905, 910 (D.R.I. 1997); In re Nardone, 70 B.R. 1010, 101617 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); Bank of Boston Int'l v. Tefel, 644 F Supp. 1423, 1428 (E.D.N.Y
1986); In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 48 B.R. 341, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Hanam, B.V v.
Kittay, 589 E Supp. 1042, 1048 (S.D.N.Y 1984); Alamosa Nat'l Bank v. San Luis Valley
Grain Growers, Inc., 756 P2d 1022, 1026 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Allen v. Coates, 661 So.
2d 879, 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Munao v. Lagattuta, 691 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Il. App.
Ct. 1998); Stensel v. Stensel, 380 N.E.2d 526, 528-29 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978); Priggen Steel
Bldgs. Co. v. Parsons, 213 N.E.2d 252, 253 (Mass. 1966);Jones v. Morgan, 228 N.W2d 419,
423 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); American Parts Sys., Inc. v. T & T Automotive, Inc., 358 N.W2d
674, 677 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc.,
535 P.2d 1077, 1078 (N.M. 1975); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Mitchell, 464 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97
(1983); S. M. Flickinger Co. v. 18 Genessee Corp., 423 N.YS.2d 73, 76 (App. Div. 1979);
First Bank v. Haberer Dairy & Farm Equip., Inc., 412 N.W2d 866, 870-71 (S.D. 1987). Cf
IFG Leasing Co. v. Gordon, 776 P2d 607, 614 (Utah 1989) (declining to "address the various
views regarding the issue, except to reiterate that section 9-501 expressly states that the
requirement of actual written notice under section 9-505(2) cannot be varied or waived").
197. See, e.g., Warnaco, 872 E2d at 544-45; Jones, 228 N.W2d at 423; S. M. Flickinger Co.,
423 N.YS.2d at 76; see also U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1995) (imposing liability on a debtor for a
deficiency "unless otherwise agreed"). But see Moran v. Holman, 514 P2d 817, 820 (Alaska
1973) (noting that the debtor's possible remedies under U.C.C. § 9-507 are "illusory in most
cases" because of the debtor's "poor financial position" and the small amount involved);
Haufler v. Ardinger, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 893, 897 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1979) ("In
our opinion, a secured party should not be permitted to profit by his own failure to furnish
requisite notice by both retaining the property for his own use and then seeking additional
recovery from the debtor."); Schmode's, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 361 N.W2d 557, 558 (Neb. 1985)
("We reject this view on the ground that a secured party ought not be allowed to penalize a
debtor by asserting the secured party's own failure to give the notice contemplated by § 9505(2).").
198. See, e.g., Schultz v. Delaware Trust Co., 360 A.2d 576, 578 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976)
("There must be a reasonable limit to the length of time a secured party is permitted to hold
collateral before it is deemed to have exercised its right to retain that collateral in satisfaction
of the obligation."); Millican v. Turner, 503 So. 2d 289, 291 (Miss. 1987) (remanding for
factual determination whether creditor had elected strict foreclosure by holding vehicle for
six months); H. V Funding, Inc. v. Ernest Vakkas & Sons, Inc., 531 N.YS.2d 484, 486 (Dist.
Ct. 1988) (finding an implied retention where creditor repossessed collateral in August 1986
and had not yet sold it at time of trial in April 1988); Service Chevrolet, Inc. v. Sparks, 660
P2d 760, 763-64 (Wash. 1983) (holding that retention of collateral for an unreasonable period
of time could create a strict foreclosure, and remanding for determination whether fourweek delay in informing debtors that they could reclaim their repossessed vehicle triggered
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then sue on the underlying obligation with unfair consequences for the
debtor. 199 And a third group has found a strict foreclosure if the creditor's
behavior (or misbehavior) manifested an intent to accept the collateral in
satisfaction of the unpaid debt. 200 This approach borrows from the analogous concept of accord and satisfaction, which requires proof of the cred20 1
itor's assent.
an implied strict foreclosure); Swanson v. May, 697 P.2d 1013, 1015-16 (Wash. Ct. App.
1985) (concluding that creditor's retention of farm equipment for over one year was not,
under the facts, sufficiently unreasonable to trigger a strict foreclosure); Durdahl v. Bank of
Casper, 718 P2d 23, 28 (Wyo. 1986) (remanding for factual determination whether creditor's
continued retention of collateral at time of oral argument was so unreasonable that creditor
would be deemed to have exercised its remedy of strict foreclosure). Cf FDIC v. Tempest
Fugat, H.L.I., Inc., 707 P2d 81, 85 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (failing to find an implied strict
foreclosure despite 22-month delay between repossession and sale and 300 hours of unauthorized use of collateral by sales agent after "[a]ssuming that an unreasonable delay in
selling repossessed collateral may imply a creditor's intent" to exercise the remedy of strict
foreclosure).
199. See, e.g., Service Chevrolet, 660 P2d at 763. See also Graff v. North Port Dev. Co., 734
N.W2d 221, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Schmode's, 361 N.E.2d at 558-59.
200. See, e.g., In re Durastone Co., 223 BR. 396, 404-05 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998) (holding
creditor's post-repossession behavior-using, renting, and unsuccessfully attempting to sell
boom trailer held for over six years-"clearly signaled" intent to retain collateral in full
satisfaction of unpaid debt); In re Boyd, 73 B.R. 122, 124-25 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (finding
bank employee's use of repossessed boat manifested intent to keep collateral and forgive
debt); In re Deephouse Equip. Co., 38 B.R. 400, 403-05 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (concluding
evidence did not establish creditor intended to keep collateral in full satisfaction of unpaid
secured debt); Moran, 514 P2d at 819-21 (finding implied strict foreclosure where creditor
used repossessed vehicle for his own use during four-month period between repossession and
commencement of lawsuit); Nelson v. Armstrong, 582 P.2d 1100, 1107-09 (Idaho 1978)
(ruling that creditor's retention of collateral for 4.5 months, without some manifestation of
intent to exercise its rights under U.C.C. § 9-505(2), did not create a strict foreclosure); Haufler,
28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 896-97 (affirming trial court's conclusion that creditor's continued
possession and use of collateral for 38 months prior to sale created an implied strict foreclosure); Schmode's, 361 N.W2d at 559 (holding that creditor elected to retain collateral in satisfaction of debt when, during three-year period prior to sale, it leased collateral to others
who operated it for at least 204,000 miles); Wang v. Wang, 440 N.W2d 740, 745-46 (S.D.
1989) (concluding that creditor that took collateral in July 1980, told co-maker to stay away
from the storage location, and did not attempt to sell collateral until December 1984, had
exercised its strict foreclosure remedy); Tanenbaum v. Economics Lab., Inc., 628 S.W2d 769,
771-72 (Tex. 1982) (holding creditor's decision to scrap repossessed restaurant equipment
amounted to strict foreclosure). Cf Wisconics Eng'g, Inc. v. Fisher, 466 N.E.2d 745, 763 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1984) (Stating that "[t]here may be circumstances in which strict compliance with
the written notice provisions of § 9-505(2) are not essential to a claim that the secured party,
by his unreasonable conduct, retained the collateral in satisfaction of the debt."); Winters
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Saker, 419 N.E.2d 890, 893 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that a
"creditor may, under certain conditions, be deemed to have exercised its statutory right" of
strict foreclosure).
201. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281(1) (1979) (defining an "accord" as "a contract under which an obligee promises to accept a stated performance in
satisfaction of the obligor's existing duty") (emphasis added). See, e.g., Lamp Fair, Inc. v. PerezOrtiz, 888 E2d 173, 176-77 (1st Cir. 1989); Craff, 734 S.W2d at 228-29; Schmode's, 361
N.W2d at 559.
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The frequency with which the issue has been litigated, together with
the inconsistent approaches taken by the courts, combined to make a response by revised Article 9 all but a foregone conclusion. Joining the majority of courts, and following the recommendation of the PEB Study
Group, 20 2 revised section 9-620 no longer permits constructive, implied,
or involuntary strict foreclosures. Under revised section 9-620, a "purported or apparent" strict foreclosure is ineffective unless the secured party
sends a proposal of strict foreclosure to the debtor (or otherwise consents,
in an authenticated record, to a strict foreclosure) and all conditions prec20 3
edent to an effective strict foreclosure are met. As with the three different
approaches taken by various courts, the approach adopted by revised section 9-620 will have its fans and its critics. Proponents will rejoice that a
creditor no longer can involuntarily waive its right to a deficiency, a most
punitive result. 20 4 Opponents will contend that the statute effectively permits the creditor to deprive a debtor of its property for an extended period
of time with impunity except in those rare situations where the debtor,
already in default, has the financial ability to exert pressure on the credi20 6
tor.20 5 While parties may disagree on the merits of the approach taken,
hopefully all will agree that the decision to statutorily confront the issue
202. See PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 12, at 245-46.
203. See U.C.C. § 9-620(b) (1998).
204. See, e.g., WILLAM H. LAWRENCE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 18.02[A], at 350 (1997) (describing constructive strict foreclosure as "wrong" and
"nothing more than a fiction that allows a court to impose what is, in effect, an absolute bar
on the secured party's right to a deficiency"). However, an unreasonable delay in disposition
may support a charge that the secured party has not acted in a commercially reasonable
manner. See U.C.C. § 9-620 cmt. 5 (1998).
205. See, e.g., Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will Articles 2,
2B and 9 Be Fair To Consumers?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q.69, 130-31 (1997) (urging the retention of
constructive strict foreclosure in consumer cases where the creditor's unreasonably long delay
in disposing of the collateral may prejudice a consumer's ability to quantify the resulting
harm).
206. Most secured parties will be pleased with the approach adopted by revised § 9-620(b),
whereas most debtors will be disappointed. In a rare situation, however, the secured party
may argue for, and the debtor against, a forced strict foreclosure. For example, a secured
party may repossess collateral, hold it for an extended period of time, and then sell it for
more than the unpaid debt. Desiring to keep the surplus proceeds, the secured party will
argue that it has involuntarily elected a strict foreclosure even though it never sent notice of
its intent to keep the collateral in satisfaction of the debt. The debtor will contend that the
creditor, in the absence of any notice, did not elect a strict foreclosure and that the debtor
is therefore entitled to the surplus proceeds. How courts would resolve such a situation under
current § 9-505(2) is unclear. Cf Brown v. Baker, 688 P.2d 943, 951 n.5 (Alaska 1984) (refusing
to relax the notice requirement of U.C.C. § 9-505 "where it is the creditor and not the debtor
who argues that he opted to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt"); 4 WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 26, § 34-9, at 429 ("But we would be generally less sympathetic when
the creditor rather than the debtor advances an implied election argument, for here the
debtor may not have had sufficient notice of the possible loss of its equity in the collateral.").
Revised Article 9, through §§ 9-620(b) and 9-615(d)(1), would prompt a court to award any
surplus proceeds to the debtor.
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should reduce litigation, promote uniformity, and provide certainty.20 7 For
that, the drafting committee deserves nonpartisan applause.

REVISED SECTION 9-621: NOTIFICATION OF
PROPOSAL TO ACCEPT COLLATERAL
Current Article 9, through section 9-505(2), describes the parties to
whom a secured party must send its notice of strict foreclosure. The parties
to whom a secured party must send its "proposal" 20 8 of strict foreclosure
under revised Article 9 are described in section 9-621.209
207. SeeJean Braucher, The Repo Code: A Study of Adjustment to Uncertainty in Commercial Law,
75 WASH. U. L.Q 549, 550 (1997) (commenting on the conventional wisdom that "certainty
is justice in the commercial field"); James Chareq & Anne Fortney, An Argument for Retaining
the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q REP. 315, 321 (1997) (asserting that
"[t]he pillar upon which the U.C.C. rests is its promise of creating uniformity and predictability"); Corinne Cooper, The Madonnas Play Tug of War With the Whores or Who Is Saving the
UCC?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 563, 568-69 (1993) (contending that "lawyers who have as their
main goal to advance the cause of clarity, uniformity, and elegance (CUE) in commercial
law ...are the keepers of the precious flame that is the UCC"); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of
Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (observing that "[e]ven in
simpler times uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of Law" and
noting that predictability "is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name"); cf
Fred H. Miller,Is Karl's Code Kaput?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 703, 707 (1993) (suggesting that
"rigid uniformity" is not, and probably never was, a "realistic goal" of the U.C.C.). But see
1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7, at 21
(Practitioner's 3d ed. 1988) (describing as "false or fanciful" the notion that a well-drafted
code "will greatly reduce uncertainty, enhance predictability and diminish the volume of
legal disputes").
208. A "proposal" is "a record authenticated by a secured party which includes the terms
on which the secured party is willing to accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the
obligation it secures pursuant to Sections 9-620, 9-621 and 9-622." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(66)
(1998); see also id. § 9-102(a)(7) (defining "authenticate"); id. § 9-102(a)(69) (defining "record").
Revised Article 9 does not propose a model form or stipulate what information must be
included. At a minimum, the proposal should describe the collateral to be retained, the
amount of debt to be satisfied, and any applicable conditions. See id. § 9-620 cmt. 4; 2
GIILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.3, at 1224; see also In re Alcom Am. Corp., 154 B.R. 97, 113
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1993) ("To fulfill the requirements of § 9-505(2), the secured party must
explicitly inform the debtor that it is retaining the collateral in satisfaction of the indebtedness."); In re Leeling, 129 BR. 637, 642 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) ("[W]hile it might not be
necessary to use the magic words 'foreclosure' or 'retain in full satisfaction of the indebtedness' the intent to retain must be such that a reasonable person would understand that intent,
and it must be clearly manifested by the secured creditor."); Patrick v. Wix Auto Co., 681
N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997) ("The written notice must clearly and explicitly inform
the debtor that the creditor is retaining the collateral in satisfaction of the indebtedness.").
If the secured party is proposing to retain collateral in satisfaction of all of the unpaid debt,
the secured party should avoid including any language in its notice that may be construed
as a request for payment, which is inconsistent with the concept of full strict foreclosure and
could destroy the effectiveness of the notice. See, e.g., Alcom Am. Corp., 154 BR. at 113; Leeling,
129 B.R. at 641-42; Patrick, 681 N.E.2d at 101-02.
209. The rights and duties under revised § 9-621 cannot be waived or varied. See U.C.C.
§ 9-602(10).
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Under current section 9-505(2), a secured party must send a written
notice to a debtor that has not executed a post-default waiver of its right
to receive the notice. 2 10 The debtor is nowhere to be found on the recipient
list in revised section 9-621. Under revised section 9-620, however, a strict
foreclosure is ineffective unless the secured party either has sent a proposal
to the debtor or consents, in an authenticated record, to the debtor's acceptance. 2 11 It is possible, therefore, for a secured party to notify the debtor
of its desire to keep the collateral and forgive all or part of the unpaid
debt in a manner that is not a "proposal." But in the absence of a proposal,
the debtor must agree (in an authenticated record) to the terms, 2 12 and
the secured party must consent (also in an authenticated record) to the
2 13
debtor's agreement.
If the collateral consists of consumer goods, then current Article 9 does
2 14
not require a creditor to send notice to anyone other than the debtor.
This rule is sensible because the value of most consumer goods makes
them attractive as security only to one creditor, a party whose interest will

often enjoy purchase-money status. Occasionally, however, a high-dollar
consumer good that does not rapidly depreciate (such as a grand piano)
might collateralize concurrent loans, justifying notice to any other secured
party. Perhaps it is for this reason that the nature of collateral does not
dictate who receives a proposal under revised section 9-621.
If the collateral is not consumer goods, current section 9-505(2) requires
the creditor to send notice to any other secured party from whom the
2 15
creditor has received timely written notice of its interest in the collateral.
Revised Article 9 significantly expands the list of non-debtor recipients to
include four categories of parties. 2 16 The first category includes any other
210. See id. § 9-505(2) (1995). "Debtor" is defined at current § 9-105(l)(d) and has been
construed by many courts to include guarantors. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. BJ.M.,Jr.,
Inc., 834 E Supp. 813, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Earl of Loveless, Inc. v. Gabele, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
829, 831 (Ct. App. 1991); McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984); Gambo v. Maryland, 648 A.2d 1105, 1108 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Marine
Midland Bank v. CMR Indus., Inc., 559 N.YS.2d 892, 899 (App. Div. 1990); McChord
Credit Union v. Parrish, 809 P.2d 759, 761 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
211. See U.C.C. § 9-620(b)(1) (1998).
212. See id. § 9-620(c)(1), (2). Observe that the debtor's consent cannot be implied, through
silence, in the absence of a proposal. See id. § 9-620(c)(2)(A).
213. See id. § 9-620(b)(1).
214. See id. § 9-505(2) (1995).
215. See id. To be timely, written notice of the competing interest must be received by the
foreclosing creditor before the foreclosing creditor has sent its notice of strict foreclosure to
the debtor or before the debtor has renounced its rights to receive notice. See id.
216. The expansion is explained as part of the analysis of revised § 9-622, discussed infra
notes 244-66 and accompanying text.
The PEB Study Group recommended that notice should be sent to persons who timely
provide the secured party with written notice of a competing property interest. See PEB
STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 12, at 241-43. The PEB Study Group also urged the
drafting committee to "consider seriously" whether to require a secured party to send notice
to persons with recorded property interests. See id.
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person claiming an interest (whether statutory judicial, or consensual) in
the collateral from whom the secured party has received, before the debtor
consents to the proposal, an authenticated notification of the competing
interest. 2 17 The second category includes any other secured party or lienholder if, ten days prior to the debtor's consent, that party's property
interest was perfected by a financing statement that identified the collateral, was indexed under the debtor's then-existing name, and was filed in
the then-proper place. 218 The third category includes any other secured
party that, ten days prior to the debtor's consent, held a security interest
perfected by compliance with any statute, regulation, or treaty referenced
in revised section 9-31 l(a).2 19 And the fourth category, which applies only
if the proposal contemplates partial strict foreclosure, includes any sec220
ondary obligor.
Not surprisingly, the list of non-debtor parties to whom a creditor must
send its proposal closely resembles the list of non-debtor parties to whom
a creditor must send its notice of disposition under revised section 961 1.221 But three noticeable differences between revised sections 9-611 and
9-621 are worth mentioning. First, a secondary obligor is always entitled
to notice of disposition, 222 but is entitled to a proposal of strict foreclosure
only if the secured party is accepting collateral in partial, rather than full,
satisfaction of the unpaid debt. 223 The reason for this different treatment
is both apparent and flawed. A secondary obligor usually remains liable
for any deficiency following a disposition of collateral, 22 4 so it has an interest in receiving a disposition notice. But a deficiency survives a proposal
217. See U.C.C. § 9-621(a)(1) (1998).
218. See id. § 9-621(a)(2). Prior to the 1972 amendments to Article 9, U.C.C. § 9-505(2)
obligated a creditor to send notice to any other person with a security interest in the collateral
and who had duly filed a financing statement indexed in the name of the debtor or whose
security interest was known by the creditor. See id. § 9-505 ("Text Prior to 1972 Amendment"),
3B UL.A. 353 (1992). The 1972 amendments deleted these secured creditors from the recipient list to conform to concurrent amendments made to the list of recipients of a disposition notice under U.C.C. § 9-504(3). See id. § 9-505 ("Official Reasons for 1972 Change").
Nevertheless, a handful of states that adopted the 1972 amendments have retained language
requiring a secured party to send notice of its strict foreclosure to secured parties that have
filed financing statements against the collateral. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-9505B
(West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.505(2) (West Supp. 1998); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 9.505(b) (West 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-505(2) (West 1995); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 409.505(2) (West 1995). See also CLARK, supra note 9, 4.10[1], at 4-184 ("In
any revision of Article 9, it may be wise to return to the pre-1972 rule that required notice
to all secured parties of record.").
219. See U.C.C. § 9-621(a)(3) (1998).
220. See id. § 9-621 (b); see also id. § 9-102(a)(7 1) (defining "secondary obligor").
221. See id. § 9-611 (c).
222. See id. § 9-611 (c)(2).
223. See id. § 9-620(b).
224. See id. § 9-615(d)(2); cf id. § 9-615(e)(2) (relieving obligors of any continued liability
for a deficiency, absent contrary agreement, if the underlying transaction is a sale of accounts,
chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes).
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of strict foreclosure only if the creditor proposes partial satisfaction. The
statute assumes that a secondary obligor will never object to a proposal of
full strict foreclosure because the obligor's liability completely disappears;
therefore, requiring the creditor to send a proposal of full strict foreclosure
to a secondary obligor serves no purpose, and revised section 9-621(b)
acknowledges this. But this reasoning fails to recognize the existence of
situations where a secondary obligor might object to an offer of full strict
foreclosure. For example, SubCorp borrows $1,000,000 from Bank. Repayment of the loan is secured by a security interest in SubCorp's inventory and guaranteed by ParentCorp. SubCorp then borrows $500,000
from Lender. Repayment of the loan is secured by a subordinate security
interest in SubCorp's inventory and guaranteed by ParentCorp. After
SubCorp defaults on the $1,000,000 loan, Bank proposes full strict foreclosure on inventory that it believes has a fair value of $1,100,000. Bank
sends its proposal to SubCorp and Lender. Bank does not send its proposal
to ParentCorp, a secondary obligor, because Bank is offering to keep the
inventory in full, rather than partial, satisfaction of its loan. Maybe
SubCorp does not object, believing that the value of the inventory is less
than $1,000,000. Maybe Lender declines to object, knowing that it has
recourse against ParentCorp. ParentCorp, believing that the inventory has
a value of $1,100,000, wants to object to the offer of full strict foreclosure
and preserve the excess $100,000 for the direct benefit of Lender and, in
turn, its own benefit. But because Bank is offering full strict foreclosure,
ParentCorp is not a party to whom Bank is required to send its proposal.
225
The
Therefore, any objection by ParentCorp can be ignored by Bank.
foregoing suggests that ParentCorp has an interest in the collateral sufficient to warrant veto power, and in order to protect that interest revised
section 9-621 should have required a foreclosing creditor to send its proposal of any strict foreclosure, whether full or partial, to secondary obli226
gors.
Second, a creditor that intends to dispose of consumer goods must send
its notice only to the debtor and any secondary obligor,227 but a creditor
that intends to keep the same consumer goods in satisfaction of the debt
has a much different list of potential recipients, as the list of recipients
225. See id. § 9-620(a)(2)(A).
226. ParentCorp can take action that will obligate Bank to send a proposal to it.
ParentCorp's subrogation rights against SubCorp may provide it with a contingent property
interest in the collateral. If ParentCorp timely provides Bank with an authenticated notification of this property interest, then Bank is obligated to send its proposal to ParentCorp
under revised § 9-62 1(a)(1). Alternatively, ParentCorp can take and timely perfect a security
interest in the collateral to secure SubCorp's reimbursement obligations. Without taking any
further action (including sending an authenticated notification of its perfected security interest to Bank), ParentCorp becomes a party to whom Bank must send a proposal under revised
§ 9-621(a)(2) or (3).
227. See U.C.C. § 9-61 l(c)(1), (2).
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under revised section 9-621 is not predicated on the nature of the collateral. 228 The value of most consumer goods makes them attractive as security only to one creditor (the party that either sold the goods or financed
their purchase), so in many transactions this difference has no practical
effect. Occasionally, however, a high-dollar consumer good retains its value
and, therefore, might collateralize concurrent loans. No apparent reason
explains why a second creditor is entitled to a proposal of strict foreclosure
of the consumer good, but not a notice of its disposition. One can debate
whether non-debtors should receive notices of disposition and proposals
of strict foreclosure when the collateral consists of consumer goods, but a
uniform list of recipients in both situations seems best.
The third difference between revised sections 9-611 and 9-621 concerns
the duty of inquiry placed on the creditor. As a result of changes made
to the recipient lists in both statutes, the creditor can no longer remain
passive, sending notice only to those parties that have timely informed the
creditor of their competing interests.2 29 Instead, in order to ensure that its
notice of disposition or proposal of strict foreclosure is sent to all required
parties, the creditor must order a search report from the appropriate recording office. 2 30 No doubt some delay will arise between ordering and
receiving a U.C.C. search report, which may reflect erroneous or incomplete information. Revised section 9-611 acknowledges the possibility of
delay and error and places those risks on the non-notified party.231 But
revised section 9-621 does not provide the foreclosing creditor with similar
protection. Why? As explained in the Official Comments, the reason for
placing the risk of filing office delays and errors on a creditor that proposes
strict foreclosure is that the non-notified parties are not independently
protected by the duty of commercial reasonableness (as they are in a disposition).2 32 This reasoning seems weak, when in a strict foreclosure any
holder of competing property interest can protect itself from the risk of
non-notification resulting from tardy or erroneous search reports by independently informing the foreclosing creditor of its competing property
23 3
interest.
An issue that exists under current Article 9 is whether the secured party
must send written notice of strict foreclosure to parties other than the

228. Cf id. § 9-505(2) (1995) (requiring a creditor to send its strict foreclosure notice only
to the debtor when consumer goods will be retained).
229. Cf id. § 9-504(3) (stating that the only non-debtor parties to whom a secured party
must send its disposition notice are parties that have timely contacted the secured party); id.
§ 9-505(2) (same).
230. See id. § 9-61 l(c)(3)(B), (C) (1998); id. § 9-621(a)(2), (3).
231. See id. § 9-611 (e).
232. See id. § 9-621 cmt. 2; see also Rapson, supra note 30, at 41 n.204 (explaining omission
of safe harbor from revised § 9-621).
233. See U.C.C. § 9-621 cmt. 2.
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debtor. Prior to being amended in 1972, the second sentence of section
9-505(2) read as follows:
Written notice of such proposal shall be sent to the debtor and except in the
case of consumer goods to any other secured party who has a security
interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement
indexed in the name of the debtor in this state or is known by the
secured party in possession to have a security interest in it.234
As a result of the 1972 amendments, this sentence was revised and broken
into three sentences, the first obligating the creditor to send "[w]ritten
notice" to the debtor, the second excusing any other notice in the case of
consumer goods, and the third requiring the creditor to send "notice" to
certain other parties. 235 Neither the explanation for the amendment, nor
the official comments, reveal any intent to change the existing law on the
form of notice. Therefore, it seems plausible that, in crafting three sentences from one, the word "written" was accidentally omitted from the
third sentence. 23 6 The issue disappears under revised Article 9 through its
requirement that the creditor send a "proposal," 23 7 which must take the
form of an authenticated record.23 8 Although an oral notice of strict foreclosure can accomplish its intended purpose just as easily as a notice in
the form of an authenticated record, an oral notice does expose the sender
to proof problems. These proof problems are reduced, if not eliminated,
if the notice is an authenticated record.
As did its predecessor, revised section 9-621 emphasizes the act of sending, rather than receiving, the proposal. 23 9 If the creditor sends its proposal
to the last known address with proper postage, but discovers that a party
has not received the notice, is the creditor obligated to resend the proposal
234. Id. § 9-505 ("Text Prior to 1972 Amendment"), 3B U.L.A. 353 (1992) (emphasis
added).
235. See U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1995).
236. But observe that the third sentence of current § 9-505(2) requires the recipient to
object in the form of a "written notice," suggesting that the authors appreciated the difference between "notice" and "written notice." Cf 9 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 32, § 9505:06, at 861 ("Although the 1972 amendments to subsection 9-505(2) do not specifically
state that the secured party's notice of a proposal of strict foreclosure to parties other than
the debtor must be in writing, it is obvious, in light of the requirement of sending a written
notice of strict foreclosure to the debtor and the use of the word 'send,' that a written notice
of a proposed strict foreclosure to any other secured party is intended.").
237. See U.C.C. § 9-621(a), (b) (1998).
238. See id. § 9-102(a)(66); see also id. § 9-102(a)(7) (defining "authenticate"); id. § 9102(a)(69) (defining "record").
239. See id. § 9-621(a) ("A secured party ...shall send its proposal.
); id. § 9-621(b)
(same); id. § 9-505(2) (1995) (stating written notice "shall be sent to the debtor" and "notice
shall be sent" to certain secured creditors); see also Begay v. Foutz & Tanner, Inc., 619 P2d
551, 558-59 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd on othergrounds, 617 P2d 149 (N.M. 1989) (concluding
that creditor complied with notice requirements of U.C.G. § 9-505 by depositing notice in
mail, even though debtor never received it).
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or attempt to contact the intended recipient and confirm its correct mailing
address? The question remains unanswered. 240 The same issue exists with
respect to disposition notices sent under revised section 9-611, where the
accompanying comments acknowledge the issue but delegate it "to judicial
resolution, based upon the facts of each case." '24 1 A creditor is well-advised
to utilize all information readily available to it in an effort to notify the
intended recipient of its desire to pursue a strict foreclosure. Otherwise,
the creditor may be liable for damages 24 2 and, in the case of a partial
24 3
strict foreclosure, have difficulty recovering any deficiency.

REVISED SECTION 9-622: EFFECT OF ACCEPTANCE
OF COLLATERAL
Under current section 9-504, a disposition of collateral discharges security interests and liens that are subordinate to the security interest held
by the foreclosing creditor. 244 Surprisingly, current section 9-505 does not
state the effect of a strict foreclosure on other security interests in and liens
on the collateral retained by the secured party.245 Some scholars contend
that disposition and retention are alternative methods of liquidating the
relationship between the secured party and the debtor; therefore, a strict
foreclosure should have the same effect on competing interests as a disposition. 246 Others, noting the express language in section 9-504(5) and
the absence from section 9-505 of similar language, have expressed concern that a creditor exercising its strict foreclosure remedy may retain the

240. But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9-505(2)(b) (1997) (stating that notice to the debtor
is reasonable when sent by certified mail to the debtor's most recent address in the loan
documents or in any other writing from the debtor that is timely received by the creditor,
and notice to another secured party is reasonable when sent by certified mail to the most
recent address provided by the other secured party in its written notice of a competing interest
in the collateral or in any other writing from the other secured party that is timely received
by the creditor).
241. U.C.C. §9-611 cmt. 6 (1998).
242. See id. § 9-625(b), (c).
243. See id. § 9-626(a)(3), (4).
244. See id. § 9-504(4) (1995).
245. The PEB Study Group recommended that U.C.C. § 9-505 should be revised to
provide that a strict foreclosure terminates allsubordinate property interests. See PEB STUDY
GROUP REPORT, supra note 12, at 244-45.
246. See W Rodney Clement, Jr., Enforcing Security Interests in Personal Property in Mississippi,
67 MIss. LJ. 43, 105 & 109 (1997); 2 GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.3, at 1225; 9 HAWKLAND
E1 AL., supra note 32, § 9-505:10, at 869; see also Holmes, supra note 159, at 301 (noting that
a strict foreclosure terminates junior liens on personal property, whereas a deed absolute
does not terminate junior encumbrances on real property). One state, through a non-uniform
amendment, has revised its version of U.C.C. § 9-505 in a manner that expressly addresses
the issue. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.9505(2) (West 1995) ("Retention of the collateral
discharges the security interest of the secured party and discharges any security interest or
lien subordinate to the security interest of the secured party.").
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collateral subject to subordinate interests. 247 Revised section 9-622 re248
moves the uncertainty by addressing the issue.
Once a secured party has accepted collateral in satisfaction of the unpaid obligation, the unpaid obligation is discharged in full or, if the secured
party has proposed a partial strict foreclosure, in an amount approved by
the debtor. 249 Additionally, all of the debtor's rights in the collateral are
25 1
transferred to the secured party,250 whose security interest is terminated.
Furthermore, the strict foreclosure discharges "any subordinate security
interest or other subordinate lien" 252 and "any other subordinate interest." 253 By negative implication, the collateral remains subject to security
interests, liens, and interests that rank equally with, or enjoy priority over,
the foreclosing creditor's security interest.
A party whose interest may be adversely affected by a strict foreclosure
should be entitled to notice of the secured party's intended course of
action. The recipient can then protect its interest by redeeming the collateral or, alternatively, objecting to the proposal of strict foreclosure and
forcing the creditor to hold a commercially reasonable disposition in which
254
the recipient (and, at its urging, other parties) may possibly participate.
Whether a recipient may find redemption or a forced disposition an at247. See CLARK, supra note 9, 4.10[5], at 4-198 (suggesting that subordinate secured
creditors have a "good argument" that their interests survive a strict foreclosure); Dobbs,
supra note 9, at 142 ("While some support exists for the proposition that a strict foreclosure
does extinguish junior encumbrances, there is sufficient room for doubt."); Steven 0. Weise,
UCC. Article 9: PersonalProperty Secured Transactions,48 Bus. LAW. 1659, 1694-95 (1993) (suggesting, in reliance on real property law and express language in U.C.C. § 9-504(4), that "it
seems likely from the absence of a discharge provision" in U.C.C. § 9-505 "that the retention
in satisfaction does not discharge junior liens").
248. The rights and duties under revised § 9-622 cannot be waived or varied. See U.C.C.
§ 9-602(10) (1998).
249. See id. § 9-622(a)(1).
250. See id. § 9-622(a)(2); cf id. § 9-617(a)(1) (stating that a post-default disposition transfers
"all of the debtor's rights in the collateral" to the transferee).
251. See id. § 9-622(a)(3); cf id. § 9-617(a)(2) (stating that a post-default disposition "discharges the security interest under which the disposition is made").
252. See id. § 9-622(a)(3); cf. id. § 9-617(a)(3) (stating that a post-default disposition "discharges any subordinate security interest or other lien"). Notwithstanding revised § 9-622(a),
the secured party may wish to consult a lawyer familiar with the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code (particularly 26 U.S.C. § 7425 (1994)) to determine whether a strict foreclosure
will terminate a subordinate federal tax lien.
253. See id. § 9-622(a)(4). Presumably subsection (a)(4) is needed to address the effect that
a strict foreclosure has on an interest that is neither a "security interest" nor a "lien," both
of which are the subject of subsection (a)(3).
254. See id. § 9-623(a) (permitting "[a] debtor, any secondary obligor, or any other secured
party or lienholder" to redeem the collateral); 9 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 32, § 9-505:05,
at 859 (explaining the purpose of giving notice of strict foreclosure to the debtor); id. § 9505:06, at 861-62 (explaining the purpose of giving notice of strict foreclosure to other
secured parties); Chen v. Profit Sharing Plan, 456 S.E.2d 237, 240 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995);
Herring Mining Co. v. Roberts Bros. Coal Co., 747 S.W2d 616, 619 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
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tractive option will depend on several factors, including the amount of
2 55
debt secured by the collateral and the perceived value of the collateral.
If subordinate property interests are terminated by a strict foreclosure,
then the holders of those terminated property interests should be entitled
to receive the secured party's proposal of strict foreclosure. If the recipient
list in revised section 9-621 was composed for the purpose of protecting
the holders of interests that may be terminated, then the list is both overinclusive and under-inclusive. The list is over-inclusive because it includes
all secured parties and lienholders that have timely provided the foreclosing
creditor with notice of their property interest 256 or satisfy other statutory
requirements, 2 57 not just secured parties and lienholders whose security

interests and liens are subordinate to the security interest of the foreclosing
creditor. The foreclosing creditor would undoubtedly prefer a pared list
because the number of parties with veto power would decrease, but a
pared list would force the foreclosing creditor to resolve priority issues prior

to sending its notice. Furthermore, and perhaps more important, a party
whose property interest will not be terminated (e.g., a secured creditor with
a senior security interest) still benefits from receiving a proposal of strict
foreclosure because the recipient, relying on the information, can then
take steps to protect itself (such as accelerating the debt after enforcing a
cross-default provision in the loan documents, or objecting to a proposal
that puts excess value in the pockets of the foreclosing creditor which might
otherwise be applied by the debtor to reduce senior debt).

255. For example, Debtor defaults on a $1,000,000 loan from Bank. Debtor also defaults
on a $250,000 loan from Lender. Both loans are secured by a security interest in Debtor's
inventory, and Bank's interest enjoys priority. Bank proposes to retain the inventory in satisfaction of the $1,000,000 unpaid debt. In the first scenario, the inventory has a fair market
value of $800,000, in the second, $1,400,000, and in the third, $1,200,000. In the first
scenario, Lender will not redeem inventory worth $800,000 by paying $1,000,000 to Bank.
And, under the payout scheme of revised § 9-615(a), Lender will not receive any proceeds
from a forced sale of inventory worth $800,000, so it is unlikely that Lender will object to a
strict foreclosure and force a sale. In the second scenario, however, paying $1,000,000 for
inventory worth $1,400,000 makes redemption appealing. And because Lender may be entitled to receive proceeds under revised § 9-615(a)(3) that remain after Bank has satisfied its
$1,000,000 debt and disposition-related costs, Lender may object to Bank's proposal of strict
foreclosure and force a disposition. For the same reasons, redemption and disposition are
attractive options in the third scenario. The attraction is not quite as bright as under the
second scenario because the value of the inventory ($1,200,000) is less than both loans
($1,250,000). Whether Lender exercises its right of redemption or forces a disposition by
objecting to Bank's proposal may turn on Lender's perception of Debtor's ability to pay any
deficiency. If Lender opts to redeem the collateral or force a disposition, Lender can rely on
excess inventory to satisfy $200,000, or 80% of the unpaid $250,000. Because Lender will
lose its interest in inventory worth $200,000 if Bank keeps the inventory, Lender should
either redeem the collateral or force its disposition unless Lender is confident that Debtor
will pay at least 80% of Lender's unsecured deficiency claim.
256. See U.C.C. § 9-621(a)(1).
257. See id. § 9-621(a)(2), (3).
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The list is under-inclusive because it does not require the foreclosing
creditor to send its proposal to all lienholders with subordinate liens. Instead, subordinate lienholders are entitled to a proposal only if they timely
notify the foreclosing creditor of their interest 258 or "perfect" their lien
"by the filing of a financing statement. ' 259 "Perfection" is a term of art
normally associated with consensual security interests governed by Article
9, not involuntary liens created by statute or judicial process. 260 And while
a lien may be evidenced by a writing filed in the public records, the writing
may not qualify as a "financing statement." 261 And even if the lien filing
is a "financing statement," it may not be recorded in the same place as a
financing statement filed by a secured party. The statute could have been
drafted in a manner that did not apply traditional Article 9 terms and
concepts to liens. 262 Apparently the drafting committee concluded that
this would place on secured parties an unacceptable search-and-notify burden (a burden already made heavier by revised Article 9263). Whether it is
any less unacceptable to place the burden on the party whose interest will
be destroyed is debatable.
Will a subordinate interest be terminated if the foreclosing creditor fails
to send its proposal to the holder of that interest, even if the holder is a
party entitled to notice under revised section 9-621? Revised section 9622 answers that question affirmatively, if other conditions necessary to
258. See'id. § 9-621(a)(1).
259. See id. § 9-621 (a)(2). A lienholder that perfects its interest by complying with a statute,
regulation, or treaty described in revised § 9-311 (a) is not entitled to receive a proposal under
revised §9-621(a)(3). For some unexplained reason, that provision (unlike revised § 9621(a)(2)) fails to reference "lienholder." Lienholders receive the same treatment under revised § 9-611. See Zinnecker, supra note 2, at 1163-64 n.297.
260. See U.C.C. § 9-308 (indicating when a "security interest" or an "agricultural lien" is
"perfected").
261. The absence of the debtor's signature, however, will not prevent the writing from
being a financing statement. See id. § 9-502(a) (indicating that a financing statement requires
the name of the debtor, the name of the secured party or its representative, and a description
of collateral; cf. id. § 9-402(1) (1995) (requiring the name and address of the debtor and the
secured party, a description of collateral, and the debtor's signature).
262. For example, revised § 9-621(a)(2) could have been drafted as follows:
(2) any other secured party or lienholder that, 10 days before the debtor consented
to the acceptance, held either a security interest in the collateral perfected by the filing
of a financing statement, or a lien on the collateral evidenced by a proper filing, that:
(A) was indexed under the debtor's name as of that date; and (B) was filed in the office
or offices in which to file a financing statement or record a lien against the debtor
covering the collateral as of that date.
Original clause (A) ("identified the collateral") is deleted as unnecessary (a financing statement already must describe the collateral under revised § 9-502(a)(3)) and too limiting (a lien
filing may not describe the collateral).
263. Compare U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1995) (obligating a secured creditor to contact parties that
have timely informed it of their competing claims), with id. § 9-621(a) (1998) (obligating a
secured party to contact parties that have timely informed it of their competing claims, as
well as parties that have a perfected interest).
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an effective acceptance of the proposal are met.264 However, a person to
whom the creditor is required, but fails, to send its proposal is entitled to
recover damages in the amount of any loss caused by the creditor's noncompliance. 265 Damages may be non-existent unless the party is able to
prove that an objection to the proposal would have forced a commercially
reasonable disposition generating proceeds that would revert to the party
under the payment scheme of revised section 9-615(a). For example, Bank
proposes to accept inventory that it believes is worth $250,000 in satisfaction of a $300,000 debt. Bank fails to send its proposal to Lender, the
holder of a perfected, but subordinate, security interest in the inventory.
Unless Lender can introduce evidence that a commercially reasonable sale
would have brought a price greater than $300,000, Lender may be unable
to recover any damages for Bank's noncompliance. 266

REVISED SECTION 9-623: RIGHT TO REDEEM
COLLATERAL
Current Article 9 permits the debtor to redeem, or "buy back," collateral under certain conditions.2 67 That right continues under revised Article
9 and is codified at section 9-623.
Current law grants the right of redemption not only to the debtor, but
also to any other secured party with a security interest in the collateral,
regardless of the priority or perfection of that security interest. 268 The
right of redemption, however, does not extend to nonconsensual lienholders.269 This omission from current section 9-506 is questionable 2 70 for at
least two reasons. First, at a minimum, junior lienholders should be entitled
264. See id. § 9-622(b) & cmt. 2.
265. See id. §§ 9-622 cmt. 2, 9-625(b).
266. See, e.g., McGowan v. Nebraska State Bank, 427 N.W2d 772, 775-76 (Neb. 1988)
(holding junior creditor suffered no loss from senior creditor's failure to send disposition
notice to junior creditor-even if (as junior creditor argued) collateral was worth nearly
$50,000 instead of $28,956 received at auction-where amount of unpaid senior debt was
$372,000); River Valley State Bank v. Peterson, 453 N.W2d 193, 195-97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990)
(concluding junior creditor suffered no loss from senior creditor's failure to send disposition
notice to junior creditor-even if (as junior creditor argued) collateral was worth $10,000
instead of $6400 received at sale-where amount of unpaid senior debt exceeded $30,000).
See also U.C.C. § 1-106 (1995) (stating that U.C.C. remedies "shall be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party
had fully performed"); Nickles, supranote 24, at 235-36 (discussing the calculation of damages
under U.C.C. § 9-507(1), which provides an aggrieved party with "a right to recover from
the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this Part").
267. See U.C.C. § 9-506 (1995).
268. See id. § 9-506.
269. But see IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.9506 (West 1995) (granting redemption rights to "the
debtor or any other secured party or lienor") (emphasis added).
270. See, e.g., CLARK, supranote 9, 4.11[3], at 4-202 (proposing that "courts should treat
the omission as a drafting error"); 2 GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.2, at 1218 (suggesting that
"the failure of § 9-506 to refer to other lienors must be put down to drafting inadvertence").
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to redeem the collateral because a disposition (and, perhaps, a strict foreclosure) of the collateral terminates their liens. 27 1 Second, unless the se2 72
it
cured party has a post-default motive other than to be made whole,
should not mind if the right of redemption is extended to any party with
a property interest in the collateral. The PEB Study Group Report recommended that holders of judicial, statutory, and common-law liens be given
the right of redemption, concluding that to do so "would not appear to
work any particular hardship on secured parties whose collateral is re2 74
deemed. ' ' 273 Revised section 9-623 adopts that recommendation.
To redeem the collateral under current section 9-506, a party must
tender payment of (i) all debt secured by the collateral, 275 (ii) any expenses
reasonably incurred by the creditor in taking, storing, and preparing the
collateral for disposition, 276 and (iii) reasonable attorneys' fees and legal
expenses (but only to the extent provided in the security agreement
and not otherwise prohibited by law). 2 7 7 Revised section 9-623 requires the same payment. 278 Notice that the fair market value of the
271. See U.C.C. § 9-504(4); supra note 246 and accompanying text.
272. An oversecured creditor might propose strict foreclosure, hoping to make a profit on
any resale of the collateral. Because the creditor's desire is frustrated if the collateral is
redeemed, the creditor has an interest in limiting the number of potential redeemers.
273. PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 12, at 247.
274. See U.C.C. § 9-623(a) (1998).
275. See id. § 9-506 (1995).
276. See id.; see also Rogers v. Associates Comm. Corp., 632 P2d 1002, 1006 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1981) (ruling debtor's payment that did not include expenses was "an insufficient
tender"); Howard v. Lud, 325 N.W2d 623, 627 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (noting redemption
price includes "expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party in retaking the collateral");
Owens v. Automobile Recovery Bureau, Inc., 544 S.W2d 26, 31-32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding loan service fee was not part of redemption price); Everett v. U. S. Life Credit Corp.,
327 S.E.2d 269, 269-70 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding debtor cannot avoid paying repossession charges as part of redemption price merely because creditor failed to give notice
of repossession that would allow debtor to voluntarily surrender collateral and avoid charge);
Haraway v. Burnett, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1256, 1267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding redemption price did not include expenses of $11,569.39 incurred by creditor in
seizing assets not part of the collateral).
277. See U.C.C. § 9-506 (1995); see also Clark v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 363
S.E.2d 813, 817 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding summaryjudgment was premature where
reasonableness of attorneys' fees had not been determined); Interstate Elec. Supply Co. v.
Contractors & Eng'rs, Inc., 515 N.E.2d 182, 189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (noting that U.C.C.
§ 9-506 permits a creditor to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses, but concluding that implicit in the statute is "the right of a redeeming party to a hearing on the
reasonableness" of those fees and expenses); see also supra note 4 (citing cases addressing ability
to recover attorneys' fees).
278. U.C.C. § 9-623(b)(2) (1998). The secured party and the debtor should consider the
merits of including a provision in the loan documents that attempts to define the "reasonableness" of fees and expenses. For example, some variation of the following might be
acceptable:
All reasonable costs, fees, and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees,
legal expenses, and court costs) incurred by Secured Party incident to this transaction
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279
collateral is irrelevant in calculating the redemption price.
The presence (and exercise of) an acceleration clause will affect the
calculation of "all obligations secured by the collateral"-a phrase that
appears in both current section 9-506 and revised section 9-623(b). For
example, Bank makes a $1,000,000 secured loan to Debtor, who agrees
to repay the loan in five equal installments of $200,000 (excluding any
interest). Before the first payment is due, Debtor fails to deliver an audited
financial report, triggering a non-payment default. Alternatively, Debtor
fails to pay the first installment, creating a payment default. Bank seizes
collateral, incurring a repossession expense of $100. Is the redemption
price (a) $100 (non-payment default), (b) $200,100 (payment default), or
(c) $1,000,100 (both defaults)? The phrase "all obligations secured by the
collateral" suggests $1,000,100. However, section 9-506 prefaces the
phrase with "tendering fulfillment," language that revised Article 9 substantially retains. 280 The official comments to revised section 9-623 shed
light on the intended meaning of "tendering fulfillment":

To redeem the collateral a person must tender fulfillment of all obligations secured, plus certain expenses. If the entire balance of a secured
obligation has been accelerated, it would be necessary to tender the entire balance.
A tender of fulfillment obviously means more than a new promise to
perform an existing promise. It requires payment in full of all monetary obligations then due and performance in full of all other obligations then matured. If unmatured secured obligations remain, the
security interest continues to secure them (i.e., as if there had been
28 1
no default).
The emphasized language reveals that unless the secured party has properly accelerated the debt, the redemption price is not $1,000,100, but
shall be part of the secured obligation. Costs, fees, and expenses shall be deemed "rea-

sonable" if, in the aggregate, they do not exceed more than 25% of the sum of unpaid
principal and accrued and unpaid interest thereon.
The provision should be enforceable unless a court concludes that the agreed-upon standard of "reasonableness" is "manifestly unreasonable." See id. § 9-603(a); id. § 9-501(3) (1995).
279. However, the collateral value does play a role in determining the redemption price
in a consumer bankruptcy The Bankruptcy Code permits an individual debtor to redeem
consumer goods by paying an amount equal to the creditor's "allowed secured claim." 11
U.S.C. § 722 (1994). An "allowed secured claim" is not necessarily the amount of the unpaid
debt. Rather, it is "the /esser ofthe secured debt or the value of the collateral." DAVID G.
EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRuPTCY § 7-39, at 562 (1993). To illustrate the difference between
redemption under Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code, assume Debtor has defaulted on a
$25,000 loan secured by a boat worth $20,000. Under current § 9-506 and revised § 9-623,
Debtor's redemption price is $25,000 (plus repossession and similar charges and possibly
attorneys' fees and legal expenses). Under Bankruptcy Code § 722, Debtor's redemption price
is only $20,000.
280. See U.C.C. § 9-623(b) (1998) (requiring a person to "tender: (1) fulfillment").
281. Id. § 9-623 cmt. 2 (emphasis added); see also id. § 9-506 cmt. (1995) (similar language).
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28 2
rather only $100 (non-payment default) or $200,100 (payment default).
The foregoing example illustrates the importance of including an acceleration clause in the loan documents, 283 advice that many creditors already

heed.

28 4

The phrase, "all obligations secured by the collateral," raises another,
somewhat related, interpretive dilemma. Assume Bank makes a second
secured loan of $500,000 to Debtor, secured by the same collateral that
secures the $1,000,000 loan. The two loans are evidenced by two separate
sets of loan papers and, through oversight, the first set of loan papers does
282. See Williams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 435 So. 2d 66, 68 (Ala. 1983) (holding that
creditor's acceleration of unmatured debt required debtor to redeem collateral by tendering
amount equal to full contract price plus expenses, not the amount necessary to bring contract
current); Rogers v. Associates Comm. Corp., 632 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)
(concluding, in reliance on the official comment to U.C.C. § 9-506, that "the accelerated
balance is part of the obligation secured within the meaning of the redemption provisions");
Black v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 437 So. 2d 26, 30 (Miss. 1983) (noting that U.C.C. § 9506 requires a redeeming debtor "to pay the entire amount due including any accelerated
obligation"); Medallion Funding Corp. v. Helen Laundromat, Inc., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(West) 250, 257 (N.Y 1997) (holding that debtors who offered to redeem collateral by paying
two monthly payments, together with interest and costs, did not make valid tender offer as
all amounts due under note had been accelerated); see also Zubrow, supra note 87, at 538
n.376 ("Under Article 9, so long as the security agreement contains an adequately drafted
acceleration clause redemption requires repayment of the full amount of the antecedent
debt."); cf U.C.C. § 9-506 (1952 Official Text) (permitting the debtor to reclaim collateral
by "tendering payment of all sums due under the defaulted agreement," a clause explained
in the official comments: "if the agreement contains a clause accelerating the entire balance
due on default in one installment, the amount 'due under the defaulted agreement' would
be the entire balance"), reprinted in XV ELIZABETH SLUSSER KELLY, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE DRAFrs 299-300 (1984).
283. If Bank sold the collateral before redemption, and the loan documents did not include an acceleration clause, any proceeds in excess of $100 (non-payment default) or
$200,100 (payment default) would revert to Debtor as surplus proceeds in the absence of
any subordinate property interests in the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1995); id. § 9-615(a),
(d) (1998); see also ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN, SECURED TRANSACTIONS

IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 235 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing adverse consequences under U.C.C.
§§ 9-504(1) and 9-506 for a creditor that fails to include acceleration clause in loan documents
when debt is payable in installments).
284. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 9, § 43.4, at 1195 ("For a hundred years, it may be, no
security agreement has failed to include an acceleration clause."). If the loan documents
include an optional, rather than an automatic, acceleration clause, the creditor must properly
exercise its option before accelerating the debt. For example, under Texas law a creditor
cannot exercise an optional acceleration clause until it has presented the note, given notice
of its intent to accelerate the debt, and given notice of the acceleration, unless the obligor
has executed a clear and unequivocal waiver of presentment and notice. See, e.g.,Shumway
v. Horizon Credit Corp, 801 S.W2d 890 (Tex. 1991) (concluding that clause waiving "prior
notice or demand" did not waive right to notice of intent to accelerate, which creditor failed
to give). And even if a creditor properly accelerates the debt, the accelerated part may be
statutorily excluded from the redemption price. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-9-506 (1981)
(expressly excluding from the redemption price "any sums that would not then be due except
for an acceleration provision").
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not include a cross-default clause that makes a payment default on the
second loan a default under the first loan. When Debtor misses a payment
on the second loan, Bank repossesses the collateral and properly accelerates the full $500,000. Can Bank set a redemption price of $1,500,000,
arguing that Debtor must pay "all obligations secured by the collateral"?
Read literally, one might think so. Again, however, the official comment
quoted above discourages that interpretation. Absent a default, the
$1,000,000 is not "then due" or "then matured," but instead is an "unmatured secured obligation." The statutory language could have been
drafted with more precision (e.g., "all obligations secured by the collateral
and then due"), but hopefully the phrase will be interpreted as intended.
Under current Article 9, a debtor can waive its right to redeem the
2 85
collateral only if the waiver is in writing and executed after default.
Under revised Article 9, the right of redemption is one of the non-waivable rights referenced in revised section 9-602,286 suggesting that no party
(including the debtor) can ever waive its redemption right. However, revised section 9-602 is subject to revised section 9-624,287 which permits
288
redemption waivers in limited situations.
The period during which a party may redeem collateral is not statutorily
289
prescribed in terms of a guaranteed number of days, weeks, or months.

285. See U.C.C. § 9-506 (1995); see also Kellos v. Parker-Sharpe, Inc., 263 S.E.2d 138, 140
(Ga. 1980) ("Thus, the right to redeem collateral may be waived by an agreement in writing,
after default, but cannot be waived by an agreement in writing before default."); Data Sec.,
Inc. v. Plessman, 510 N.W2d 361, 365 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993) ("Under § 9-501 (3)(d), a debtor's
right of redemption may not be waived or varied except as provided in § 9-506, which means
only in writing and after default."); Medallion Funding Corp., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at
257 (finding waiver clause in promissory note "ineffective"); Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp.
v. Karlen, 319 N.YS.2d 831, 834 (1971) (stating that a debtor's right of redemption may not
be waived prior to default).
286. See U.C.C. § 9-602(11) (1998).
287. See id. § 9-602.
288. See discussion of U.C.C. § 9-624(c), infra notes 320-27 and accompanying text.
289. However, several states provide a minimum redemption period in transactions governed by retail installment sales statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.2 (West 1985) (10day redemption period following giving of notice to sell or retain goods); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 36a-785(c) (West 1996) (15-day redemption period following repossession); 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/26-26 (West 1993) (15-day redemption period for selected debtors
following repossession); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-625(a) (1990) (15-day redemption
period following giving of statutory notice); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 425.208(1) (West 1998) (15day redemption period following creditor's exercise of nonjudicial enforcement right). Cf
UNIF. CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 18, 3B U.L.A. 585 (1992) (10-day redemption period
following repossession). Query whether the parties can contractually agree that the debtor's
right of redemption terminates after a specific period of time. For example, the security
agreement might include a provision stating: "Debtor must exercise its right of redemption
under Article 9 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, as amended from time to time,
no later than the 15th day following the date on which Secured Party repossesses the collateral, after which Secured Party may properly reject any offer of redemption by Debtor in its
discretion." Under current § 9-501 and revised § 9-603, the secured party and the debtor
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Under current Article 9, the redemption period continues until the secured
party disposes of the collateral, the secured party contracts for the disposition of the collateral, or the obligation is discharged by a strict foreclosure. 290 Revised Article 9 retains these termination events 29 1 and adds
a fourth: the collection of collateral under revised section 9-607,292 such
as the receipt of a payment created by an account, a general intangible,
a promissory note, or chattel paper. The fact that third-party payments of
an account or a general intangible can terminate the right to redeem that
account or general intangible removes any doubt that the right of redemption extends to non-possessory collateral.
How valuable is the right of redemption? For most debtors, the answer
is "not very." A debtor, particularly a consumer debtor, may not be aware
that it has a right of redemption. Neither current section 9-504 nor current
section 9-505 requires the secured party to inform the debtor of its re293
demption right in the notice of disposition or offer of strict foreclosure.
may agree on standards measuring the fulfillment of rights and duties if those standards are
not "manifestly unreasonable." One author believes that such a provision is enforceable if
the agreed-upon period is not manifestly unreasonable. See 9 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note
32, § 9-506:05, at 795-96. But a provision that effectively terminates the debtor's redemption
rights prior to the statutory termination events appears to be a partial waiver of the redemption right, rather than an attempt to agree on permissible standards of conduct, and
should not be enforceable in the absence of a statutory provision permitting the debtor to
waive its redemption right. For a provision permitting waiver-of-redemption clauses in limited
situations, see revised § 9-624(c), discussed infra notes 320-27 and accompanying text.
290. See U.C.C. § 9-506 (1995); see also Willis v. Healthdyne, Inc., 382 S.E.2d 651, 653
(Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (finding debtor's demand for redemption "untimely" when made after
collateral had been sold); Korogluyan v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 572 N.E.2d 1154, 1161
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (observing that debtor's redemption request "came too late" when made
after court had confirmed creditor's prior sale of collateral); Data Sec. Inc., 510 N.W2d at
365 ("Under § 9-506, the debtor has a right to redeem collateral at any time before the
secured party has disposed of collateral or entered into a contract for its disposition unless
otherwise agreed in writing aJer default."); Cordova v. Lee Galles Oldsmobile, Inc., 668 P2d
320, 322 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) ("Under § 9-506 plaintiff had a right to redeem the car at
any time before disposition.").
291. See U.C.C. § 9-623(c)(2) (1998) (disposition or disposition contract), (3) (strict foreclosure). If a secured party terminates the debtor's right of redemption under revised § 9623(c)(2) by selling the collateral at a disposition, and the secured party failed to send a
disposition notice to the debtor as required by revised § 9-61 l(c)(1), the debtor is entitled to
recover "damages in the amount of any loss" caused by the secured party's noncompliance.
See id. § 9-625(b). Query how a debtor quantifies damages for the loss of its redemption right.
Is the debtor required to prove that it could (and would) have redeemed the collateral? If
the debtor offers such proof, minimum damages might equal (i) the fair market value of a
similar item in comparable shape, minus (ii) the redemption price. But what if a replacement
item cannot be purchased because the item was unique?
292. See id. § 9-623(c)(1).
293. One of the stated purposes of requiring notice of a disposition or a strict foreclosure
is to permit the debtor to protect its interest in the collateral by exercising its right of redemption. See, e.g., Fremont Fin. Corp. v. Izzo (In re Rack Eng'g), 212 B.R. 98, 103 (Bankr.
WD. Pa. 1997); Friendly Fin. Corp. v. Bovee, 702 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Del. 1997); Chen v.
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Revised Article 9 improves the awareness of a consumer debtor by requiring a disposition notice in a consumer-goods transaction to refer to
the redemption right.2 94 A disposition notice sent in a non-consumergoods transaction may improve the cognizance of other debtors by informing them that they are entitled to an accounting of the unpaid
debt.2 9 5 However, revised Article 9 does not require a creditor to reference the redemption right in any proposal of strict foreclosure. Of course,
296
the creditor may, on its own volition, inform the debtor of this right.
But even if a debtor knows, or is informed, that it has a right to redeem
the collateral, it is unlikely that the right will be exercised. A party already
in default on its payment obligations is unlikely to have the financial resources to pay the statutory ransom, especially if the creditor has accelerated unmatured payments. 297 Recognizing this concern, revised Article 9,
during much of the drafting process, included a section permitting selected consumer obligors to reinstate the debt and cure a payment default

Profit Sharing Plan, 456 S.E.2d 237, 240 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Herring Mining Co. v. Roberts
Bros. Coal Co., 747 S.W2d 616, 619 (Ky. 1988); Peoples Heritage Say. Bank v. Theriault,
670 A.2d 1391, 1393 (Me. 1996).
294. See U.C.C. § 9-614(l)(C).
295. See id. § 9-613(1)(D).
296. A creditor whose notice of disposition or proposal of strict foreclosure describes, but
misstates the right of redemption may find that its notice or proposal is legally defective. A
common error is sending a notice that informs the debtor that its redemption rights will
terminate after a specific number of days, rather than upon disposition. See Coones v. FDIC,
848 P2d 783, 803 (Wyo. 1993) (concluding creditor's notice misstated debtor's redemption
rights by informing debtor that it would have to competitively bid for items). See, e.g, Moore
v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., Nos. 94C2558, 96C4894, 1997 WL 323822, at *2 (N.D. IlJune
11, 1997); Loyola Fed. Say. & Loan v. Hopson, No. C.A. 92A-09-015, 1993 WL 331154, at
*2 (Del. Super. Ct. July 21, 1993); Ayers v. Mellon Bank, No. 85C-DE-68, 1987 WL 8274,
at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 1987); Bradford v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 359 S.E.2d
757, 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Credithrift v. Smith, 308 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983);
Topeka Datsun Motor Co. v. Stratton, 736 P.2d 82, 88-89 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987); First Nat'l
Bank v. DiDomenico, 487 A.2d 646, 648-49 (Md. 1985).
297. Professor Gilmore wrote that a defaulting debtor "never" cures a default by redeeming collateral. Whether prompted by levity, third-party comments, second thoughts, or otherwise, he modified his declaration with a footnote: "Well, almost never." See 2 GILMORE,
supra note 9, § 44.2, at 1216 n.2 and accompanying text; see also Leonard Lakin, Default
Proceedings Under Article 9: Problems, Solutions, and Lessons to be Learned, 8 AKRON L. REV. 1, 40
(1974) (observing that while "redemption is a right 'devoutly to be wished' by the debtor,
most debtors.., are usually unable to pay the full amount of the [accelerated] debt");James
J. White, Representingthe Low Income Consumer in Repossessions, Resales and DeficiencyJudgment Cases,
70 Nw. U. L. REv. 808, 821 n.40 (1970) (referring to the number of cases in which debtors
could (and would) redeem as "de minimus"); cf Barkley Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure
and Deficiency: A Journey to the Underworld And a Proposed Salvation, 51 OR. L. REV. 302, 315-16
(1972) (criticizing the permitted use of acceleration clauses, which, in consumer transactions,
discourage redemption and encourage deficiency judgments).
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by tendering an amount that excluded any accelerated payments.

But this limited right of reinstatement fell victim to heavy criticism

299

2 98

and

298. The section appeared as early asJuly 1995. See U.C.C. § 9-506 (DraftJuly 28-Aug.
4, 1995). At the time of its deletion in early 1998, the section read as follows:
SECTION 9-622. REINSTATEMENT OF OBLIGATION SECURED WITHOUT
ACCELERATION.
(a) A debtor or a secondary obligor who is a consumer obligor may cure a default consisting only of the failure to make required payment and may reinstate the secured obligation without acceleration if:
(1) 60 percent of the cash price has been paid in the case of a purchase money security interest in consumer goods; or
(2) 60 percent of the principal amount of the obligation secured has been paid in
the case of another consumer goods secured transaction.
(b) To cure a default under subsection (a), a person must tender:
(1) the unpaid amount of the secured obligation due at the time of tender, without
acceleration, including charges for delinquency, default, or deferral; and
(2) reasonable expenses and attorney's fees of the type described in Section 9614(b)(1).
(c) A tender of payment under subsection (b) is ineffective to cure a default or reinstate
a secured obligation unless made before the later of:
(1) 21 days after the secured party sends a notification of disposition under Section
9-611 (b) to the debtor and any consumer obligor who is a secondary obligor; and
(2) the time the secured party:
(A) disposes of collateral or enters into a contract for its disposition under Section 9-6 10; or
(B) accepts collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures
under Section 9-618.
(d) A tender of payment under subsection (b) restores to the debtor and a consumer
obligor who is a secondary obligor their respective rights as if the default had not occurred
and all payments had been made when scheduled, including the debtor's right, if any, to
possess the collateral. Promptly upon the tender, the secured party shall take all steps
necessary to cause any judicial process affecting the collateral to be vacated and any pending action based on the default to be dismissed.
(e) A secured obligation may be reinstated under this section only once.
U.C.C. § 9-622 (Draft Mar. 1998); cf id. § 7-607(2) (Draft May 1949) ("Unless default occurred by reason of impairment of the value of the collateral or by reason of removal or
other disposition of the goods the performance due shall be deemed to be the performance
due as if no acceleration of the obligation had occurred."), reprinted in VIII KELLY, supra
note 282, at 163-64; UNIF. CONSUMER CREDrr CODE § 5.111 (1974 Act), 7A U.L.A. 17576 (1985) (providing consumers with a limited cure period).
299. See, e.g., Fred H. Miller, Consumers and the Code: The Search for the Proper Formula, 75
WASH. U. L.Q 187, 213 (1997) (suggesting that the provision may actually harm consumers
because it will increase the cost of credit transactions and prompt the tightening of credit
standards); id. at 215-16 (contending that the provision does not represent a consensus position as evidenced by present state laws, harms all consumers at the expense of the few, and
may delay enactment of revised Article 9); see also Chareq & Fortney, supra note 207, at 320
(asserting that states have adequately addressed redemption and reinstatement concerns in
consumer transactions through legislation that removes any need for including a reinstatement provision in Article 9); Alvin C. Harrell, UCC Article 9 Drafting Committee March 1996
Meeting Considers Consumer-Related Collateral, 50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q REP. 95, 98 (1996) (ar-
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' ' 30
was deleted as part of the "consumer compromise.
A secondary obligor also may not redeem the collateral very often. A
secondary obligor may have no objection to a disposition or a partial strict
foreclosure, realizing that its potential liability for any remaining deficiency
will be less than the redemption price. Alternatively, it may rely on its
ability to protect its interest in the collateral by attending and participating
in a public disposition or contacting the secured party and expressing a
desire to participate in a private disposition. One situation where a secondary obligor may find redemption attractive is if the collateral offers
sentimental value or the potential for long-term appreciation 30 ' and the
redemption price is less than the collateral's fair market value.
How frequently a secured party or lienholder will redeem collateral is
unknown. These parties may be in the best position to obtain the necessary
funds on an expedited basis. However, not all secured parties and lienholders are entitled to a disposition notice 30 2 or a strict foreclosure proposal, 303 reducing the likelihood that those non-recipients will redeem the
collateral. Additionally, security interests and liens not subordinate to the
security interest of the foreclosing creditor survive a disposition 30 4 and a
strict foreclosure, 305 decreasing the probability that holders of those security interests and liens will redeem the collateral. For holders of security
interests and liens that will not survive a disposition or a strict foreclosure,
redemption may be attractive if the value of the collateral exceeds the
redemption price and the excess is more than the amount likely to be
collected by the holder from the debtor in a lawsuit. Realistically, however,
that attraction may be nothing more than a faint glimmer, as the senior
creditor is much more likely to be undersecured, rather than over-collateralized.
0

guing that a right of reinstatement is "likely to increase the cost of a default to the lender,
thereby raising overall the cost of consumer credit"); Heiser & Flemma, supra note 34, at
490 (referring to the reinstatement provision as "social engineering" that reflects a public
policy decision best addressed in the broad context of all consumer credit transactions and
not in Article 9); cf Hillebrand, supra note 205, at 169 (observing that the "limited but useful"
right of reinstatement may not be available until late in the loan period).
300. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
301. Examples include rare coin collections, sports memorabilia, and other unique items.
302. See U.C.C. § 9-61 1(c) (1998) (failing to include among the parties entitled to a disposition notice any lienholder (other than a lienholder from whom the creditor has received
timely notice of the lien and any lienholder that has perfected its lien by filing a financing
statement in the proper place) and any unperfected secured party (other than a secured party
from whom the creditor has received timely notice of the security interest)).
303. See id. § 9-62 1(a) (failing to include among the parties entitled to a strict foreclosure
proposal any lienholder (other than a lienholder from whom the creditor has received timely
notice of the lien and any lienholder that has perfected its lien by filing a financing statement
in the proper place) and any unperfected secured party (other than a secured party from
whom the creditor has received timely notice of the security interest)).
304. See id. § 9-617(a)(3).
305. See id. § 9-622(a)(3).

HeinOnline -- 54 Bus. Law. 1794 1998-1999

The Default Provisions of Revised Article 9

1795

REVISED SECTION 9-624: WAIVER
Under current section 9-504, a secured party usually is required to send
a disposition notice to a debtor, 30 6 a right that the debtor cannot waive
except in writing and after default. 307 Under revised section 9-611, a secured party usually is obligated to send an authenticated notification of
disposition to a debtor and any secondary obligor. 30 8 Unlike current section 9-504, revised section 9-611 does not address the ability of a debtor
or secondary obligor to waive its right to notice. Revised section 9-611,
however, is included among the statutes listed in revised section 9-602 that
create rights and duties that cannot be waived or varied, 30 9 suggesting
that, in a departure from current law, a debtor and secondary obligor may
never waive their right to a disposition notice. But revised section 9-602
is subject to revised section 9-624, 310 a section that permits a debtor or
secondary obligor to waive its right to notification "only by an agreement
to that effect entered into and authenticated after default." 311 This provision will change the result in cases that have upheld the enforceability
of the typical waiver-of-notice clauses in guaranty agreements and other
3 12
loan papers executed by a secondary obligor before default.
In an effort to protect a consumer debtor with significant equity in the
collateral, a creditor under current Article 9 must forego its remedy of
strict foreclosure and timely dispose of consumer goods in its possession
if the consumer debtor has paid at least sixty percent of the cash price
(or, if applicable, the principal amount).3 13 Recognizing that the consumer
§ 9-504(3) (1995).
306. See id.
307. See is.; id.§ 9-501(3)(b); see also In re Huffman, 204 B.R. 562, 564 (Bankr. WD. Mo.
1997) (stating that "a debtor's right to written notice cannot be waived or varied by any predefault agreement"); Canadian Community Bank v. Ascher Findley Co., 280 Cal. Rptr. 521,
534 (Ct. App. 1991) ("California interpretive law is quite clear that pre-disposition notice
may only be waived in writing by a debtor after default."); Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp. v.
Wells, 651 A.2d 507, 520-21 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994) (relying on U.C.C. § 9-504(3)
to conclude that waiver-of-notice provision in guaranty was ineffective); cf In re Collins, 132
B.R. 491, 493 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (observing, under North Carolina law, that a nonguarantor debtor may waive its right to a disposition notice only in writing after default, but
upholding a waiver-of-notice clause in a guaranty).
308. See U.C.C. § 9-61 1(b)-(d) (1998).
§ 9-602(7).
309. See id.
310. Id. § 9-602 ("Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-624 ... .
311. Id. § 9-624(a).
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Curley, 753 E Supp. 611, 613-14 n.6 (E.D. Va.
312. See, e.g.,
1990) (citing cases enforcing waiver clauses); Gambo v. Bank of Maryland, 648 A.2d 1105,
1111 n.9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (same); Harry C. Sigman, Guarantor'sPre-Default Waivers
of Article 9 Debtors' Rights to Notice and Commercially Reasonable Disposition Should Be Effective, 29
IDAHO L. REv. 627, 628 n.6 (1992-93) (same). But see Chrysler Credit Corp., 753 E Supp. at
614 n.7 (citing cases invalidating waiver clauses); Gambo, 648 A.2d at 1111 n.8 (same).
313. See U.C.C. § 9-505(1) (1995); see also Kelley v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 678 P2d 620,
623-24 (Kan. 1984) (concluding debtor renounced rights under U.C.C. § 9-505(1) to a forced
sale of repossessed vehicle); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Marston, 185 N.W2d 47, 50 (Mich. Ct.
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debtor may benefit from an offer of a strict foreclosure, current Article 9
permits the debtor to waive this right to a forced sale if the waiver is in
writing and executed after default. 3 14 Revised Article 9 imposes similar
constraints on the creditor through subsections (e) and (f)of revised section
9-620, 3 15 neither of which suggests that the debtor retains the ability to
waive its right to a forced sale. 3 16 As revised section 9-620 is referenced in
revised section 9-602 as a statute that creates rights and duties that cannot
be waived or varied,31 7 one might conclude that the current law will
change. But revised section 9-602 is subject to revised section 9-624,3 8 a
section that permits a debtor to waive its right to a forced sale under revised
section 9-620(e) "by an agreement to that effect entered into and authen3 19
ticated after default."
Under current section 9-506, a debtor can waive its right to redeem
collateral only if the waiver is in writing and executed after default. 320
Revised section 9-623 codifies the right of redemption but, unlike current
section 9-506, is silent on whether a debtor or secondary obligor may waive
that right. However, revised section 9-623 is referenced in revised section
9-602 as a statute that creates rights and duties that cannot be waived or
varied, 321 suggesting a change in current law. But revised section 9-602 is
subject to revised section 9-624,322 a section that permits a debtor or secondary obligor to waive its redemption right in a transaction "only by an

App. 1970) (holding U.C.C. § 9-505(1) was irrelevant where debtor made no payments on
note nor alleged payment of 60% of either cash price or loan amount); Press v. Purks, 32
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1016, 1019-20 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1997) (concluding debtor that paid
more than 60% of purchase price of horse prior to default could redeem horse from creditor
that failed to timely sell it under U.C.C. § 9-505(1)).
314. See U.C.C. § 9-505(1) (1995).
315. See id. § 9-620(e), (f) (1998).
316. Cf id. § 9-620(a)(4) (indicating that a secured party may accept collateral and forgive
all or part of the debt if "subsection (e) does not require the secured party to dispose of the
collateral or the debtor waives the requirenentpursuant to Section 9-624") (emphasis added).
317. See id. § 9-602(10).
318. See id. § 9-602 ("Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-624 ... .
319. Id. § 9-624(b). As noted earlier, this waiver did not appear in revised Article 9 until
very late in the drafting process. See supra note 191.
320. See id. §§ 9-506, 9-501(3)(d) (1995); see also Kellos v. Parker-Sharpe, Inc., 263 S.E.2d
138, 140 (Ga. 1980) ("Thus, the right to redeem collateral may be waived by an agreement
in writing, after default, but cannot be waived by an agreement in writing before default.");
Data Security, Inc. v. Plessman, 510 N.W2d 361, 365 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993) ("Under § 9501 (3)(d), a debtor's right of redemption may not be waived or varied except as provided in
§ 9-506, which means only in writing and after default."); Medallion Funding Corp. v. Helen
Laundromat, Inc., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 250, 257 (N.Y 1997) (finding waiver clause
in promissory note "ineffective"); Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Karlen, 319 N.YS.2d
831, 834 (1971) (stating that a debtor's right of redemption may not be waived prior to
default).
321. See U.C.C. § 9-602(11) (1998).
322. See id. § 9-602 ("Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-624 .
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323
agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after default."
However, in a departure from current section 9-506, a debtor or a secondary obligor may never waive its right of redemption in a consumer324
goods transaction.

To be effective, waivers permitted by revised section 9-624 must be
authenticated.3 25 In many transactions the creditor will satisfy this requirement by introducing a writing signed by the debtor or the secondary obligor.326 As parties (particularly consumers) occasionally sign writings without reading or understanding them, one may question whether
enforceability should turn on proof of authentication alone. The statute
could have required the creditor to prove that the signatory "expressly
agreed" to the waiver, 327 but that would likely create difficult, if not impossible, evidentiary hurdles. The approach taken by the Drafting Committee seems a fair compromise.
A minor quibble with revised section 9-624 is the placement of its substance apart from revised section 9-602. Revised section 9-602 provides a
list of statutes that create rights and duties that cannot be waived or varied.3 28 Revised section 9-624 permits limited waivers of selected rights and
duties created by statutes referenced in revised section 9-602. Rather than
draft a "rule" in one section (revised section 9-602) and, through a crossreference, direct the reader to the "exception" codified in another section
located nowhere nearby (revised section 9-624), the "exception" could
have been strategically grafted into the "rule." ' 329 In this manner all waiverrelated provisions would have been embodied in a single section.

323. Id. § 9-624(c).
324. See id. ("Except in a consumer-goods transaction ....
325. See id. § 9-624(a), (b).
326. See id. § 9-102(a)(7)(A).
327. Early drafts contemplated such proof. See id. § 9-504(i) (Draft July 28-Aug. 4, 1995)
(including bracketed language requiring a creditor to prove that a party "expressly agreed"
to waive its right to a disposition notice); id.§ 9-505(m) (requiring a creditor to prove that a
party "expressly agreed" to waiving selected strict foreclosure rights); id. § 9-506(o (requiring
a creditor to prove that a party "expressly agreed" to waive the right to redeem collateral in
a consumer secured transaction).
§ 9-602(12) (1998).
328. Revised § 9-624 itself is one of those statutes. See id.
329. For example, revised § 9-602(7) could have been drafted to read: "(7) Sections 9610(b), 9-611, 9-613, and 9-614, which deal with disposition of collateral, except a debtor
or secondary obligor may waive the right to notification of disposition of collateral under
Section 9-611 by authenticating an agreement to that effect after default." Similarly, revised
§ 9-602(10) could have been written to read: "(10) Sections 9-620, 9-621, and 9-622, which
deal with acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of obligation, except a debtor may waive
the right to require a disposition under revised § 9-620(e) by authenticating an agreement to
that effect after default." And revised § 9-602(11) might have read: "(11) Section 9-623, which
deals with redemption of collateral, except a debtor or secondary obligor may waive the
right to redeem collateral in a transaction, other than a consumer-goods transaction, by
authenticating an agreement to that effect after default."
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Revised section 9-624 permits debtors and secondary obligors in consumer-goods transactions to waive their right to a disposition notice but
not their right to redeem collateral. 330 This approach is questionable.
Many debtors and secondary obligors in consumer-goods transactions are
individuals who either are not aware that they enjoy a right to redeem
collateral or are not in a financial position to exercise that right. In an
effort to improve the awareness of these individuals, revised Article 9 requires a secured creditor to include redemption information in the disposition notice. 33 1 Why an individual should be able to waive its right to
a disposition notice that may inform the individual of its redemption right,
but not waive the very right mentioned in the waivable notice, is unclear.
In fact, of the four possible statutory approaches that could have been
adopted with respect to the waiver of notice and redemption rights in
consumer-goods transactions-(i) prohibit waiver of each right, (ii) prohibit waiver of the right to notice but permit waiver of the redemption
right, (iii) prohibit waiver of the redemption right but permit waiver of
the right to notice, and (iv) permit waiver of each right-the approach
selected arguably makes the least sense.
The enforceability of waiver clauses in standard guaranty agreements
and other loan papers executed by a secondary obligor before default was
an issue considered by the PEB Study Group. The PEB Study Group
received thoughtful comments from both "pro-waiver" advocates and
"anti-waiver" proponents, but ultimately declined to offer a recommendation favoring one side. 332 Through revised section 9-602 and revised
section 9-624, the drafting committee has adopted the "anti-waiver"
view, 333 a choice that will be well-received by some and criticized by others.
Nevertheless, by confronting the issue and resolving it statutorily the drafting committee has improved Article 9 by removing from potential litigation
a frequently contested issue that courts have failed to resolve in a uniform
3 34
manner.
Freedom-of-contract proponents may be disappointed that revised sections 9-602 and 9-624 continue to limit the ability of parties to waive or
330. See U.C.C. § 9-624.
331. See id. § 9-614(1)(C); see also id. § 9-614(3) (paragraph of model form beginning "You
can get ....").
332. See PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 12, at 227-30.
333. The "anti-waiver" view was specifically adopted during a floor vote at NCCUSL's
1997 annual meeting. See Weise Memorandum, supra note 50.
334. See supra note 312 and accompanying text. Occasionally the secured debt is evidenced
by a negotiable instrument governed by U.C.C. Article 3. If the instrument is executed by a
guarantor and includes a typical provision by which the guarantor waives suretyship defenses,
a potential conflict appears to exist between U.C.C. § 3-605(i) (permitting suretyship waivers)
and revised §§ 9-602 and 9-624 (prohibiting pre-default waivers and many post-default waivers). This conflict is resolved in favor of the Article 9 provisions. See U.C.C. § 3-102(b) (1995);
see also id. § 3-605 cmt. 8 (acknowledging Article 9 limitations); PEB Commentary No. 11
(Issue 11), 3B U.L.A. 120, 125 (Supp. 1998) (same).
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modify the rights and duties created by Part 6. The disappointment may
be justified, absent any empirical evidence that the majority of today's
creditors engage in post-default predatory tactics. Possibly the better reason for adopting a somewhat paternalistic approach is to address the concern that the debtor's "freedom" to contract may be nonexistent in many
secured transactions. 335 Usually the loan papers are drafted by creditors
and their counsel, who often adopt a "take it or leave it" approach at the
bargaining table. Debtors, desperate for the creditor's funds, goods, or
services, may either fail to read what they sign or may read but not comprehend the significance of the legal jargon without the assistance of counsel (the cost of which may frustrate the ability to consummate the transaction).336 Perhaps when "freedom of contract" is illusory the statutory
limitations on waiver and variance are necessary to level the playing field
for the various participants.
Some may criticize the contractual limitations in revised sections 9-602
and 9-624 for being too broad. The limitations in revised section 9-602
apply to all debtors and obligors, not just those without bargaining
strength. 337 Some debtors and obligors are quite sophisticated and knowledgeable in commercial matters. They can adequately protect themselves
against any attempted overreaching and intimidation by their creditors
and have no need to be rescued from their own errors by a statutory white
knight. These parties should be permitted to waive or vary their rights
and the duties imposed on their creditors if they so desire.
Redrafting revised sections 9-602 or 9-624 in a manner that extends
protection only to those parties in need of it is a noble goal, but drafting
language that furthers that goal is a daunting challenge. How does one
discern whether a party can adequately handle its commercial affairs?

335. See, e.g., 2 GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.3, at 1221 ("No one will deny that the consumer security agreement is a contract of adhesion or that the consumer needs protection.");
Miller, supra note 299, at 187-88 (offering several reasons why "freedom of contract" in a
consumer context is "a license for the unscrupulous to take unfair advantage of the consumer"); Philip Shuchman, Profit on Default:An Archival Study of Automobile Repossessionand Resale,
22 STAN. L. REV. 20, 52-53 (1969) ("Contract theory has long since run the full circle. The
consumer'sfreedom to contract is a lie. The consumer needs freedomfrom such flexibility.").
336. See, e.g., Clark, supranote 297, at 303 (noting that a consumer "is as likely to read (let
alone understand) [a security agreement] as he is to run windsprints in Red Square"); Greenfield, supra note 170, at 300 (contending that a consumer's waiver of a statutory right at the
time of contract formation "is highly suspect" and that the "small-print boilerplate" language
of the waiver makes a consumer's assent "a fiction"). But see Heiser & Flemma, supra note
34, at 493 (contending that "[t]he idea that a consumer debtor is unsophisticated and completely at the mercy of secured parties ignores reality"); James J. White, Work and Play in
Revising Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 2089, 2095 (1994) (urging the drafting committee to "purge
the idea of the noble consumer who borrows in ignorance, who is surprised by repossession
and deficiency judgment, and who claims incredible promises by his creditor" because "the
consumer class overflows with liars and cheats").
337. See U.C.C. § 9-602 (1998).
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Should Article 9 create the term, "sophisticated party"? 338 And if so, how
should the term be defined? What factors should dictate the inclusion of
natural persons? Education? Net worth? Adjusted gross income on the
most recent tax return? And when is a business entity a "sophisticated
party"? If its capital stock is traded on a national exchange? If it is audited
by a "Big Five" accounting firm? If it has had net income of at least "x"
dollars for at least "y" consecutive years? Should the term include some
built-in exclusions (e.g., the term excludes all natural persons and any party
to a transaction involving principal of less than "x" dollars)? One may
criticize revised sections 9-602 and 9-624 for limiting the contractual freedom of parties that can take care of themselves, but the criticism pales in
comparison to the drafting nightmares triggered when one contemplates
how and where to statutorily draw the line between those parties who need
its protection and those who do not.
REVISED SECTION 9-625. REMEDIES FOR SECURED
PARTY'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ARTICLE
A secured party may breach the peace while repossessing collateral,
forget to send a disposition notice to the debtor, fail to dispose of collateral
in a commercially reasonable manner, or otherwise falter in carrying out
its statutory obligations. Under current Article 9, the secured party's liability for noncompliance is addressed in section 9-507(l).33 9 Revised Article 9 deals with the same concern in section 9-625.34o
Current law provides injunctive relief by authorizing a court to order
or restrain a disposition if the secured party "is not proceeding in accordance with the [default] provisions of this Part [Five]. '"341 For example, if
a secured party has held collateral for an unreasonable period of time
without attempting to sell it or offering to keep it in satisfaction of the
debt, a court may order a disposition. And if a secured party has repossessed collateral prior to a default, a court may restrain any scheduled
disposition.
Revised section 9-625 makes two modifications to this remedy. First,
the remedy applies when the secured party fails to comply with any provision of Article 9, not just the default provisions. 342 Therefore, injunctive
relief may be available if the secured party is breaching its statutory duties
338. Federal securities laws have adopted a similar approach, excluding from coverage
selected transactions involving "accredited investors." See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15) (1994)
(defining "accredited investor"); id. § 77d (exemption); id. § 80a-6(a)(5)(A)(iii) (exemption).
339. See U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1995).
340. The rights and duties under revised § 9-625 cannot be waived or varied. See id. § 9602(13) (1998).
341. See id. § 9-507(1) (1995).
342. See id. § 9-625(a) (1998) ("If it is established that a secured party is not proceeding in
accordance with this article ....
")(emphasis added).
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that arise under a section of revised Article 9 other than those sections in
Part Six, such as the statutory duty to release collateral in its contro 3 43 or
to file or send (or cause to be filed or sent) a termination statement. 344 And
second, the remedy has been expanded to permit a court to order or
restrain "collection" and "enforcement" of collateral, in addition to its
disposition.3 45 For example, a court may enjoin a secured party from collecting payments from account debtors346 if a default has not occurred
and the secured party is not otherwise contractually permitted to collect
the payments. Also, a court might order a hesitant secured party to initiate
litigation to protect the debtor's interest in intellectual property against
unlawful infringement 347 if the loan documents prohibit the debtor from
initiating the litigation.
The introductory phrase in both current section 9-507(1) and revised
section 9-625(a) is identical: "If it is established . .

.

. "34

This language

places the burden of establishing noncompliance on the party seeking
injunctive relief. Neither statute, however, indicates who is eligible to seek
relief. Elsewhere both statutes permit recovery of damages by specific parties.3 49 Presumably the absence of any prescribed list of potential litigants
permits a court to grant injunctive relief at the request of any party that
establishes that the creditor is failing to comply with Article 9 and other350
wise convinces the court that injunctive relief is warranted.
Other remedies for noncompliance are available in addition to injunctive relief. Under current Article 9, a secured party is liable for "any loss"
caused by its noncompliance. 3 5 1 However, the loss must be caused by the
secured party's noncompliance with the default provisions, and no loss is
recoverable until the collateral has been disposed. 352 Parties eligible to
343. See id.
344. See id. § 9-513.
345. See id. § 9-625(a).
346. A secured party enjoys this post-default remedy under current and revised Article 9.
See id. § 9-502(1) (1995); id. § 9-607(a) (1998).
347. Under revised Article 9, a secured party enjoys the statutory right to initiate litigation
aimed at protecting and preserving collateral consisting of intellectual property against unlawful infringement. See id. § 9- 6 07(a)(3) & cmt. 3 (1998).
348. See id. § 9-525(1) (1995); id. § 9-625(a) (1998).
349. See id. § 9-501(1) (1995) (permitting "the debtor or any other person entitled to notification or whose security interest has been made known to the secured party prior to the
disposition" to recover damages); id.§ 9-625(c)(1) (1998) (awarding damages to "a person
that ...was a debtor, was an obligor, or held a security interest in or other lien on the
collateral").
350. At least one source suggests that the normal conditions for injunctive relief need not
be satisfied, as the relief is statutorily authorized. See LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 204,

§ 19.01 [A], at 377.
351. See U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1995).
352. See id.
Because § 9-507(1) permits recovery of any loss only if "the disposition has
occurred," the reader may conclude that an aggrieved party has no remedy under § 9-507(1)
if the secured party has breached its duties under the strict foreclosure provision of § 9-505.
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recover damages include the debtor, any person entitled to notification of
a disposition, and any party whose security interest in the collateral was
known by the secured party before disposition.3 53 The priority rank of the
security interest held by an injured party is irrelevant. Noticeably absent
from the list of parties entitled to damages are parties holding liens in the
collateral (including subordinate liens destroyed by the disposition 354 ).
Under revised Article 9, a secured party is liable "for damages in the
amount of any loss" caused by its noncompliance with any provision of
revised Article 9, whether or not the collateral has been disposed. 355 The
revised list of potential claimants includes any debtor, any obligor (whether
primary or secondary), and any party holding a security interest in or other
lien on the collateral (regardless of priority and whether or not the party
was entitled to receive a disposition notice or the secured party knew of
the party's property interest).356 However, the party must enjoy that status
"at the time of the failure." 3 57

A secured party's failure to comply with a provision of Article 9 may
create an obvious loss. For example, a creditor may repossess equipment
from a debtor that is not in default, forcing the debtor to lease replacement
equipment until it can persuade the creditor (or a court) that the original
equipment should be returned. At a minimum, the debtor has sustained
a loss equal to the amount of its lease expense.3 58 In other instances, a
However, comment 2 to § 9-505 reveals that a party can recover damages under § 9-507(1)
caused by a secured party's failure to comply with § 9-505. See also 4 WHITE & SUMMERS,
supranote 26, § 34-19, at 463-64 n.2.
353. See U.C.C. § 9-507(1); see also id. § 9-504(3) (indicating which parties are entitled to a
disposition notice).
354. See id. § 9-504(4).
355. Id. § 9-625(b) (1998). The ability to recover these damages is "[s]ubject to subsections
(c), (d), and (f)." Id. Subsection (c) places limits on who can recover damages and incorporates
the limitations of revised § 9-628, discussed infra notes 453-73 and accompanying text. Subsection (d) is discussed infra notes 377-82 and accompanying text. Subsection (f), not discussed
herein, applies when a person fails to comply with revised § 9-210.
356. See U.C.C. § 9-625(b), (c)(1) (1995); cf PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 12,
at 205-06 (recommending that U.C.C. § 9-507(1) be revised to provide a remedy to all junior
claimants, not just junior claimants entitled to a disposition notice or whose property interest
is known by the secured party before disposition).
357. U.C.C. § 9-625(c)(1) (1998).
358. An aggrieved party may claim a different measure of damages in tort. See id.§ 9625 cmt. 3. Query whether a party should have the option to pursue a tort remedy for a
creditor's breach of an Article 9 provision. Comment 3 to § 9-625 references § 1-103, which
permits principles of law (e.g., tort law) to supplement the U.C.C. provisions "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act." Is § 9-625 not a remedy provision? If so, is
a tort remedy not displaced by a particular provision? If one overlooks this tension between
§ 1-103 and comment 3 to § 9-625 and concludes that an aggrieved party can pursue a tort
remedy, then the party should determine whether a tort remedy will provide a greater recovery than an action under § 9-625 for actual damages. For example, after Debtor defaults,
Lender unlawfully repossesses equipment with a fair market value of $100,000 and sells it
in a commercially unreasonable manner for $70,000. Evidence reveals that a commercially
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party in whose favor the breached duty runs may suffer no loss. For example, a senior secured party with an unpaid debt of $100,000 may sell
collateral without sending the requisite disposition notice to a subordinate
secured creditor.3 59 The collateral is sold for $75,000. Unless the subordinate creditor can prove that the value of the collateral was worth more
than $100,000, it has suffered no loss as a result of the senior secured
creditor's noncompliance. Why? Because the subordinate secured party is
entitled to receive proceeds only after the senior secured creditor has re360
couped its reasonable expenses and satisfied its debt.
In many consumer transactions, the financial resources of the debtor,
the costs of litigation, and little (if any) actual damage collectively permit
a creditor to breach its statutory duties with impunity. Recognizing that
potential liability for actual damages may not adequately discourage creditor misconduct, current Article 9 imposes a minimum penalty in selected
transactions. The penalty, equal to "an amount not less than the credit
service charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the debt or
the time price differential plus ten per cent of the cash price," can be
recovered by any debtor that has granted a security interest in consumer
goods. 36 1 The same minimum award is available under revised section 9625 to a party that was a debtor or a secondary obligor at the time of
noncompliance.3 62 A party need not prove any actual damages in order
reasonable sale should have rendered a bid of $80,000. Under statutory principles, Debtor
is entitled to a credit of $80,000 (the sales price at a commercially reasonable sale). In a
conversion action, Debtor is entitled to a credit of $100,000 (the fair market value of the
collateral at the time of the unlawful repossession). Suing in tort permits Debtor to recover
an additional $20,000. Debtor also may be able to recover punitive damages. See, e.g., Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. Turner, 553 So. 2d 64, 67 (Ala. 1989); Truck Center of Tulsa, Inc. v. Autrey,
836 S.W2d 359, 365-66 (Ark. 1992); Star Bank, N.A. v. Laker, 637 N.E.2d 805, 807 (Ind.
1994); Zimprich v. Harvestore Sys., Inc., 461 N.W2d 425, 430-31 (N.D. 1990).
359. See U.C.C. § 9-61 l(b), (c)(3).
360. See id. § 9-615(a); see also supra note 266 and accompanying text.
361. U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1995). This minimum civil penalty has been described as "probably the most glittering nugget of consumer protection found in all of Article 9." CLARK,
supranote 9, 4.12[4], at 4-214; see also Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W2d 263, 268 (Mo. Ct. App.
1974) (noting that debtor was not entitled to statutory minimum award because collateral
consisted of business equipment, not consumer goods);Joyce v. Cloverleaf Homes, Inc., 344
S.E.2d 58, 60-61 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding trial court properly invoked third sentence
of § 9-507(1) as mobile home was a consumer good); cf CAL. COM. CODE § 9507(1) (West
1990) (deleting remedy from statute); OR. REV. STAT. § 79.5070(1) (Supp. 1996) ("If the
collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover in any event an amount not
less than $350.").
Some courts have held that the bankruptcy trustee inherits the debtor's cause of action.
See, e.g., Jones v. Star Bank (In re Angel), 142 B.R. 194, 198 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992); In re
Reed, 102 B.R. 243, 246 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989).
362. See U.C.C. 9-625(c)(2) (1998). Three stylistic changes have been made to the statutory
language: the revised statute references "10 percent" rather than "10 per cent" or "ten per
cent," "obligation" rather than "debt," and "time-price differential" instead of "time price
differential."
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to recover the minimum award 363 (which, in some cases, has significantly
reduced, if not completely eliminated, the debtor's liability for any deficiency 3 6 4). A party, however, that can prove its actual damages exceed the
statutory minimum can collect the greater amount.
Whether the "credit service charge" formula or the "time-price differential" formula applies to a particular transaction is unclear. The statute
offers no direction, and the accompanying comments leave "construction
and application to the court." 365 Case law and scholarly commentary reveal that application depends on whether the debtor received credit from
the seller or a third-party financer. If the seller extended credit to the buyer,

then the statutory minimum equals the time-price differential plus ten
percent of the cash price. If the debtor received credit from a third-party
financer, such as a bank, then the minimum award equals the credit service
charge plus 10% of the principal. 366 A simple example may be helpful.
Consumer desires to buy a piano, but cannot pay the $5000 cash price.

This minimum award can be recovered only when the secured party has "failed to comply
with this part [6]" (as contrasted with "this article"). Id.
363. See Ogletree v. Brokers South, Inc., 383 S.E.2d 900, 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Davenport v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 818 S.W2d 23,31 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); First City BankFarmers Branch v. Guex, 659 S.W2d 734, 740 (Tex. App. 1983 writ granted), affd, 677
S.W2d 25 (Tex. 1984).
364. See, e.g., Reed, 102 B.R. at 243 (indicating a $2763.28 deficiency and a $2590 penalty);
In re Hamby, 19 B.R. 776, 779, 784 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982) (indicating a $3017.07 deficiency
and a $2997.22 penalty); Gulf Homes, Inc. v. Gonzales, 676 P.2d 635, 640-41 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1983) (indicating a $1621.29 surplus and an $8250 penalty), affd & vacated in part, 676
P2d 629 (Ariz. 1984); Gulf Homes, Inc. v. Goubeaux, 664 P2d 183, 185, 189 (Ariz. 1983)
(indicating a $2416.72 deficiency and a $10,916.60 penalty); Conti Causeway Ford v.Jarossy,
276 A.2d 402, 405 (NJ. Dist. Ct. 1971) (indicating a $258.12 deficiency and an $872.00
penalty), affd, 288 A.2d 872 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972) Kruse v. Voyager Ins. Cos., 648
N.E.2d 814, 815, 819 (Ohio 1995) (indicating a $2477.44 deficiency and a $2461.91 penalty);
Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Wilson, 635 N.E.2d 92, 93 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1994) (indicating
$4913.48 deficiency and a $5359.35 penalty); Davenport, 818 S.W2d at 23 (indicating a
$6774.00 deficiency and a $6727.52 penalty).
365. U.C.C. § 9-625 cmt. 4.
366. See 9 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 32, § 9-507:06, at 901-02; LAWRENCE ET AL.,
supra note 204, § 19.03, at 384-85; see also Angel, 142 B.R. at 198-99 (using "credit service
charge" formula to calculate damages recoverable from third-party financer); Gulf Homes,
676 P2d at 640 (using "time price differential" formula to calculate damages recoverable
from seller); Jacobs v. Healey-Ford Subaru, Inc., No. CV 900031301S, 1996 WL 87600
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1996) (using "time price differential" formula to calculate damages
recoverable from seller after noting that "it appears to be more appropriate to interpret [the
third sentence of U.C.C. § 9-507(1)] as requiring a 'credit service charge' calculation when
there is a third party creditor, such as a bank, and to require a calculation of the 'time-price
differential' when the original seller demands a premium representing the difference between
the cash and credit price"); Kruse, 648 N.E.2d at 819 (using "credit service charge" formula
to calculate damages recoverable from third-party financer); Western Nat'l Bank v. Harrison,
577 P2d 635, 642 (Wyo. 1978) (using "credit service charge" formula to calculate damages
recoverable from third-party financer).
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Seller agrees to sell the piano to Consumer on credit if Consumer agrees
to make twelve monthly payments of $500. Alternatively, Bank agrees to
finance the purchase if Consumer agrees to pay $5750 on the one-year
anniversary date of the loan. If Seller finances the purchase and breaches
a statutory duty, Consumer can recover $1500 (time-price differential of
$1000 [total payments of $6000 minus cash price of $5000] plus $500
[10% of $5000 cash price]). If Bank finances the purchase and breaches
a statutory duty, then Consumer is entitled to recover $1250 (credit service
charge of $750 [total payment of $5750 minus borrowed amount of
$5000] plus 10% of the $5000 principal).
Is the "cash price" (as that term is used in the "time-price differential"
formula) reduced by any down payment paid by Consumer out of its own
funds? The same term also appears in the redemption statute, 36 7 where it
is distinguished from the amount financed. If the term is intended to have
a uniform meaning throughout the default provisions of Article 9, then a
Consumer's down payment has no impact on the damages calculation.
However, three reasons for a contrary interpretation could trump the desire for a uniform meaning. First, the redemption statute uses "cash price"
in a calculation that attempts to preserve the debtor's equity in the collateral; the damages statute uses "cash price" in a calculation that attempts
to penalize a creditor for breaching its statutory duty. As the term appears
in statutes that accomplish different purposes, then perhaps the term need
not be interpreted in a uniform manner.3 68 Second, ignoring the effect of
a down payment seems to result in a windfall for a debtor that has funded
the down payment with third-party funds rather than its own money. In
fact, in the unlikely (but not impossible) event that a seller and a thirdparty lender both finance part of the purchase and breach their statutory
duties, 369 failure to subtract the down payment from the cash price results
in an inflated aggregate penalty. 37° Third, failing to reduce the cash price
by any down payment may elevate form over substance. Debtor wants to
buy a new car that costs $25,000. Debtor will make a $5000 down payment. Both Dealer and Bank have offered to finance the $20,000 balance
on terms requiring Debtor to repay the loan in 60 equal payments (each
of which includes a "time-price differential" or "credit service charge"
component). From Debtor's perspective, the two proposals are identical.
The only discernible difference is whose name appears on the payee line
of the monthly check. But if the "cash price" component is $25,000 rather
than $20,000, Debtor may recover additional damages of $500 (10% of
367. See U.C.C. § 9-505(1) (1995); id. § 9-620(e)(1) (1998).
368. See LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 204, § 19.03, at 385.
369. For example, the third-party financer may receive full payment of the funded down
payment but fail to timely file a termination statement (a breach of U.C.C. § 9-513(a) (1998)),
and the seller, after a default, may dispose of the collateral in a manner not commercially
reasonable (a breach of U.C.C. § 9-610(b)).
370. See 9 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 32, § 9-507:06, at 902.
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the $5000 down payment) by accepting Dealer's offer. No persuasive rea-

son justifies different penalties for substantively identical credit transactions.
Certainly some guidance on whether the "cash price" excludes any
down payment would have been welcome. 37 1 But that is not the only
question that arises under revised section 9-625(c). Why does the statute
permit only secondary obligors to recover the statutory penalty372 when
any obligor is allowed to recover actual damages? 373 And if the minimum
statutory penalty is a form of consumer protection, should not the penalty
provision be both expanded to apply when a consumer debtor grants a
security interest in any collateral (rather than just consumer goods) and
modified to protect, in addition to debtors, all (but only) consumer obli3 74

gors?

The minimum statutory penalty may have the unintended consequence
of providing consumer creditors with an extra incentive to proofread their
notices for accuracy and otherwise scrutinize their compliance with the
provisions of Article 9. Although a creditor's noncompliance may not
trigger a material statutory penalty in any single transaction, noncompliance that is widespread (e.g., a wrong telephone number on a standard,

371. Guidance was requested in the Zinnecker Memorandum, supra note 33, at 5. Another, less troublesome, issue is whether the "principal amount" as referenced in the "credit
service charge" formula is measured at the inception of the loan or the time of noncompliance. Most, if not all, sources have concluded that the term refers to the original amount of
the loan. See, e.g., 9 HAWKI-AND ET AL., supra note 32, § 9-507:06, at 901 ("The principal
amount of the debt, of course, means the original amount of the debt without any additions
for interest or deductions for payment made."); 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 26, § 3419, at 465 (observing that "the penalty is computed on the basis of the original principal
amount"). See also Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Wilson, 635 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ohio Mun. Ct.
1994); Knights of Columbus Credit Union v. Stock, 814 S.W2d 427, 432 (Tex. App. 1991,
writ denied); Garza v. Brazos County Fed. Credit Union, 603 S.W2d 298, 300-01 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1980, no writ). The specific reference to "at the time a secured party failed to comply"
elsewhere in revised § 9-625(c)(2), and the omission of the same or similar language in the
formula itself, further supports the conclusion reached by scholars and the case law. Furthermore, using the amount of the loan principal at the time of the noncompliance, which
frequently will be less than the amount originally borrowed, effectively punishes the borrower
and rewards the third-party financer through a reduced penalty.
372. See U.C.C. § 9-625(c)(2).
373. See id. § 9-625(c)(1). The official comments attempt to limit the breadth of the statute
by stating that "a principal obligor who is not a debtor may recover damages only for
noncompliance with Section 9-616, inasmuch as none of the other rights and duties in this
Article run in favor of such a principal obligor." See id. § 9-625 cmt. 3. For much of the
drafting process, only secondary obligors were allowed to recover actual damages. See id. § 9507(b) (Draft Nov. 15, 1995). But see id. § 9-625(c)(1) (undated draft marked to reflect changes
to the ALI Proposed Final Draft dated Apr. 15, 1998) (changing reference from "a secondary
obligor" to "an obligor").
374. The reference to "consumer obligor" in subsection (e) suggests that the use of "secondary obligor" in subsection (c)(2) was a deliberate choice.
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computer-generated, disposition notice3 75) could prompt one or more class
actions with significant and adverse financial consequences. 3 76 Query
whether consumer creditors will attempt to mitigate this risk by increasing
the cost, or limiting the availability, of consumer credit.
A debtor continues to enjoy the ability to pursue damages for the loss
of any surplus proceeds.37 7 However, if its deficiency is reduced or eliminated under revised section 9-626, revised section 9-625 prevents a debtor
or secondary obligor from recovering any actual damages (other than damages for loss of surplus proceeds) triggered by the secured party's failure
to comply with default provisions relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance.3 78 The goal of awarding damages is to restore the
aggrieved party to the position it occupied before the secured party
breached its statutory duties. 379 The limitation found in subsection (d)
attempts to further that goal by eliminating the possibility of double-recovery or over-compensation.38 0 Yet, the limitation on recovery may frustrate the goal of restoration if the aggrieved party proves damages in an
amount that exceeds that portion of the deficiency reduced or eliminated
under revised section 9-626. For example, Creditor fails to send the requisite disposition notice to Debtor. Under local law, Creditor's noncompliance bars recovery of a $2000 deficiency Debtor can prove actual damages resulting from Creditor's noncompliance. Debtor has improved its
position by $2000, less its actual damages. If those damages are not greater
than $2000, then a court can deny recovery of actual damages and yet
place Debtor in a position no worse (and probably better) than it would
have enjoyed if Creditor had sent a disposition notice.3 81 If actual dam-

375. See U.C.C. § 9-614(1)(C), (D) (1998) (requiring a secured party in a consumer-goods
transaction to include in its disposition notice a telephone number from which the recipient
can discover the redemption price and additional information about the disposition and the
secured obligation).
376. For a while, a proposed provision capped the aggregate statutory penalty payable by
a secured party in one or more class actions prompted by the same noncompliance, but the
provision was deleted as part of the "consumer compromise." See infra notes 472-73 and
accompanying text.
377. See U.C.C. § 9-625(d).
378. See id. The relevant provisions presumably include at least revised §§ 9-607 to 9-616,
9-620, and 9-621. These statutes, or their substantive counterparts codified at a different
address, were expressly referenced before being deleted and replaced with "the provisions of
this part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance." See id. § 9-624(d)
(Draft Apr. 6, 1998). If the secured party fails to comply with a provision not concerning
collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance, then an injured party whose deficiency
is reduced or eliminated under revised § 9-626 should pursue damages under revised
§ 9-625.
379. See id. § 9-625 cmt. 3; id. § 1-106(1) (1995).
380. See id. § 9-625 cmt. 3.
381. See, e.g., Coones v. FDIC, 894 P2d 613, 615-16 (Wyo. 1995) ("Since the amount of
Coones's alleged damages did not exceed the amount of the deficiency, a judgment for
damages would be an impermissible double recovery.").
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ages, however, exceed $2000 (for example, $2400), then a court should
permit recovery of the amount ($400) by which the damages ($2400) exceed the discharged deficiency ($2000). Only by doing so can Debtor be
restored it its proper place. To best advance the restoration goal of damage
awards, revised section 9-625(d) should be interpreted in a manner that
prohibits recovery of actual damages only to the extent that (rather than /t
382
the deficiency is reduced or eliminated.
Because revised section 9-626 does not apply to consumer transactions, 383 the limitation in revised section 9-625(d) also does not apply to
consumer transactions. 384 If the aggrieved party in a consumer transaction
seeks to recover actual damages, then the restoration goal is best achieved
if those damages are netted against any unadjusted deficiency claim or
reduced, dollar for dollar, by that part of the creditor's deficiency claim
reduced or eliminated under local law for noncompliance. Should the
same relationship exist between a reduced or eliminated deficiency claim
and the minimum civil penalty? Some cases have held that a creditor must
pay the minimum civil penalty to the injured consumer even if noncompliance bars or reduces the deficiency claim, 385 while other cases have
concluded that an injured consumer cannot recover minimum damages if
those damages are less than the discharged deficiency 38 6 During most of
382. This concern was raised in the Zinnecker Memorandum, supra note 33, at 5. Revised
§ 9-625(d) would advance the proposed interpretation if the second sentence were revised to
read as follows: "However, a debtor or secondary obligor may not otherwise recover under
subsection (b) for noncompliance with the provisions of this part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance to the extent that its deficiency is eliminated or reduced
under Section 9-626."
383. See U.C.C. § 9-626(a) (1998) (stating that the rules therein apply "[i] n an action arising
from a transaction, other than a consumer transaction")(emphasis added).
384. See id. § 9-625(d) (stating that the first sentence applies only if a "deficiency is eliminated under Section 9-626" and the second sentence applies only if a "deficiency is eliminated or reduced under Section 9-626").
385. See, e.g.,
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner, 415 A.2d 773, 781 (Del. 1980) (denying
$2262.19 deficiency and awarding statutory damages of $1445.32); Randolph v. Franklin
Inv.Co., 398 A.2d 340, 352 (D.C. 1979) (ruling creditor's noncompliance barred deficiency
recovery and permitted debtor to pursue relief under § 9-507(1)); Georgia Cent. Credit
Union v. Coleman, 271 S.E.2d 681, 684 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (holding creditor could not
recover deficiency of $1892.55 and must pay debtor minimum damages of $366.37); Staley
Employee Credit Union v. Christie, 443 N.E.2d 731, 732 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (denying deficiency and awarding statutory damages of $2647.38); Kruse v. Voyager Ins. Cos., 648 N.E.2d
814 (Ohio 1995) (awarding $2461.91 statutory damages and denying $2477.44 deficiency);
Wilkerson Motor Co. v. Johnson, 580 P.2d 505, 509-10 (Okla. 1978) (concluding creditor
must pay minimum damages of $982.82 to debtor and forego deficiency). One scholar
describes this approach as "the no-deficiency-PLUS rule." See Steve H. Nickles, Rethinking
Some UC.C.Article 9 Probleis-Subrogation,Equitable Liens; Actual Knowledge; Waiver of Security
Interests; Secured Party Liabilityfor Conversion Under Part5, 34 ARK. L. REV. 1, 172-73 (1980); cf
PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 12, at 203-04 (recommending that a debtor not
recover statutory minimum damages if a deficiency is discharged).
386. See, e.g., Northwest Bank & Trust Co. v. Gotshall, 274 N.W2d 713, 718-19 (Iowa
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the drafting process, the secured party could offset against the minimum
statutory penalty that part of its deficiency claim reduced or eliminated
under revised Article 9, together with any other damages payable to the
aggrieved party. 387 However, these offsets fell by the wayside as part of the
"consumer compromise." 388 Whether the end result is favorable depends
on one's perspective of the minimum civil penalty. If the formulaic damage award bears no relationship to the nature of the misconduct or the
actual harm suffered, the award should be viewed as a penalty, not an
attempt to make the injured party whole, and should be fully recoverable
even if the creditor's noncompliance reduces or eliminates its deficiency.3 89
But if statutory damages exist solely as a substitute for actual, but nonquantifiable, damages, and the creditor's noncompliance also reduces or
eliminates its deficiency claim, then the dollar amount of that reduction
or elimination should serve as the debtor's "actual damages" and render
unnecessary any award of statutory damages (at least if the "actual damages" exceed the statutory damages).
Some statutes impose on a secured party a duty (such as releasing collateral in its control after the transaction has concluded, 390 filing or sending
a termination statement after the transaction has ended, 39 1 or sending an
explanation of the calculated deficiency or surplus3 92) that, if breached,
may not result in quantifiable damages. To provide the obligated party
with an incentive to carry out specific duties, revised section 9-625 permits
1979) (holding discharge of $1078.32 deficiency precluded debtor from recovering statutory
damages of either $394.03 or $514.75); Topeka Datsun Motor Co. v. Stratton, 736 P2d 82,
84 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding debtor could not recover statutory damages of $3192.66
after court discharged $3083.51 deficiency under Kansas version of Uniform Consumer
Credit Code); Bank of Chapmanville v. Workman, 406 S.E.2d 58, 65 (W. Va. 1991) (indicating that a hypothetical debtor cannot recover minimum damages of $10,000 if the court
denies a $50,000 deficiency). See also LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 204, § 19.03, at 385
(contending that awarding penalty damages after a deficiency has been reduced or eliminated
"would violate the spirit of the Code" and "would be adding a penalty on top of a penalty").
387. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 9 -50 7 (g) & cmt. 10 (Draft July 28-Aug. 4, 1995); id.§ 9-624(d) &
cmt. 7 (DraftJan. 1998).
388. See id.§ 9-624(c)(2) (underlined as new language), (d) (lined through as deleted language), and "Changes from Prior Draft" (Draft Mar. 1998); supra note 168 (discussing "consumer compromise").
389. In a jurisdiction that follows this approach and yet reduces actual damages by the
amount of any forfeited deficiency claim, a debtor that incurs actual damages greater than
the minimum statutory damages may find it economically attractive to forego the larger
claim and pursue the smaller claim. For example, assume Creditor's noncompliance bars
recovery of a $5000 deficiency claim, Debtor's actual damages are $3500, and its minimum
statutory damages are $2000. If Debtor attempts to recover its actual damages, it improves
its position by $1500 ($5000 deficiency claim minus $3500 actual damages). But if Debtor
opts for the statutory minimum, it improves its position by $3500 ($5000 deficiency claim
minus $3500 actual damages plus $2000 statutory damages).
390. See U.C.C. § 9-208 (1998).
391. See id. § 9-513.
392. See id. § 9-616.
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a party for whose benefit the duty exists to recover $500 for each breach
of that duty.393 This $500 is a supplement to, not in lieu of, any other
damages awarded under revised section 9-625394 and is not reduced or
eliminated if, as a result of the breach, a deficiency claim is reduced or
395
eliminated.

REVISED SECTION 9-626: ACTION IN WHICH
DEFICIENCY OR SURPLUS IS AN ISSUE
Whether intentionally or through oversight, a secured party may dispose
of the collateral in a commercially unreasonable manner, fail to send a
disposition notice to a debtor, or otherwise breach one of its statutory
duties. Current Article 9 does not expressly state the effect that noncompliance has on a secured party's ability to pursue a deficiency claim. 396 As
a result, three judicial responses have emerged: (i) a secured party's noncompliance absolutely bars recovery of a deficiency claim, (ii) a secured
party's noncompliance creates a rebuttable presumption that the value of
the collateral equals the amount of unpaid debt, effectively negating a
deficiency claim absent contrary proof by the secured party that a deficiency would remain even if the secured party had complied with its duties, 397 and (iii) a secured party's noncompliance permits the aggrieved
party to recover damages under section 9-507(1) that can be applied
against the secured party's deficiency claim. A legion of cases and articles
have analyzed the various approaches, lauding the merits and criticizing
the defects of each. 398 As one can readily surmise, the existing law on this
issue is anything but consistent.
393. See id. § 9- 6 25(e).
394. See id. ("In addition to any damages recoverable under subsection (b) .
395. See id. § 9-625(d) (limiting recovery "under subsection (b)" but not other provisions).
396. Professor Gilmore noted that the effect of a secured party's noncompliance on the
debtor's continuing liability for a deficiency "seems to have escaped the conscious attention
of the Article 9 draftsmen." 2 GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.9.4, at 1264.
397. Courts have disagreed on the degree of proof required to rebut the presumption.
See, e.g., Warnaco, Inc. v. Farkas, 872 E2d 539, 545-46 (2d Cir. 1989) (preponderance); Fedders
Corp. v. Taylor, 473 F Supp. 961, 978 (D. Minn. 1979) (preponderance); United Bank Alaska
v. Dischner, 685 P2d 90, 93 (Alaska 1984) (clear and convincing); Connecticut Bank & Trust
Co., N.A. v. Incendy, 540 A.2d 32, 38-39 (Conn. 1988) (preponderance); Caterpillar Fin.
Servs. Corp. v. Wells, 651 A.2d 507, 519 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994) (preponderance);
Associates Capital Servs. Corp. v. Riccardi, 408 A.2d 930, 934 (R-I. 1979) (clear and convincing); McChord Credit Union v. Parrish, 809 P.2d 759, 762 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (clear
and convincing).
398. Relevant cases are cited in most of the literature. CLARK, supra note 9, 4.12[5] [a][d]; 9 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 32, § 9-507:07; 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 26,
§ 34-20; Alan Aronowitz, Comment, Secured Creditor'sRight to a Deficiency JudgmentAfter Misbehauior Under U.CC. § 9-504(3): Which JudicialApproach Should Texas Adopt?, 21 Hous. L. REV.
359 (1984); Elizabeth Dalton, Note, The Consequences of Commercially UnreasonableDispositions
of Collateral:HaggisManagement, Inc. v. Turtle Management, Inc., 1986 UTAH L. REv. 813; Norma
G. Formanek, Comment, The CaliforniaArticle 9 No-Dficiency Rule: Undermining the Secured Party's
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The PEB Study Group acknowledged the present nonuniformity and
recommended adoption of the rebuttable presumption rule. 399 The drafting committee accepted that recommendation. Revised section 9-626400
states, in relevant part, that if a secured party fails to comply with the
default provisions pertaining to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance, then the liability for a deficiency "is limited to an amount by
which the sum of the secured obligation, expenses, and attorney's fees
exceeds the greater of: (A) the proceeds of the collection, enforcement,
disposition, or acceptance; or (B) the amount of proceeds that would have
been realized" if the secured party had complied with the relevant pro40
visions. '
The decision to adopt the rebuttable presumption rule should not come
as a surprise, as it is the law in the majority of states. 40 2 The rebuttable
presumption rule also represents a fair compromise of the two other positions, both of which suffer from serious flaws. The absolute bar rule often
renders a punitive result that bears no relationship to the actual harm
caused by the noncompliance and also provides the defaulting debtor with
Security, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 153 (1982); Howard Foss, The Noncomplying Secured Party'sRight to a
Dficiency, 21 UCC LJ. 226 (1989); Benjamin N. Henszey, A Secured Creditor'sRight to Collect a
Deficiency Judgment under UCC Section 9-504: A Need to Remedy the Impasse, 31 Bus. LAw. 2025
(1976); Elaine P Lariviere, Comment, Reevaluating Section 9-504(2) of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Deficiency Actions Afier Commercially Unreasonable Collateral Sales, 2 W, NEw ENG. L. REV.
493 (1980); Lloyd, supra note 156, at 695; Douglas M. Mancino, Note, Denial of Deficiency: A
Problem of Reasonable Notice Under UCC § 9-504(3), 34 OHIO ST. LJ. 657 (1973); Note, The
Right to an Article 9 Deficiency Judgment Without 9-504 Notice of Resale, 7 VAL. U. L. REV. 465
(1973); Joseph J. Ortego, CollateralDisposition: Creditor Concerns, 113 BANKING LJ. 726 (1996);
Kathryn Page, A Secured Party's Right to a Deficiency judgment After Noncompliance with the Resale
Provisions of Article 9, 60 N.D. L. REV. 531 (1984); Michelle Rowe, Comment, Failure of Notice
in the Disposition of Collateral: Its Effect on Debtor and CreditorRights Under the Alabama Uniform
Commercial Code, 14 CUMB. L. REV. 181 (1984); Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Uniform Commercial Code: Failure of Secured Creditor to Give Required Notice of Dispositionof Collateralas Bar to
Deficiency judgment, 59 A.L.R.3D 401 (1975 & 1996 Supp.); Richard C. Tinney, Annotation,
Failure of Secured Party to Make "Commercially Reasonable" Disposition of Collateral Under UCC§ 9504(3) as Bar to Deficiency udgment, 10 A.L.R.4TH 413 (1981); Erika L. Weinberg, Comment,
An Equitable Approach to Creditor Noncompliance with Section 9-504(3) of New rork's Uniform Commercial Code: Siemens Credit Corp. v. Marvik Colour,Inc., 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 373 (1996).
399. See PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 12, at 199-201.
400. The rights and duties under revised § 9-626 cannot be waived or varied. See U.C.C.
§ 9-602(13).
401. Id. § 9-626(a)(3). The amount of proceeds that would have been realized in the
absence of the secured party's noncompliance "is equal to the sum of the secured obligation,
expenses, and attorney's fees unless the secured party proves that the amount is less than that
sum." Id. § 9-626(a)(4).
If the secured party has failed to comply with a provision not pertaining to "collection,
enforcement, disposition, or acceptance" (e.g., repossessing a motor vehicle prior to default),
then revised § 9-626 does not apply. Instead, the secured party is liable for damages under
revised § 9-625. See id. § 9-626 cmt. 2.
402. SeeJoseph P Cook, The Secured Party's Right to a Deflciency udgment AJLr Violating UCC
Section 9-504(3): A TabularApproach, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q REP. 242, 245-55 (1995).
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a windfall. 40 3 And while the setoff rule strives to measure the actual harm
triggered by the creditor's noncompliance, it places the burden of proof
not on the creditor, but on a party that may have neither the financial
40 4
resources nor the access to information necessary to pursue its remedy.
403. See Aronowitz, supra note 398, at 377 ("The absolute bar approach may frequently
be 'harsh and punitive' because it is not premised on the debtor's actual loss caused by the
creditor's noncompliance."); Formanek, supra note 398, at 176 (criticizing the absolute bar
rule for "inflicting direct harm on the secured party and awarding an unjustified benefit to
the debtor"); Foss, supra note 398, at 238-39 ("Especially when the debtor is not damaged
by the secured party's noncompliance or is damaged less than the amount of the deficiency,
it is argued that the absolute bar approach will result in a windfall to the debtor and a penalty
to the secured party . . . ."); Heiser & Flemma, supra note 34, at 491 (criticizing the rule for

allowing a debtor "to escape a valid obligation on the basis of a harmless infraction" and
encouraging a debtor "to look for technical violations of the law ... where the alleged
infraction had no adverse impact on the debtor whatsoever"); Lloyd, supra note 156, at 701
(contending that the absolute bar rule "encourages the waste of resources," is "unjust," and
"results in higher deficiencies for most debtors while giving an undeserved windfall to a lucky
few"); Mancino, supra note 398, at 662 ("On the negative side, denial of any deficiency may
give a 'windfall' to the debtor."); Robert S. Minetz, May a "Wrongdoer" Recover a Do/ciency
Judgment, or Is Section 9-507(1) a Debtor's Exclusive Remedy?, 6 UCC L. J. 344, 363 (1974) (concluding that the absolute bar rule "may punish a secured party guilty of only a technical
harmless error and unjustly reward certain debtors"); Page, supra note 398, at 553 (contending
that the absolute bar rule "is a harsh, punitive, and unwarranted measure"); Rowe, supra
note 398, at 192 (observing the "penalizing effect of the absolute bar rule when the debtor's
damages do not equal or exceed the amount of the deficiency"); Sigman, supra note 312, at
631 (describing the absolute bar rule as "arbitrary, unfair and wasteful"); Weinberg, supra
note 398, at 392 (concluding that "the absolute bar rule often arbitrarily deprives creditors
of the deficiency"); see also Security Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Kirkland (In re Kirkland), 915 F2d
1236, 1237-38 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming application of absolute bar rule to deny deficiency
of S 1,303,882.78 to secured party that failed to send disposition notice to guarantor-debtor);
In re Excello Press, Inc., 890 E2d 896, 904 (7th Cir. 1989) (observing that the absolute bar
rule "produces a penalty out of line with the gravity of the omission"); Siemens Credit Corp.
v. Marvik Colour, Inc., 859 E Supp. 686, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The absolute bar rule is
disproportionately harsh to the creditor because it deprives the creditor of money to which
it is entitled, often as punishment for a relatively minor oversight. ... An absolute bar can
result also in a windfall for the debtor, who is relieved of the obligation to pay a legitimate
debt."); Bank of Chapmanville v. Workman, 406 S.E.2d 58, 64 (W. Va. 1991) (describing the
absolute bar rule as "a judge-made punitive provision" that imposes a penalty in the amount
that "bears no relation to the degree of commercial unreasonableness of the secured creditor's conduct, but depends solely upon the amount of the deficiency").
404. See Aronowitz, supra note 398, at 381 (observing that the setoff approach penalizes
the debtor for the creditor's misbehavior by placing on the debtor "the very arduous task of
proving the debtor's actual loss, which may be impossible to perform"); Lloyd, supra note
156, at 723 (noting that "the setoff rule gives the secured party an unfair advantage" because
"[t]he facts necessary to prove the debtor's damage claim are much more readily available
to the secured party than they are to the debtor"); Page, supra note 398, at 553 (contending
that the setoff rule is "an inequitable solution because it requires the debtor to submit
evidence proving a loss"); Rowe, supra note 398, at 198-99 (arguing that the setoff approach
"is the least popular of the three approaches because the debtor bears the burden of proof");
Weinberg, supra note 398, at 394 ("The problem inherent in this approach is that it places
the burden of proving damages upon the debtor, often the party least able to prove such
damages."); see also Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. Parsons, 820 S.W2d 315, 324 (Mo.
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By permitting the noncomplying secured party to recover a deficiency only
after proving that a commercially reasonable disposition would have generated proceeds in an amount less than the unpaid debt, the rebuttable
presumption rule balances the interests of both parties without penalizing
405
either.

Another issue not expressly addressed by current Article 9 concerns the
allocation of the burdens of pleading and proving compliance with the
statutory requirements associated with collecting, enforcing, disposing of,
or accepting collateral. In the absence of a roadmap, courts have traveled
different paths. Some require the secured party to plead and prove compliance, 406 others require the debtor to raise an issue in its pleadings as a
counterclaim or a defense before the secured party is required to prove
408
compliance, 40 7 and a few treat noncompliance as an affirmative defense.
Revised Article 9 provides clarity on the burden of proof.
Under revised section 9-626, a secured party need not prove compliance
unless a debtor or a secondary obligor places the secured party's compliance in issue. 409 If the creditor's compliance is placed in issue, then the
secured party bears the burden of establishing its compliance. 41 0 If the
secured party disposed of the collateral to itself, a person related to itself,
or a secondary obligor, then a debtor or an obligor wishing to contest the
Ct. App. 1991) ("The impediment of this [setoff] rule is that the burden to prove damages
rests on the debtor."); Bank of Chapmanville, 406 S.E.2d at 64 ("The main problem with this
[setoff] rule is that the debtor has the burden of proving his losses under U.C.C. § 9-507,
and will usually have a hard time proving that the fair market value was higher than what
the collateral actually sold for at the repossession sale.").
405. But the rebuttable presumption rule is not without its critics. See, e.g., Clark, supra
note 297, at 320 (describing the presumption as "highly fictional"); Comment, Remediesfor
Failure to Notify Debtorof Disposition of Repossessed CollateralUnder the UCC, 44 U. CoLo. L. REv.
221, 232 (1972) (observing that "there seems to be no basis under the language of the Code
for placing the burden on the creditor to prove [the fair market value of the collateral]"); see
also Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner, 415 A.2d 773, 779-80 (Del. 1980) (rejecting the rebuttable presumption rule and adopting the absolute bar rule after noting the "minimal"
burdens placed on the creditor and the "very onerous" results that noncompliance may place
on the debtor); Randolph v. Franklin Inv. Co., 398 A.2d 340, 347-48 (D.C. 1979) (rejecting
the rebuttable presumption rule and adopting the absolute bar rule after noting "the substantial prejudice to debtors in the absence of notice of resale, especially when compared to
the ease with which any creditor can comply with the notice requirements"); Tanenbaum v.
Econs. Lab., Inc., 628 S.W2d 769, 772 (Tex. 1992) (contending that the rebuttable presumption rule can "rob the debtor" of "express protections the Code provides"); cf Zubrow,
supra note 87, at 529 ("Ordinarily, in tort or contract cases alleging a similar failure to perform
a duty of care, the burden of proof is placed on the injured party to establish the violation
of duty and the resulting loss sustained.").
406. See Greathouse v. Charter Nat'l Bank-Southwest, 851 S.W2d 173, 174-75 n.4 (Tex.
1992) (citing cases).
407. See id. at 174-75 n.5 (citing cases).
408. See id. at 175 n.6 (citing cases).
409. See U.C.C. § 9-626(a)(1) (1998).
410. See id. § 9-626(a)(2).
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propriety of such a sale has the burden of establishing that the amount
of proceeds yielded at the actual disposition is significantly below the range
of prices that a proper disposition to a party outside those three categories
41
would have yielded. '
This allocation of proof is reasonable, although not free from debate.
The secured party's compliance may not be disputed in a deficiency suit.
To require proof of compliance in such a case would be, as one court
observed, "an unreasonable burden on the judicial process." 4 12 Revised
section 9-626 avoids a waste of judicial resources by requiring a secured
party to prove that it has satisfied its statutory obligations only when a
4 13
debtor or a secondary obligor challenges the secured party's conduct.
But once the creditor's compliance is challenged, the appropriateness of
placing the burden of proof on the creditor, rather than the party challenging the compliance, is debatable. Some may argue that revised section
9-626 departs from established legal principles that place the burden of
proof on the injured party, not the wrongdoer.4 14 If a debtor or a secondary obligor alleges that the secured party has failed to satisfy its obligations,
and that allegation is true, then the challenger receives a benefit (no deficiency) through the statutory presumption. Why not place the burden of
proving noncompliance on the party that benefits from the truth of its
allegation? 4 15 There are two likely responses. First, a creditor's noncompliance should not go unpunished; the law should provide the creditor
with an incentive to satisfy its statutory obligations. 4 16 Revised section 9411. See id. § 9-626(a)(5). The reason for placing the burden of proving low proceeds on
the objecting party, rather than the secured party, is to discourage price challenges every time
the collateral is disposed to one of the suspect parties. See id. § 9-626 cmt. 5.
412. See Greathouse, 851 S.W2d at 176.
413. See U.C.C. 9-626(a)(1). This will change the law in jurisdictions that presently require
a secured party to prove compliance if its pleadings are specific, rather than general. Texas
is such a jurisdiction. See Greathouse, 851 S.W2d at 77.
414. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. b (1981); W, PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 165 (5th ed. 1984); 2

McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 427 (4th ed. 1992) ("In most cases, the party who has
the burden of pleading a fact will have the burdens of producing evidence and of persuading
the jury of its existence as well."); Zubrow, supra note 87, at 529.
415. See Michael P. Donaldson, The Commercially Reasonable Disposition of Collateral Under
Article 9 of the UCC: The Question of the Burden of Proof,20 UCC LJ. 307, 325 (1988) (proposing
that whichever party benefits from the truth of a proposition of fact should bear the burden of
proof as to that proposition); see also GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.5, at 1235 ('Allegations
of fraud or of failure to exercise a required degree of diligence are easily made; the burden
of bringing forward convincing proof should be on the party who makes the allegations.").
416. See Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 398 S.W2d 538, 542 (1966) (noting it
would be "manifestly unfair" for a creditor to benefit from its own misbehavior). Norton was
the first case to apply the rebuttable presumption approach. Donaldson, supra note 415, at
821. Whether (and when) the rebuttable presumption rule applies in Arkansas is the subject
of some debate. See First State Bank v. Hallett, 722 S.W2d 555, 555-57 (Ark. 1987) (applying
absolute bar rule); Cheshire v. Walt Bennett Ford, Inc., 788 S.W2d 490, 492 (Ark. Ct. App.
1990) (applying rebuttable presumption rule).
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626 creates that incentive by requiring the creditor to prove its compliance
when challenged by a debtor or a secondary obligor. Second, evidence of
compliance is more accessible to the secured party than others; 4 17 therefore, the burden of proof should be placed on the secured party. To each
response is a plausible reply. The rebuttable presumption (which becomes
relevant only after the secured party's noncompliance has been established)
provides a secured party with an adequate incentive to comply with its
statutory obligations through the denial of a deficiency absent proof by the
securedparty that rebuts the presumption. Therefore, the creditor's noncompliance does not necessarily go unpunished. Additionally, while the secured
party may have better access to some evidence (e.g., whether, and to whom,
a disposition notice was sent and its contents), other evidence may be easier
for a debtor or a secondary obligor to access, especially when the secured
party did not sell the collateral to the debtor.4 18 And so the arguments go,
back and forth, like tennis balls at Wimbledon. Revised section 9-626
brings the argument to a close by placing the burden of proof on the
secured party. 419 Mindful of the statutory allocation, a creditor should
anticipate the possibility that its conduct will be questioned and, as a result,
carefully monitor and document its post-default behavior with a view towards litigation.
The effect of a secured party's noncompliance on its ability to recover
a deficiency in a consumer-goods transaction was the subject of much
thought during the drafting process. 420 An early draft proposed a modified
absolute bar rule that permitted a noncomplying creditor to recover only
that part of its deficiency claim that exceeded a statutory (but undetermined) dollar amount. 42 1 The same draft also either mandated or allowed
a court to award reasonable attorneys' fees and the costs of the action to
a consumer debtor or consumer obligor that prevailed on the issue of
noncompliance. 422 A subsequent draft proposed two alternatives if the
417. See Aronowitz, supra note 398, at 371; Dalton, supra note 398, at 834; Foss, supra note
398, at 246; see also Greathouse, 851 S.W2d at 176.
418. See Zubrow, supra note 87, at 529.
419. U.C.C. § 9-626(a)(2) (1998).
420. The PEB Study Group invited discussion of this issue through a "teaser" recommendation. See PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 12, at 201 ("The Drafting Committee should consider defining one or more special classes of transactions to which the
'absolute bar' rule would be applied (e.g., those in which the collateral is consumer goods or
those in which the secured debt is less than a specified amount).... The Committee reached
no consensus on the appropriate scope of this special class.").
421. See U.C.C. § 9-507(c)(2)(i) & cmt. 4 (DraftJuly 28-Aug. 4, 1995). The proposed rule
only applied if no other collateral remained to secure the obligation. See id. The same draft
barred a deficiency claim, even if the secured party satisfied all of its statutory obligations, if the
secured party took possession of collateral consisting of consumer goods and the secured
debt did not exceed a statutory (but undetermined) dollar amount at the time of default. See
id. § 9-504A.
422. See id. § 9-507(h).
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secured party failed to comply with the relevant statutes. Under the first
alternative, the absolute bar rule would apply in consumer secured transactions (and the rebuttable presumption rule would apply in all other transactions).423 Under the second alternative, the rebuttable presumption rule
would apply in all transactions, including consumer secured transactions. 424 The same draft retained the provision mandating or allowing a
court to award reasonable attorneys' fees and the costs of the action to a
consumer debtor or consumer obligor that prevailed on the issue of noncompliance. 425 As with other consumer-oriented provisions, the first alternative (favoring consumers through adoption of the absolute bar rule),
together with the provision permitting consumers to recover legal fees and
expenses, was deleted near the end of the drafting process as part of the
"consumer compromise. '426 Ultimately a decision was made to exclude consumer
transactionsfrom the coverage of revised section 9-626.427
So which rule applies in consumer transactions? The absolute bar rule?
The rebuttable presumption rule? The setoff rule? And who bears the
burden of pleading and proof on compliance issues in consumer transactions? The answers (or lack thereo) are found in subsection (b), which
states:
The limitation of the rules in subsection (a) to transactions other than
consumer transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of
the proper rules in consumer transactions.The court may not infer from that
limitation the nature of the proper rule in consumer transactions and
428
may continue to apply established approaches.
Whether the rules of revised section 9-626 should apply to consumer
transactions, whether a different set of rules applicable to consumer transactions should have been drafted, or whether a court should apply, or
depart from, the rules of revised section 9-626 in consumer transactions
are all questions worthy of debate to a degree greater than the confines

423. See U.C.C. § 9-625 (Alternative A) (Draft Oct. 1996). Under Alternative A, the absolute bar rule would apply in a consumer secured transaction only if no other collateral
remained to secure the obligation. See id. If other collateral remained, the secured party's
sole recourse would be to that collateral, and a consumer obligor would have no personal
liability for any deficiency. See id.
424. See id. § 9-625 (Alternative B).
425. See id. § 9-628.
426. See id. § 9-625 (deleting Alternative A); id. § 9-628 (deleting provision); see also supra
note 168 (discussing "consumer compromise").
427. See U.C.C. § 9-626(a) (1998) (stating that the rules apply "[i]n an action arising from
a transaction, other than a consumer transaction")(emphasis added).
428. Id. § 9-626(b) (emphasis added); see id. § 9-102(a)(26) (defining"consumer transaction"); Rapson, supra note 30, at 57-59 (discussing drafting evolution of revised § 9-626(b)).
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of these pages. 429 Suffice it to say that nonuniformity is a foregone conclusion. 430 That may be a not-so-small (but nevertheless acceptable) price
to pay, if the inclusion of rules governing deficiency claims in consumer
transactions would delay enactment of revised Article 9 by state legislatures.

43 1

REVISED SECTION 9-627: DETERMINATION OF
WHETHER CONDUCT WAS COMMERCIALLY
REASONABLE
Current Article 9 does not define "commercially reasonable." Although
the term "is a vague and fluctuating one, which cannot be meaningfully
429. Some authors already have fueled the debate. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 9,
4.12 [5] [d], at 4-224 (suggesting that courts apply the absolute bar rule in cases involving
consumer goods); Gail Hillebrand, The Redrafling of UCC Article 2 and 9: Model Codes or Model
Dinosaurs?, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 191, 208-11 (1994) (advocating an anti-deficiency rule for
all consumer goods other than well-defined luxury goods); Lloyd, supra note 156, 701 n.33
(declining to take a position on whether the absolute bar rule should be retained in consumer
cases but offering several reasons for its retention); James J. White, UCC Proposals Concerning
Consumer Transactions, SC36 ALI-ABA 253, 256 (1997) ("What policy requires the rebuttable
presumption rule for all commercial transactions but would allow states to adopt the absolute
bar rule for consumer transactions?").
430. Even if revised Article 9 adopted a rule applicable to consumer transactions, some
nonuniformity would likely result from the enactment of nonuniform amendments enacted
by state legislatures unhappy with the rule selected by the Drafting Committee. Cf Alvin C.
Harrell, Commentary: The Case for Nonunmiormity in State Law, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q REP.
294, 327 (1997) (suggesting that "it serves the interests of the uniform law process to steer
clear of uniform rules for issues that are subject to widespread disagreement"); Discussion,
Uniform State Laws: A Discussion Focused on Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REv. 257, 269 (1997) (JuliannaJ. Zekan, panelist) (observing that "the paramount
goal should be to improve the law, not to maintain perfect uniformity"); Fred H. Miller,
Realism Not Idealism in Uniform Laws-Observationsfrom the Revision of the UCC, 39 S. TEX. L.
REv. 707, 727 (1998) (asserting that adding consumer protection provisions to the Code
increases the risk of delayed enactment and nonuniformity); see also Richard A. Elbrecht, The
NCCUSL Should Abandon Its Searchfor Consensus and Address More Difficult and Controversial Issues
Applying"Process" Concepts, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 147, 152 (1994) (contending that "NCCUSL
is not serving the interests of either the business community or the consumers" when it
"focus[es] on writing statutes that will have the consensus needed to guarantee their adoption
in almost every state").
431. CfJulian B. McDonnell, The Code Project Confronts FundamentalDilemmas, 26 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 683, 688 (1993) (observing that drafters "must produce a product that has a good
chance of being sold to all of the state legislatures" if the goal of uniformity is to be advanced); Memorandum of Article 9 Drafting Committee, Consumer Issues Subcommittee
(May 29, 1996), reprintedin Fred H. Miller, UCCProposalsConcerning Consumer Transactions(Article
2 and 9), SC36 ALI-ABA 185, 201 (Dec. 11, 1997) ("A major goal in the revision process is
maintenance of uniformity and quick acceptance of Revised Article 9 and the final decision
regarding the extent of special consumer provisions in Article 9 must take into account
enactability of the statute."); William J. Woodward Jr., The Realist and Secured Credit: Grant
Gilmore, Common-Law Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Process, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1511, 1522
(1997) (observing that "[e]nactability operates as the great leveling agent in the reform process").
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described except in terms of particular fact situations, ' 432 a secured party
can avoid the peril often associated with the term by sailing into one of
several safe harbors in current section 9-507. 4 3 3 Similar safety exists under
434
revised Article 9 and is codified at section 9-627.
Under current section 9-507(2), the mere fact that a better price could
have been achieved if the secured party had sold collateral at a different
time or in a different method will not, by itself, establish that the secured
4 35
party failed to sell the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner.
Revised section 9-627 retains the same concept and expands it beyond
just collateral sales to also include collateral acceptance, collateral collection, collateral disposition, and collateral enforcement. 436 Rarely, if ever,
will post-default activity yield maximum proceeds, making this safe harbor

"necessary to prevent every disgruntled debtor from making a jury case

by talking price. ' 437 Although the rule suggests that the court should shine
432. See GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.5, at 1234-35.
433. See U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (1995).
434. In addition to the protection afforded by revised § 9-627, a secured party is advised
to take advantage of revised § 9-603(a), which permits parties to adopt standards defining
"commercial reasonableness" if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable. See id. § 9603(a) (1998).
435. See id. § 9-507(2) (1995); see also id. § 9-504(3) (requiring all aspects of a collateral
disposition to be commercially reasonable); see also FDIC v. Lanier, 926 E2d 462, 467 (5th
Cir. 1991) (refusing to infer commercial unreasonableness of private sale that yielded
$ 100,000-an amount $400,000 less than the distributor's cost and approximately $80,000$150,000 less than an independent distributor alleged he was willing to pay-absent proof
of "procedural irregularities, allegations of bad faith, or other reasons to explain the allegedly
low price"); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Diamond Timber, Inc., 559 F Supp. 972, 979 (S.D.N.Y
1983) ("Commercial reasonableness of a sale depends on the procedures employed in the
sale, not on the proceeds it generates."), affd, 729 E2d 1442 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Marshall,
219 B.R. 687, 690 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1997) (ruling that foreclosure sale of motor home for
$2650, a price much less than the fair market value of $5500 estimated by the creditor's
expert, did not make the sale commercially unreasonable); In re Whatley, 126 B.R. 231, 236
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991) (holding creditor's foreclosure sale of collateral to itself for $25,000
was not rendered commercially unreasonable merely because creditor subsequently sold same
collateral at auction for $39,748.29); Daniel v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 612 So. 2d 483, 485
(Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (declining to rule that dealer's wholesale auction was commercially
unreasonable solely because vehicle sold for $3500, instead of $5775 as suggested by national
appraisal guidebook); Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. Parsons, 820 S.W2d 315, 322
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (noting the disparity between the $6600 sales price and the $27,000
value ascribed to collateral by expert "is a factor important, but not decisive, to commercial
reasonableness").
436. See U.C.C. § 9-627(a) (1998); see also id. § 9-607(c) (obligating the secured party to
proceed in a commercially reasonable manner in its collection and enforcement efforts); id.
§ 9-608(a)(3) (requiring a secured party to apply noncash proceeds in a commercially reasonable manner); id. § 9-610(b) (stating every aspect of a collateral disposition must be commercially reasonable).
437. Nadler v. Baybank Merrimack Valley, N.A., 733 E2d 182, 184 (1st Cir. 1984); see also
Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918, 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (observing that
the first sentence of U.C.C. § 9-507(2) recognizes that "only on rare occasions will a repossession sale bring the highest bids or the highest value for the collateral and therefore such
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its spotlight on the procedures followed by the creditor, rather than the
amount of proceeds yielded by those procedures, it would be imprudent
for a creditor to believe that a court will completely ignore allegations of
an inadequate price when reviewing the propriety of the creditor's actions.

438

Under current section 9-507(2), a secured party can claim a conclusive
presumption of commercial reasonableness by selling collateral of a type
customarily sold on a recognized market either in the "usual manner" or
at "the price current in such market at the time of his sale." 43 9 Revised
section 9-627 retains the same rule. 440 The reason for this rule is not hard
to glean. Market forces independent of the secured party's behavior dictate
the price of collateral sold on a recognized market. If the creditor disposes
of such collateral in its usual manner, then any disparity between the
market price and the disposition price did not result from creditor missales could always be vulnerable to attack by a showing that a higher price might have been
obtained under different circumstances"); 9 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 32, § 9-507:08,
at 915 (noting that "the drafters apparently did not want the secured party to be secondguessed after the fact").
438. See, e.g., Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 292 E Supp. 797, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (noting
that a discrepancy between a price received and a price obtainable, "if substantial, is relevant
to a determination of whether a challenged sale [is] 'commercially reasonable' "); McMillian
v. Bank South, N.A., 373 S.E.2d 61, 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (reducing deficiency judgment
by $150, the difference between the $500 appraised value at repossession and the $350
yielded at the foreclosure sale); FDIC v. Herald Square Fabrics Corp., 439 N.YS.2d 944,
953-55 (1981) (concluding that proof of discrepancy between original sale price of $85,200
and foreclosure sale price of $8393.14 was sufficient to deny creditor's motion for summary
judgment even though no issues existed on adequacy of notice or sales procedures); Meadows,
supra note 77, at 2446-47 ("While the Code does not require the price to be maximized, the
creditor is expected to make choices regarding the conduct of the sale with the expectation
that they will result in a fair price.") (footnotes omitted); Miller, supra note 431, at 224-25
(contending that if evidence suggests that the price obtained by the creditor is unreasonable
in light of information concerning prices generally obtained for similar property, then the
creditor should be required to introduce a commercially reasonable justification for carrying
out the sale as it did and accepting the particular price); see also U.C.C. § 9-627 cmt. 2 ("While
not itself sufficient to establish a violation of this Part, a low price suggests that a court should
scrutinize carefully all aspects of a disposition to ensure that each aspect was commercially
reasonable.").
439. U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (1995); see Zinnecker, supra note 2, at 1155-56 (discussing "recognized market"); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. DeValk Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 600 E Supp.
1547, 1551 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (finding sale of vehicle at dealers-only auction-"a well-recognized market for automobiles in the Chicago metropolitan area"-to be commercially reasonable); Washburn v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 502 N.E.2d 739, 742-43 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986) (concluding creditor was entitled to summary judgment on issue of commercial reasonableness after selling Ginnie Mae bonds in usual manner on recognized market); Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Russell, 519 N.W2d 465-66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming trial court's
grant of creditor's motion for summary judgment on issue of commercial reasonableness
where creditor sold vehicle at wholesale, dealers-only, auction-a"well-recognized market");
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Potts, 548 N.E.2d 223, 228 (Ohio 1989) (finding public sale of
repossessed vehicle was conducted "in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor").
440. See U.C.C. § 9-627(b)(1), (2) (1998).
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conduct. And if the creditor disposes of collateral at its then-current market price, the commercial reasonableness of procedures followed by the
creditor is irrelevant.
Current Article 9 states that the sale of collateral sold "in conformity
with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold" is a commercially reasonable sale. 44 1 The same principle continues under revised section 9-627.442 The premise is that, in the absence
of a recognized market, the collateral will bring a fair (if not the best)
price if it is disposed by reasonable commercial practices through normal
channels, 443 thus negating any need to review the commercial reasonableness of the secured party's actions. However, the reasonableness of a
44 4
dealer's commercial practices remains subject to judicial scrutiny.
A disposition of collateral under current Article 9 that has been approved (i) in a judicial proceeding, (ii) by any bona fide creditors' committee, or (iii) by any representative of creditors is commercially reasonable 44 5 (although the absence of such approval does not necessarily prevent
441. See id. § 9-507(2) (1995); see also Piper Acceptance Corp. v. Yarbrough, 702 E2d 733,
735 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding creditor's sale of aircraft in accordance with industry practice
was commercially reasonable); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. B.J.M., Jr., Inc., 834 E Supp. 813,
835 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (concluding sale of dealer's motor vehicle inventory at wholesale, dealersonly, auction was commercially reasonable in absence of any evidence that method utilized
did not conform to reasonable commercial practices in auto dealership industry); Daniel v.
Ford Motor Credit Co., 612 So. 2d 483, 484-85 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (concluding sale of
vehicle at wholesale dealer auction-"the usual manner of sale of repossessed automobiles
•.. in conformity with the reasonable commercial practices among dealers in repossessed
automobiles"-was commercially reasonable); Davis v. Concord Commercial Corp., 434
S.E.2d 571, 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming trial court's directed verdict on issue of
commercial reasonableness in favor of creditor that retained expert dealer to dispose of used
heavy equipment); McMillian, 373 S.E.2d at 62-63 (upholding trial court's conclusion that
method and manner of vehicle sale was commercially reasonable where vehicle was sold at
private auction by recognized automobile auction company according to standard practice
and procedures followed weekly for eleven years); Carter v. First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n,
347 S.E.2d 264, 268 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding creditor's sale of repossessed motor
home by same method and manner followed by similar creditors was commercially reasonable).
442. See U.C.C. § 9-627(b)(3) (1998).
443. See id. § 9-507 cmt. 2 (1995); 2 GILMORE, supra note 9, § 44.5, at 1236.
444. See U.C.C. § 9-507 cmt. 2 ("Such a method of sale,fairly conducted, is recognized as
commercially reasonable .... ") (emphasis added).
445. See id. § 9-507(2); see also Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Traenkle, 933 E Supp. 1280, 128687 (D. Md. 1996) (holding borrowers could not challenge commercial reasonableness of
court-ordered marshal's sale of yacht); Geiger v. Tokheim, 191 BR. 781, 796 (N.D. Iowa
1996) (ruling commercial reasonableness of stock sale approved by bankruptcy court in
judicial proceeding could not be challenged); FBS AB Credit, Inc. v. Estate of Walker, 906
E Supp. 1427, 1432 (D. Colo. 1995) (finding bank's sale of collateral pursuant to bankruptcy
court order was conclusively deemed commercially reasonable); National Westminster Bank
v. Ross, 130 B.R. 656, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding trustee was estopped from challenging
commercial reasonableness of sale expressly approved by bankruptcy court); Bryant v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 407 E Supp. 360, 367 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (concluding borrowers
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a disposition from being commercially reasonable 446). Other than extending the conclusive presumption to dispositions approved by an assignee for
the benefit of creditors, the law remains unchanged under revised Article
9.447 One court explained the purpose of this principle as follows:
[A] judicial approval of a disposition of collateral is given conclusive
effect not because the tribunal necessarily scrutinized all aspects of
the disposition and found them reasonable, but because the hearing
allowed the parties to voice their objections and to comment upon
the proposed transaction. If the parties have had an opportunity for
thorough discussion of the sale's terms, it is appropriate to give the

court's determination of reasonableness a conclusive effect. 448
Although the time and expense necessary to qualify for the presumption
may limit the frequency of its use, a secured party may overlook those
impediments if the collateral is atypical or the monetary risks of failing to
act in a commercially reasonable manner are great. Once the necessary
approval has been obtained, the secured party should adhere to the preapproved procedures; a departure may result in a loss of the presumption.

449

Noticeably absent from revised section 9-627 (and its predecessor) is a
safe harbor for dispositions of collateral of a type that is the subject of
widely distributed standard price quotations. 450 The same reasons that
justify a conclusive presumption of commercial reasonableness when collateral is disposed on a recognized market support enactment of a similar
presumption when collateral subject to widely distributed standard price
quotations is disposed. In many instances collateral subject to such quotations also is sold on a recognized market, so the need for an additional
could not challenge commercial reasonableness of court-ordered stock sale absent proof of
noncompliance, fraud, or overreaching by creditor); Cramton v. Altus Bank, 596 So. 2d 902,
906 (Ala. 1992) (holding guarantor could not challenge commercial reasonableness of courtordered sale of barge in absence of evidence that court proceedings were procedurally defective or creditor was guilty of malfeasance); Davis, 434 S.E.2d at 574 (ruling trustee's auction
sale of machine was conclusively deemed to be commercially reasonable).
446. See U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (1995).
447. See id. § 9-627(c), (d) (1998).
448. Bryant, 407 F Supp. at 364; see also In re Zsa Zsa Ltd., 352 E Supp. 665, 672 (S.D.N.Y
1972).
449. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Appalachian Pocohontas Coal Co. (In re Appalachian
Pocahontas Coal Co.), 31 B.R. 579, 580-81 (S.D. W Va. 1983) (concluding that even if
bankruptcy court order was "judicial approval" under U.C.C. § 9-507(2), creditor that failed
to comply with express terms and implied provisions of order could not invoke conclusive
presumption that disposition was commercially reasonable). Cf Carlton Mfg., Inc. v. Bauer,
429 S.E.2d 329, 331 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (holding creditor could not invoke conclusive
presumption as bankruptcy court order "merely authorized plaintiff to conduct a commercially reasonable sale; it did not declare the manner in which plaintiff ultimately conducted
the sale to be commercially reasonable").
450. An explanation was requested in the Zinnecker Memorandum, supra note 33, at 5.
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safe harbor may not be as great as it seems. 45 1 Nevertheless, the statutory
references to both "recognized market" and "widely distributed standard
price quotations" discourage any suggestion that collateral subject to the
latter will always fall within the former.452 Therefore, an additional safe

harbor would provide some benefit. The desired result could be accomplished if revised section 9-627(b) were revised in a manner that created
a conclusive presumption of commercial reasonableness for any disposition of collateral "at the price current at the time of disposition of property
subject to widely distributed standard price quotations."

REVISED SECTION 9-628: NONLIABILITY AND
LIMITATION ON LIABILITY OF SECURED PARTY
LIABILITY OF SECONDARY OBLIGOR
Revised section 9-628 has no predecessor under current Article 9.
Through its five provisions, revised section 9-628 limits a secured party's
liability for noncompliance in specific situations.
As noted earlier, a secured party owes no duty to a debtor or an obligor
(or a secured party or a lienholder that has filed a financing statement
against a debtor) unless the secured party knows (i) that the person is either
a debtor or an obligor, (ii) the identity of the person, and (iii) how to
communicate with the person. 453 If a secured party owes no duty to a
person in the absence of the requisite knowledge, then it seems only fair
that the secured party's acts or omissions should neither trigger liability
to, nor reduce or eliminate any deficiency claim against, such a person.
An exculpatory clause to that effect is codified in revised section 9-628. 4 54
Many of the duties created by the default provisions of revised Article
9 require a secured party to determine whether the transaction is a con451. A secured party disposing of such collateral also might avail itself of revised § 9627(b)(3), as collateral subject to widely distributed standard price quotations is likely to be
disposed by dealers.
452. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1995) (excusing disposition notice if collateral is sold on
recognized market but not excusing disposition notice if collateral is subject to widely distributed standard price quotations; also permitting secured party to buy at private sale if
collateral is sold on recognized market or the subject of widely distributed standard price
quotations); id. § 9-61 0(c)(2) (1998) (permitting secured party to purchase at private disposition
if collateral is sold on recognized market or the subject of widely distributed standard price
quotations); id. § 9-611 (d) (excusing disposition notice if collateral is sold on recognized market but not excusing disposition notice if collateral is subject to widely distributed standard
price quotations).
453. See id. § 9-605 (1998), discussed in Zinnecker, supra note 2, at 1128-30.
454. See U.C.C. § 9-628(a). A casual reading of subsections (a)(l) and (b) may prompt the
reader to question whether any substantive difference exists between the two provisions.
Subsection (a)(1) exculpates the secured party from liability for failing to comply with Article
9. Subsection (b) relieves the secured party from liability for breaching a duty arising under
other law (e.g., suretyship or tort law) if that duty is imposed on the secured party in its
capacity as such. Regrettably, this difference is not explained in revised § 9-628, but in revised
§ 9-605. See id. § 9-605 cmt. 2 (last sentence).
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sumer-goods transaction or a consumer transaction or if the collateral
includes consumer goods. 455 A secured party may breach its duty only
because its determination is erroneous. For example, a secured party may
erroneously conclude that all collateral offered by an individual is a consumer good (whereas it may be something else, such as equipment or
investment property) or any secured loan made to an individual creates a
consumer-goods transaction or consumer transaction (when it may be a
loan not incurred primarily for person, family, or household purposes).
Revised section 9-628 relieves a secured party from liability to, and preserves its deficiency claim against, any person for any breach predicated
on a reasonable (but erroneous) belief concerning the type of transaction
or collateral. 456 The protection is available to a secured party whose reasonable belief is based on its "reasonable reliance" on either "a debtor's
representation concerning the purpose for which collateral was to be used,
acquired, or held" or "an obligor's representation concerning the purpose
for which a secured obligation was incurred. '457 Accordingly, a secured
party's standard loan documents should include representations concerning the use of collateral and the purpose of the debt. And the provisions
of revised Article 9 should be applied as if the facts reasonably believed
4 58
and reasonably relied upon by the secured party were true.
To provide the secured party with some incentive to comply with its
statutory obligations, revised section 9-625(c) permits a debtor or a secondary obligor to recover minimum statutory damages in an amount equal
to "not less than the credit service charge plus 10 percent of the principal
amount of the obligation or the time-price differential plus 10 percent of
the cash price" when the collateral consists of consumer goods. 459 Revised
section 9-628 limits a secured party's liability for minimum statutory damages in two instances. First, minimum statutory damages cannot be
awarded to punish a secured party that breaches its duty under revised
455. See, e.g.,
id.§ 9-611 (c)(3) (requiring secured party to send disposition notice to parties
other than the debtor and any secondary obligor only if collateral is other than consumer
goods); id.
§ 9-612(b) (indicating disposition notice sent after default and no less than ten days
before disposition is timely; rule applies only if transaction is not consumer transaction); id.
§ 9-613 (describing contents and form of disposition notice to be sent in transaction other
than consumer-goods transaction); id. § 9-614 (describing contents and form of disposition
notice to be sent in consumer-goods transaction); id.§ 9-616(b) (obligating secured party to
send written calculation of surplus or deficiency in consumer-goods transaction); id.§ 9620(a)(3) (prohibiting secured party from accepting collateral in full or partial satisfaction of
unpaid debt if collateral is consumer goods not in debtor's possession when debtor consents
to acceptance); id.§ 9-620(e) (forcing secured party to dispose of consumer goods in its
possession if significant payments have been made); id. § 9 - 6 20(g) (prohibiting secured party
from accepting collateral in partial satisfaction of unpaid debt in consumer transaction).
456. See id.
§ 9-628(c).
457. See id.
458. See id.§ 9-628 cmt. 2.
459. Id. § 9-625(c)(2). This provision is discussed supra notes 361-89 and accompanying
text.
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section 9-616 to timely send a written calculation of a surplus or deficiency
to a debtor or a consumer obligor.46° However, the secured party remains
liable for "damages in the amount of any loss" caused by its noncompliance 46 1 and, in appropriate situations, may be assessed a $500 penalty.462
Second, a secured party cannot be liable for the minimum statutory
'463
penalty "more than once with respect to any one secured obligation.
For example, if a secured party fails to send a disposition notice to the
debtor and a secondary obligor 464 and then sells the collateral in a manner
not commercially reasonable, 465 it cannot be required to pay the minimum
statutory penalty four times (two breaches, two parties). But can the secured party be forced to write two checks-one to the debtor and another
to the secondary obligor? 466 Probably not. (So who is entitled to the single
check? 467) The language in the statute ("once with respect to any one
secured obligation") and the relevant comment ("Subsection (e) ensures
that a secured party will incur statutory damages only once in connection
with any one secured obligation. ' 468) suggests that a secured party is liable
"once per transaction" rather than "once per person per transaction."
Furthermore, the phrase "not liable to any person" in the preceding subsection 469 strongly implies that the drafting committee appreciated the
difference in meaning between "once per transaction" and "once per person per transaction." Nevertheless, that interpretation seems wrong, especially if a debtor and a secondary obligor can establish a violation
unique to itself 47 ° for which actual damages do not exceed the statutory
penalty. To adequately compensate multiple parties that each suffer unique
injuries, while also providing the secured party with an incentive to comply
with its statutory duties, subsection (e) should be interpreted in a manner
that obligates a secured party to pay the statutory penalty no more than
''once per person per transaction" rather than "once per transaction."
And if the statutory language of revised section 9-628 and its accompa460. See U.C.C. § 9-628(d); see also id. § 9-625(c) (stating that minimum statutory damages
may be awarded"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in Section 9-628").
461. Id. § 9-625(b).
462. See id. § 9-625(e)(5), (6).
463. Id. § 9-628(e).
464. See id. § 9-611 (c)(1), (2) (obligating a secured party to send a disposition notice to the
debtor and any secondary obligor).
465. See id. § 9-610(b) (requiring all aspects of a disposition to be commercially reasonable).
466. This question was posed in the Zinnecker Memorandum, supra note 33, at 5.
467. To avoid answering that question, the secured party may wish to deposit the appropriate amount with the court and bring an interpleader action against all potential claimants.
468. U.C.C. § 9-628 cmt. 4.
469. See id. § 9-628(d).
470. For example, the secured party may breach the peace while repossessing a vehicle
from the debtor (creating a cause of action under revised § 9-609 in favor of the debtor) and
then may fail to send a disposition notice to the guarantor (creating a cause of action under
revised § 9-611 (c)(2) in favor of the guarantor).
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nying comments discourage such an interpretation, legislatures may wish
to consider the following non-uniform amendment (new language italicized): "(e) A secured party is not liable to any person under Section 9625(c)(2) more than once with respect to any one secured obligation."
At one time or another, the drafting committee considered two additional exculpatory provisions. One proposed provision relieved a secured
party from liability for the minimum statutory penalty if the secured party
established that its noncompliance resulted from an unintentional goodfaith error.4 71 Another provision capped a secured party's liability for the
minimum statutory penalty in a class action or series of class actions arising
out of the same noncompliance (e.g., its standard disposition notice sent
to multiple parties in numerous transactions contains a seriously misleading error).472 Unfortunately for secured creditors, neither provision
survived the final cut; both were deleted as part of the "consumer
473
compromise.1

CONCLUSION
Professor Elizabeth Warren once wrote: "[d]efault is a distasteful idea
.... Getting the money paid is a matter of course, or of honor, or-if it
474
Distasteful or not,
should come to that-of grubby technical steps."
defaults do occur. For that reason, secured parties, debtors, other obligors,
and their respective counsel should be familiar with the revised default
provisions (which often are "technical" and, in places, perhaps even

"grubby").

§ 9-627(d) (Draft Oct. 1996). The proposed provision read as follows (brackets
471. See id.
in original):
(d) A secured party is not liable to any person under Section 9-624(c) if the secured
party meets the burden of establishing that its failure to comply with this [part] [article]
was not intentional and resulted from a good-faith error notwithstanding the secured
party's maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the failure. [Examples
of a good-faith error include clerical, calculation, computer malfunction and programing, and printing errors, except that an] [An] error of legal judgment concerning the
secured party's rights and duties under this [part] [article] is not a good faith error.
Id. Draft § 9-624(c) was a predecessor of revised § 9-625(c)(2). The provision was based on
the bona fide error defense in the Truth-in-Lending Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (1994).
472. See U.C.C. § 9-627(e) (Draft Aug. 7, 1997). The proposed provision read as follows:
(e) The total recovery under Section 9-624(c) in a class action or a series of class actions
arising out of the same noncompliance by the same secured party shall not be more
than the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the net worth of the secured party.
Id. Draft § 9-624(c) was a predecessor of revised § 9-625(c)(2).
473. See id.§ 9-627 (Draft Mar. 1998) (deleting the good-faith error defense to statutory
damages and the limitation on recoveries in class actions); see also supra note 168 (discussing
the"consumer compromise").
474. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 779 (1987).
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Although the revised default provisions may not be embraced with unbridled enthusiasm by all interested parties in every post-default situation,
the provisions do constitute a notable improvement in the law. The provisions specifically address many current concerns, provide detailed procedures that should provide clarity and reduce litigation, expand the postdefault rights available to the secured party, and attempt to fairly balance
the desires of foreclosing creditors and the interests of debtors and thirdparty claimants. Because the provisions are quite extensive and introduce
several new terms (or utilize current, but redefined, terms), the significance
of the improvement may best be appreciated by taking an exhaustive
statutory journey Hopefully this Article will serve as a welcome traveling
companion.
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